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A developmental agenda of economic growth and 
modernisation, together with the ideal of democratisation, has 
guided and shaped efforts to expand and promote the use of 
the Internet in Mexico. Such efforts, while taking for granted 
the functionality of this technology for enabling political 
participation, ignore the Internet’s provenance and pitfalls. 
Situating such omissions within the context of Mexico’s 
colonial heritage, the thesis questions: what is the Internet 
doing in Mexico and how is it related to coloniality? And how 
has an alternative politics and use of the internet been 
practiced in Mexico considering this context of coloniality? 
With a decolonial orientation and drawing on the insight from 
Science and Technology Studies that understands 
technological objects as structured in particular ways to 
achieve particular interests, the thesis analyses the Internet’s 
design in the United States and three prominent cases of 
Internet use for intended national transformation in Mexico: 
Enrique Peña Nieto’s digitisation policy, #YoSoy132 
mobilisations and the Zapatista insurgency. This analysis is 
developed through the thesis’ central concept of ‘coordination 
without politics’, meaning that collective coordination and 
experience are possible when mediated by an external third 
party, which hinders the emergence of embodied political 
experiences. This concept is drawn from Giorgio Agamben’s 
approach to instrumentality and the political and oriented by 
and toward the Zapatista political experience, the latter which 
works as a contrasting case as it embodies the concept of the 
political in relation to technology. The thesis argues that rather 
than a greater degree of political participation the use of the 
Internet in Mexico has primarily served to reproduce this 
technology’s embedded forms of coloniality as an instrument 
of coordination without politics, which is only intelligible 
through the inclusion of a decolonial element in critical and 
philosophical approaches to the internet. The Zapatistas on 
the contrary and so far, have not only countered such forms of 
coloniality/instrumentality but also, regarding Maya cosmology 
and the practice of intersubjectivity, contribute to our 
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Mexico was one of the first countries to establish an Internet connection for scientific 
research and development reasons (Koenigsberger, 2014) and recently its 
government set digitisation´s national expansion as a state priority (EDN, November 
2013). The use of the Internet in Mexico has expanded reaching an estimate of 71.3 
million users (or 63.9% of 6-year-old and older population) in 2017 (INEGI, 2018). 
Internet users have been identified as mainly 18 to 34-year-old men in cities, with a 
very limited number of users (14%) among the population in rural areas. Such a 
scenario has become an important referent for a development agenda that entwines 
technology with economic growth, electoral democracy and modernisation, assuming 
that rural communities need to develop and thus to have access to the Internet. On 
such a basis, by 2013 Internet access and universal digital inclusion had already 
been included in Article 6 of the Mexican Constitution as a right the Mexican state has 
the obligation to guarantee and fulfill. In general, developmentalism has explicitly 
pervaded the scope of the Mexican government’s national policies regarding the 
Internet. Particularly, these policies have promoted efforts to transform several 
sectors of public administration as a matter of modernisation and to address the 
digital divide. The prevailing idea is that the Internet plays as an equalizer rather than 
a complex set of interactions that also produces and reproduces inequalities.  
 
In addition to the above, the use of the Internet for activism in Mexico has been 
mainly interpreted both by activists and scholars through the accomplishments of 
organisation and the potential of technologies as a tool for protest and a basis for 
democracy. In such a democratising tone, any systematic engagement with the 
Internet’s drawbacks has been put aside. Moreover, neither government policies nor 
widespread activism have spurred a questioning of the Internet as a technology–its 
historical constitution, embedded values and political economy with an origin in a 
different geography (e.g. Andión, 2013; Avalos, 2014; Bartra, 2014; Candón Mena, 
2013; Feixa and Portillo, 2012; Goggin and Albarrán, 2014; Gómez and Treré, 2014; 
Portillo, 2014; Reguillo, 2012; Rivera, 2014; Rovira, 2012, Treré, 2015, 2013). In both 
cases, a lack of sensibility toward those excluded by and from the expansion of the 
	 2	
Internet has led to a lack of systematic enagagement with this technology’s 
underside. 
 
Regarding the margins of Mexican society, where originary peoples’ traditions, 
practices and understandings, along with self-determination, have been for centuries 
unintelligible to colonialism, modernity and developmentalism, inquiry into the causes 
of such unintelligibility and the effects the Internet has in this sector has been 
overshadowed by the assumption that what these peoples need is to have access to 
this technology. Along these lines the Internet has been part of either democratic or 
economic agendas all across the world, where those deemed as ‘underdeveloped’, 
‘Third World’ or ‘developing’ countries struggle to keep up to the pace of 
connectedness. Unfortunately, this development agenda ignores political and cultural 
difference and issues like sovereignty and autonomy, tending to reproduce foreign 
interests and ethnocentric visions and practices that have foreclosed critical 
engagement originating from communities’ own political and historical experience. 
Originary peoples in Mexico, as many other groups, have thus already been excluded 
as members of a Mexican society by the same development agenda that puts forth 
the Internet as indispensable for economic growth, transparency, democracy and 
modernity. That is, the same orientation that guides the expansion of the Internet is 
the one that has been product of Mexico´s colonial heritage. In such a context, this 
thesis sets out the question: what is the Internet doing in Mexico and how is it related 
to coloniality? And how has an alternative politics and use of the internet been 
practiced in Mexico considering this context of coloniality?  
 
To illustrate the situation, in November 2017, at the run-up to the presidential 
elections in Mexico, the Nahua1 candidate (first indigenous woman to be presidential 
candidate in this country) María de Jesús Patricio and her supporters struggled to 
comply to the requirements set by the National Electoral Institute (INE) for the register 
of signatures required to get the candidate´s name on the ballot. The register of 
signatures, as agreed and established by the INE was to be done through a digital 
application that required minimum equipment and broadband specifications in order 
to run and update the application software and upload the data. As the main support 
for Patricio comes from originary communities where the majority of the population 
has no everyday technical experience and lives below the poverty line (a product of 
centuries of exploitation and discrimination), access to required mobile phones with 
updated Operating System versions and minimum technical specifications, let alone 
Internet connection or simply electric power, represented a privilege that indicates the 
																																																								
1	Nahua is one of 64 indigenous groups in Mexico.	
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limitations and short-sightedness of such a democracy promotion institution (Gil, 
2017a, 2017b). On the contrary to a foreign reality’s assumption of an ‘everyday 
technical experience’ (Feenberg, 2010: 203) of the Internet, or a citizenship ready to 
make a democratic use of it (see Bakardjeva, 2009), the problem in Mexico is that for 
many of those communities and for the vast majority of their members there is no 
such experience, even if state institutions and a spreading digitisation of modern life 
neglect this fact or reduce it to a gap in ‘development’ or a digital divide.  
 
As Enrique Dussel (1996) has claimed, underneath, and supporting the so-called gap 
in development, lies the division between the owner of capital and the owner of labor, 
a division that as a ‘point of departure is not something natural. It is a historical point 
of arrival’ (Dussel, 1996: 224). This assertion means that for ‘Latin America, a 
continent of "[the] poor," just as with Africa and Asia, this question is central, 
essential. The "poverty" of our continents is not a point of departure (due to some 
uncongnizable [sic] self-incurred immaturity), but the point of arrival of five centuries 
of European colonialism (within the world system, in which the United States is today 
hegemonic)’ (Dussel, 1996: 224). Eurocentric institutions, though persistently 
unaware of their own role at an international and political economic level, 
systematically underpin enduring exploitation structures. In the instance of Patricio as 
presidential candidate, beyond the critique that the INE has been subjected to in 
terms of enacting racist, elitist and inefficient parameters of participation, and beyond 
any possible interpretation regarding a digital divide that needs to be surpassed, the 
main problem does not seem to be these communities’ lack of access to services or 
the INE´s lack of sensibility and biased and exclusionary attitude and decision-
making.  Without dismissing the latter, but retaining its significance beyond the blunt 
terms in which they have been put, the problem is not a ‘development’ one, either in 
technological or democratic official and institutional terms. The problem in this case 
goes 500 years back and persists in the form of ongoing discrimination of practices 
and knowledges that is not only embedded in the Mexican state institutions and 
everyday life practice in Mexico but also, as we will see, in many of Western 
democratic ideals regarding technological practices. 
 
On the contrary to a developmentalist view, what Mexico exhibits is the persistence of 
exclusion and violence only associated on a political and ontological level with the 
absence and selective presence of technology, the latter which refers in this thesis to 
a being that is not of itself and is not valued on itself as its own mode of being but 
exists only to the extent that it serves another being. This understanding is significant 
as it considers the value of beings, making visible how those beings deemed as 
technology are constructed in dependency to another being’s purpose, making 
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intelligible a difference between western and some non-western worlds like those of 
many originary peoples in Mexico, the latter in which the consideration from the 
outset of beings as existing to fulfil one’s exclusive purposes contradicts their 
cosmogonies, cosmologies and philosophies. Therefore, Mexico exhibits a 
denaturalisation of technological devices in everyday life out of economic 
discrimination but, more importantly, cultural and political difference. As a scientific, 
democratic or governmental instrument, the use of the Internet has become 
increasingly important under the banner and frameworks of scientific and economic 
development. As a prerequisite towards participation in presidential elections the 
Internet appears as a constraint and a determinant to political life, which we must 
consider entails not a persisting ‘development’ gap but the abuse and disparity of 
wealth extraction and distribution and the dismissal of other ways of life and 
knowledges. Such are the same considerations that have lacked further analysis in 
the instance of Mexico and which have significant implications in both the 
understanding and practice of politics. 
 
When thinking of the use of the Internet for activism, democracy and national 
development in Mexico, politics has been understood technically, in terms of 
organisation, negotiation, confrontation, and participation within an assumed global 
context of either mobilisations or economic development. Regarding demonstrations 
where youth dissent and commitment have been notable features (see Avalos, 2014; 
Chapter 5 in this thesis) attracting academic attention, scholars have linked these 
demonstrations to other movements across the world, understanding them as part of 
a broader trend of social and global mobilisation (see Avalos, 2014; Feixa et. al. 
2009; Feixa and Portillo, 2012). Hashtagged and globally linked, such social 
movements have been considered as ‘new new social movements’ (Feixa et. al. 
2009) or ‘novísimos movimientos sociales’ (Candón Mena, 2013), resting on a 
technological element, combining information technologies and street mobilization 
(Avalos, 2014; Bartra, 2014; Feixa and Portillo, 2012; Portillo, 2014; Rivera, 2014) in 
a network logic for organization and action (Juris, 2008; Rovira, 2012; 2014) and as a 
form of tecnopolítica (Toret, et al., 2013).  
 
Such an idea of tecnopolítica is based on a Spanish context of activism and its 
understanding of technology and politics (see Treré and Barranquero Carretero, 
2018); however, it has been quite influential in Mexico. This approach refers to a ‘new 
kind of self-organized collective political behaviour’ (author’s translation, Ibid: 9), in 
which digital technologies are central to a ‘connected multitude’ that is all about the 
‘capacity to connect, group and synchronize, through communication and 
technological devices and around objectives, the brains and bodies of a great number 
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of subjects in time, space, emotion, behaviour and languages sequences’ (author’s 
translation, Toret et. al., 2013: 20). The approach emphasises ‘the fact that there is 
no multitude without connection’ (Ibid), what, despite the limitations of the concept to 
explain the phenomenon, was emblematically embodied in Mexico in the #YoSoy132 
mobilisations that took place in 2012 and, as analysed in Chapter 6, were only 
possible thanks to the mediation of the Internet, using the Internet to promote the 
Internet and official democratic and development institutions. 
 
Tecnopolítica as a theoretical and practical approach, and as exemplified in the social 
mobilisation #YoSoy132 analysed in this thesis, upholds that networked or Internet-
based technologies enhance political organisation and activism, assuming a political 
sphere, a technological object and a technologically mediated social reality. 
Accordingly, within this concept of tecnopolítica there has been no questioning either 
of the meaning of politics or the historicity of technological design. On the contrary, 
there has been an ‘extension’ of this conception to the ‘Latin American context’ (Treré 
and Barranquero Carretero, 2018: 50), mainly to so-called ‘Latin American’ scholars 
analysing recent social mobilisations and reiterating the same assumptions and 
categories of politics and technology. As a result, the Internet has remained the ‘black 
box’ that helps explain the events but is never analysed in detail (McCarthy, 2017: 5), 
let alone on an international and world politics level. Besides the clear notion of 
informatics as crucial to globalising capitalism and its 4th World War, the current war 
‘against humanity’ as termed by Subcommandante Marcos (1999) of the Ejercito 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN, Zapatista Army of National Liberation) 2, no 
historical or political analysis of this ‘technology’ has been made in relation to its own 
historical and political (and ontological) consistency and the way in which it 
encounters difference across the world.  
 
While taking for granted the politicisation of the Internet through development and 
democratisation, scholars, activists and government have ignored this technology’s 
provenance and pitfalls, which are then exposed when this technology encounters 
other forms of being, doing and thinking in a multicultural country like Mexico. Such 
omissions risk reproducing discrimination on the basis of colonial distinctions between 
those who are deemed superior and more developed according to race, knowledge 
and possession and those who are deemed inferior, primitive or underdeveloped. But 
also, these ommisions sanction a technologically mediated everyday experience over 
a myriad of non-technological possibilities reduced to the impossible. In this light, the 
																																																								
2 In this account each World War is determined first, by conquest and reorganization of the territory; 
second, by the destruction of an enemy; and third, by the administration of the conquered and 
obtention of benefits. The 3rd World War corresponds to the Cold War and the 4th World War to the 
current war ‘against humanity’ (Subcomandante Marcos, 1999). 
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thesis’ main contribution is to position the importance of the colonial element in 
relation to politics and technology in the analysis of the current expansion of the 
Internet, destabilising any taken for granted notions of an everyday technical 
experience in non-Western countries. Such a contribution entails questioning where 
the Internet is coming from and what political effects the particular way in which it has 
been structured has when implemented in a country like Mexico. In addition, it means 
that the use of the Internet can reproduce forms of colonial discrimination and control, 
which is contrary to influential actors’ (for instance the Mexican government’s 
digitisation policy and emblematic activist groups like #YoSoy132) assumption that 
the Internet means a greater degree of political participation.  
 
On such basis, this thesis follows a decolonial orientation and engages with 
decolonial border thinking (Anzaldúa, 1987; Mignolo, 2011; Mignolo, 2018), which 
means inhabiting different worlds at once, dwelling in the border or being-in-between 
worlds and able to delink from abstract universalisms and those epistemologies that 
‘make sense of, justify, and legitimize coloniality’ (Mignolo, 2018: 14). Therefore, this 
thesis has been motivated by first-hand experience of the imposition, penetration and 
expansion of the Internet throughout a multiplicity of social interactions and spaces, 
which has taken place and is situated in-between Western practices like the 
university, state institutions and law, on the one hand; and on the other, traditions and 
practices linked to originary peoples’ cosmology like agriculture, language and 
gastronomy. In other words, the thesis unfolds from the perspective of someone who 
lives in-between Western and non-Western forms of being, thinking and doing, and is 
trying to think of the political effects of the Internet through both forms, in terms of 
concepts coming from a decolonial orientation which engages both with western 
concepts but with conscience of its colonial forms, and with non-Western forms of 
doing and thinking. 
 
Regarding everyday technical experience and the Internet, social exclusion has been 
experienced by the author of this thesis in diverse spaces like school, the office and 
the household due to the penetration of the Internet, although not dwelling in the 
social and economic margins of Mexican society. Not having access to online 
information or having limitations due to outdated equipment as a student or being 
excluded from job offers and social activities for not having a social media account, let 
alone the discomfort and mistrust this generates among users and their behaviour 
toward the non-user, are only examples of how avoiding Internet-based interaction 
can have further implications within an expanding regime of appearance and an 
accelerated rhythm and increased intensity of information and commodities flows and 
imperatives. Moreover, witnessing the emergence and expansion of social media 
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platforms in Mexico has given a clear view of how US cultural products (e.g. 
parameters of socialisation, visibility, use of language and valorisation) permeated a 
society that to some important extent had been critical of US culture and values. Such 
platforms were observed as they fostered old and new discrimination practices like 
the ones illustrated with Patricio’s experience. In this light, this thesis seeks to put 
together a different approach to the implications of using the Internet in a country 
where the imperative of development and economic growth has been insensitive to 
and tried to govern difference along the lines of its colonial heritage, while this 
development imperative unfolds as the main driver of Internet access expansion. In 
order to do so, this theis draws not only on Western categories seeking to provide 
contributions to Western knowledge production but is also situated in-between and 
drawing upon non-Western categories that correspond to Maya cosmology and 
practice and are grouped within the concept of intersubjectivity referring to the 
Zapatista experience of using the Internet (see Chapter 7).  
 
From within Western academia, this thesis looks at important contributions to 
understanding the relation between technology and world politics. Recently, 
approaches like those of Social Construction of Technology (SCoT), Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT), the Critical Theory of Technology (CTT) and new materialist and 
posthumanist approaches have emerged as ‘fusions of Science and Technology 
Studies and International Relations’ (McCarthy, 2017). As such, these approaches 
have been grouped as Science and Technology Studies in International Relations 
(here abbreviated as STS-IR). Among such approaches, Critical Theory of 
Technology in IR (CTT-IR) and Social Construction of Technology in IR (SCoT-IR) 
are considered in this thesis as important in-depth approaches to technology within a 
Western perspective. Such approaches account for the world political scenario in 
relation to a globalising political economy and the enduring historical structures and 
values embedded in technological artefacts, including the social, political, economic 
and cultural dynamics that have shaped technological design. Such emphasis on the 
interests, values and historicity of technological design is crucial in this thesis to 
understand the Internet as a technological object within the horizon of Western 
intelligibility and cultural matrix. However, these approaches have some limitations in 
analyzing and understanding the implications of technology in countries that were 
colonized and still have a non-Western heritage. Therefore there is a need to explore 
the provenance and history of the Internet, understand its design and embedded 
forms and functions (Chapters 3 and 4) on the basis of a critical engagement with the 
limitations of STS-IR in analyzing and understanding radically different practices,3 
																																																								
3  In addition to CTT-IR, alternatives to the ‘politicisation’ or ‘re-politicisation’ of information 
technologies from a post-structural perspective have emphasized the constitution of subjects, time and 
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practices that are exterior to a sociotechnical reality and/or in countries that were 
colonized and still have a strong non-Western heritage (Chapter 2). 
 
Notably, regarding STS-IR, while questions of ambivalence, or constraints and 
opportunities that come with technology in Mexico, could be addressed through the 
contributions of Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) and Critical Theory of 
Technology (CTT) approaches, there is a clear limitation in terms of its trend towards 
enclosing technology within a line of development and progress in time (see Chapter 
2), which assumes a subject capable of repurposing technology and thus the non-
deterministic character of technology. This line of development dismisses situations in 
which some groups in different geographies (and timelines), and with different 
metaphysics and ontologies, cannot influence or participate in repurposing technology 
simply because they do not speak the same language as its designers (either 
informatics, English or Spanish) and they do not share their culture and practices, 
which are then being imposed on them in the form of a sociotechnical reality and 
democratic participation. Participating in repurposing technology would mean to 
embrace a sociotechnical reality they do not share, becoming literate in foreign 
practices and contravening these communities’ way of life. On the other hand, not 
participating means fostering, in a straightforward manner, the persistence of the 
motif of (scientific, technological and/or economic) development and its ethnocentric 
rhetoric that considers these groups as immature or backward (even in terms of their 
alleged lack of so-called democratic participation). 
 
Considering the limitations and contributions of CTT-IR and STS-IR in Chapter 2, 
considering coloniality and moving towards the inclusion of a decolonial element is 
necessary as it acknowledges that there is no modernity without coloniality and that 
‘modernity, capitalism and coloniality are aspects of the same package of control of 
economy and authority, of gender and sexuality, of knowledge and subjectivity’ 
(Mignolo, 2010: 9). In this direction, as political ecology has unfolded a global 
perspective cognizant of the problematics brought by climate change in the so-called 
Anthropocene, it has also drawn attention to the socio-technical networks that 
underpin such transformations at a geological scale (Hornborg, 2001, 2015). Global 
																																																																																																																																																																													
space in relation to information technologies and how they operate (e.g. Barassi, 2015; Hintz, 2015; 
Kaun, 2015; Reid, 2009). However, those alternatives have not paid greater specific attention to what 
politics mean and the historical design and development of technology, in this case the Internet, in 
relation to how subjects, time and space are constituted. For instance, in the case of Julian Reid, 
(2009), although his critique of connectivity greatly contributes to understanding how subjects are 
categorized and ruled under the Connected-Disconnected distinction, his main focus has been on 
connectivity (although under a differential lens) and politics or the political as a category itself has not 
been explicitly addressed. In turn, CTT-IR, building on Social Construction of Technology (SCoT) and 
Andrew Feenberg´s (1991, 2002) Critical Theory of Technology, mainly focus on the historicity of 
technology and explicitly state its concern about ‘politicizing technology’ as a research guideline. 
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assemblages of artefacts appear within such approaches and analyses as matter of a 
highly inequitable world-system (Hornborg, 2001, 2015: 59). From this perspective, 
‘the steam engine… was made possible not only by James Watt’s engineering, but by 
the eighteenth-century world-system in which capital accumulation in Britain was 
based on African slave labor and depopulated American land’ (Hornborg, 2016: 17). 
 
Technology then, understood as profoundly intertwined with capitalism and coloniality 
(Hornborg, 2001, 2015, 2016), has triggered a process of epistemological, ontological 
and practical attention towards embedded forms of coloniality, combining political 
ecology and decoloniality with a ‘pluriversal view of more-than-human ontologies’, the 
latter which has meant advocating non-western forms of knowing and doing as 
referents of critique (Schultz, 2017: 135). Through decolonial critique, the persistent 
relation between coloniality (and neocolonial appropriation), capitalism (western 
industrialisation) and technology is considered without dismissing other forms of life 
and trajectories of knowledge.  
 
Still, no decolonial critique has addressed the specificities of the Internet. Important 
contributions to the understanding of colonialism through technological 
implementations and informatics (e.g. concentration of infrastructure, data ownership, 
centralised coding, contents and programming) have been made (Anonymous author, 
2016; Danezis, 2014; Hill, 2014; Knowledge Commons Brasil, 2014; Martini, 2017; 
Simmons, 2015; Soundararajan and Flanders, 2017) and technopolitical analyses 
have considered how technological systems and technical knowledge provide means 
to shape countries politically, economically, socially and culturally (Hecht, 2011). 
Nevertheless, coloniality as control of economy and authority, of gender and 
sexuality, of knowledge and subjectivity, and of being, has not yet been addressed as 
embedded by design in the Internet. So far, attempts to decolonise the digital 
maintain the digital as its playground, assuming its place and continuity as part of an 
assumed everyday technical experience (as analysed in Chapter 2). This thesis, in 
contrast to such decolonising efforts, upholds the consideration that diverse societies 
may require ‘not only new technological directions and designs influenced by more 
enlightened normative commitments, but also new social directions which de facto 
require less [or no] technological activity, thus less resource-concentration and 
inequity, and less environmental “turnover” consumption, and destruction’ (Wynne, 
2010: xiv, emphasis in the original).  
 
As above, there is still a lack of fundamental reassessment of coloniality as 
embedded in and entailed by technological and digital expansion through specific 
design forms, values and interests and through their being technological per se. The 
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latter means that efforts to decolonise technology and decolonise the Internet have 
promoted equality and democratisation in the use of this technology without 
questioning its constructed presence as a technological object and as a technology 
socially and politically necessary. Moreover, this technological object’s links to 
coloniality by design have been ignored. Critique has remained within the scope of 
technological development and human rights instead of providing profound inquiry 
and consideration of non-technological alternatives as a serious option for some 
political communities. In this regard, the thesis seeks to contribute to existing 
literature on decolonising the Internet by destabilising the technological object that is 
to be decolonised, recovering instead the political as experience that conditions the 
existence of such a technological object and which does not respond to pre-
established parameters exclusively set in a Western context. Therefore, the thesis 
does not engage in the formulation of decolonial digital futures but rather in a critique 
of technology and the digital that moves towards a decolonial politics in which no 
being is considered from the outset an instrument. Particularly, the thesis engages in 
understanding the complex Mexican context in which the Internet is being used, 
through an emblematic case that offers a contrast to the taken for granted 
assumptions of the politics of the Internet: The Zapatistas in Chiapas.  
 
The Zapatistas and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN by its initials in 
Spanish), an insurgency mainly composed by originary peoples (see Chapter 7) and 
with very limited access to the Internet, successfully gathered a support network that 
made it the ‘first major case anywhere’ of ‘information-age social netwar’ and 
originated in Chiapas, Mexico, in 1994 (Arquilla et al. 1998: 3). The Zapatistas have 
pointed to the peculiarity of the Internet as it has been designed within capitalist 
expansion, offering a critique of development agendas and discrimination and making 
a very specific use of the Internet. Part of a 30-year-long organisational effort toward 
national liberation and autonomy, the Zapatista use of the Internet was ‘the first 
example of the use of new technologies in favour of a resistance movement… 
[Which] generated a global virtual community’ of support (Rovira, 2003: 57, author´s 
translation) and has constituted itself as a case ‘informing contemporary social 
movements’ (Wolfson, 2012: 149). The Zapatistas were also a crucial actor 
supporting Patricio´s run for president and the task of calling upon indigenous 
peoples to organize, not toward taking power in the form of the state apparatus or 
within official models of democracy, but instead towards the flourishing of originary 
peoples and practices and the defence of the earth from exploitation, plundering and 
depletion (Dangl, 2017). With a clear idea of the place of informatics as crucial in the 
expansion of capitalism and the ongoing exploitation of peoples and the earth, the 
Zapatistas have been able to use the Internet according to their own political praxis 
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and far from prescribed models of political participation and citizenship. Their sense 
of being a community and its political unity as such has not relied on a technological 
support but on its shared horizon of an autonomous way of coexistence, collectivity 
and practices like patience, listening, and decision informed by a ‘culture of 
intersubjectivity’ that consists in considering all beings as subjects to be respected 
(Ceceña, 2004; Lenkersdorf, 2002; López, 2015). 
 
The thesis argues that the Zapatista use of the internet as a decolonial element, 
together with philosophy of technology and STS can offer respite to the problematics 
of alienation, discrimination, and fragmentation in digitalising contemporary Mexico. 
Therefore, the thesis starts its analysis with western political theory, using authors like 
Giorgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt, Michael Marder, Michel Foucault, Andrew Feenberg 
and Daniel McCarthy and their conceptual languages to parse the significance of 
what a Zapatista way of life and use can offer not only to alternative uses of the 
internet but also to alternative experiences of the political. This trajectory entails 
moving towards the epistemological inclusion of a decolonial element that also 
considers the historicity of technological design within the broader discussion on 
politics and technology. In so doing, the dissertation acts as a mediator between 
western political theory and originary peoples’ critique and what decoloniality can 
offer to critical approaches to the internet and politics. 
 
Ultimately, the Zapatista case in this thesis situates and incarnates, in relation to the 
use of the Internet, a concept of the political that is initially informed by Western 
thinkers like Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben (see Chapter 2), destabilising 
assumptions of an everyday technical experience, a pre-existing technological object, 
an imperative of modernity and development, and a pre-established political praxis. In 
this way, by also analysing the design of the Internet in its specific US context, with its 
embedded values, interests and forms of coordination, the thesis moves towards the 
inclusion of a decolonial element in understanding the use of the Internet in Mexico, 
based on the analysis of the reiteration (or not) of the Internet’s embedded values, 
interests and forms of coordination as forms of coloniality. These forms are shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6 as directly related to technological mediation of collective 
experiences in Mexico as a form of coordinating action without producing a shared 
political experience as self-government, openness and awareness of the form of 
being together of a group in intertwinement with territory.  
 
In light of the above, the thesis also contends that the use of the Internet in Mexico, 
as it has been widely enacted by government development agendas and activist 
endeavours, has been as an instrument of coordination without politics. This concept 
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denotes an instrument/being that has been shaped and works according to another’s 
end and economy, entailing a specific form of coordination and ontology but lacking a 
locally embodied shared political referent and experience. In relation to politics and 
coloniality, the instrument (as the slave did) does not participate of the definition of its 
overarching meaning and orientation but has been instead limited to unfold in the way 
it has been intended or designed to work as it is its own end. This conceptualisation 
makes visible the colonial forms embedded in both the Internet’s design and its use in 
Mexico by linking coloniality and instrumentality with a different reading of politics 
(see Chapter 2). Therefore, the concept explains first, how the Internet as an 
instrument of coordination without politics, internalises, systematizes and reiterates 
the concealment and indifference towards its overarching economy and design, 
managing on behalf of others what has been deemed by its designers as a complex 
system and environment and reproducing thus the limitations in the possibility of 
participating of the definition of this economy and its orientation (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Second, the Internet interpreted as an instrument of coordination without politics is 
understood to bring coordination and collective experience to its users in Mexico by 
reproducing this technology’s embedded values and interests without producing a 
shared political experience as openness, self-government (decision) and awareness 
of their form of being together (order and orientation) of a group in intertwinement with 
territory. Ultimately, the concept sustains the thesis’ argument that the Internet has 
been reproducing forms of coloniality in Mexico that can only be limited by territorially 
located politics like that of the Zapatistas. 
 
The Internet as an instrument of coordination without politics is interpreted in contrast 
to the particular use that the Zapatistas have made of this technology. But also, 
based on the Zapatista Maya roots, a critique of instrumentality contributes to an 
enquiry into the metaphysics of technology as a questioning of technology qua 
technology. This is a contribution to literature on the relationship between technology 
and world politics as it links the category of instrumentality to western metaphysics 
and idea of politics. In other words, such a contribution entails destabilising a pre-
established idea of politics and the assumption of an instrumental being as produced 
within a western cultural matrix. 
 
As developed throughout the chapters, the thesis contends first, that the Internet has 
been designed to manage, on behalf of others, what has been deemed by its 
designers as a complex technical and social system, expanding through simplification 
and adaption to different contexts and ideas but preserving its specific control 
foundations in capitalist values and colonial practices; the same foundations and 
management that hinder the possibility of alternative collective practices of self-
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government. The Internet, the thesis seeks to argue, has been designed in the US, 
developed according to western values and interests, and expanded across Mexico 
as an instrument of coordination without politics. That is, according to the concepts of 
instrument and politics developed here, a being that brings coordination and collective 
experience to its users by reproducing embedded values and interests decided by a 
third party but concealing its end and economy, mediating and thus excluding other 
situated and embodied political experiences.  
 
In the US, such form of coordination has been situated within strategic economic, 
scientific and military national imperatives, thus having a more stable direction that 
has benefited US national security through foreign policy and commercial expansion. 
However, in Mexico such form of coodination without politics has lacked a shared 
national orientation and has epistemologically and empirically expanded coloniality by 
reproducing and responding to foreign forms and interests of domination and control. 
On that basis, the main form of coloniality embedded in the Internet, the thesis 
contends, is that it works instrumentally, that is, it works at a distance according to 
another’s end, more generally its designers in western countries. The Internet as an 
instrument of coordination without politics, it is argued, entails coloniality in a Mexican 
context as it entails ‘thingification’ (Césire, 2000) and ‘domestication’ (López, 2015) 
from a Maya perspective. 
 
In contrast to an instrument of coordination without politics and its technologically 
mediated collective experiences, the thesis argues that the Internet has been 
politicised only when used or neglected with respect to a community´s own embodied 
mode of being and politics as shared experience and awareness of its collective self 
and existence, which necessarily traverses its intertwinement with territory. In so 
doing, the thesis makes a case for postponing the idea of the political in relation to 
technology and the Internet. The latter as the concept brings together poststructural 
approaches, the Zapatista experience in Chiapas and Maya cosmovision and 
philosophy. Additionally, the thesis contends that the notion of technology qua 
technology, of a being that is only valued as it serves another being’s end, is a 
category deeply embedded in Western metaphysics, which needs to be interrogated 
and destabilised in order to better understand the importance of a decolonial element 
in explaining and situating technology and politics. 
 
The methodological approach, as detailed below, conceives of foreign interests and 
control operating at a distance through the Internet but also ultimately situates the 
critique in Mexico’s other realities and the political experience of the Zapatistas. In 
this way, the thesis mediates between worlds from a situation of standing between 
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critical approaches to technology (CTT and STS) and the importance of decolonial 
thinking and doing. Accordingly, the argument moves from the question of digital 
dominance and control in US/Mexico to alternative embodied politics in which 
decoloniality and philosophy might converge, making sense of different voices from 
different geographies while always establishing an embodied dialogue between all the 
“human and non-human” members involved. In other words, the thesis moves from a 
liberalist politics of written constitutions to an embodied experience of politics, which 
matters as the thesis is engaged in a dialogue across worlds and an analytic effort to 
understand the instrumental and colonial forms embedded in the Internet and 
reiterated by the practice of technologically mediated collective experiences in order 
to avoid such forms.  
 
In terms of academic contributions, the thesis seeks to contribute to STS-IR 
approaches and decolonial thinking by emphasising the importance of historicity and 
global political economy in understanding the relation technology-politics in the world 
scenario without being limited to Eurocentric assumptions of modernity, technological 
development and politics. Instead, the proposal is that a critique of such assumptions 
opens up reflections in new directions. By inquiring into the cultural particularity of the 
concepts of technology and politics in prominent approaches to technology and world 
politics the thesis recovers these approaches’ interest in the historical development 
and social dynamics involved in technological design while advancing critique 
towards the inclusion of the decolonial in relation to technology and politics. 
Therefore, the thesis also contributes to decolonial literature as it has not yet 
systematically engaged in a critical approach to the particularities embedded in a 
technological device like the Internet. The latter is, as the thesis demonstrates, a 
specific Western production based on ethno-centric assumptions most often 




In order to engage in a critical analysis of the Internet in Mexico with a decolonial 
orientation, this section briefly outlines the conceptual basis of the thesis, and how it 
is used in each chapter, and explains its relation to the methods used to select and 
analyse the information and data gathered.  The aim of the methodological approach 
was to bring Western categories and authors, approaches and privileges into 
conversation with decoloniality so as to see what Zapatismo can bring to the analysis 
of world politics and technology, social movement analysis, STS and local non-
Western trajectories of knowledge and practice. As mentioned above, on this basis, 
the STS-IR contribution of accounting for the historicity of technological design is 
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complemented with a poststructural understanding of instrumentality and the idea of 
the political, both in turn nuanced and ultimately defined by the Zapatista experience 
and its Maya philosophical and ethical horizon.  
 
A fundamental concept to the thesis central concept of ‘coordination without politics’ 
is that of instrumentality. The Internet throughout the thesis and technology in general 
are analysed as an instrument, a being not of its own but structured in a particular 
way according to another being’s particular interests that are not only identified as 
individual ones but also as ‘anonymous strategies’ (Foucault, 1977: 202) that 
sediment interests into institutions and proceedings, operating regardless of having or 
not specific identifiable authors to whom strategies and calculation could be attributed 
to. In this regard, Chapter 2 explains what a critique of the internet as an instrument 
of coordination without politics consists of in this case, considering the limitations and 
contributions of STS-IR and the tecnopolítica approaches. The chapter explores what 
it means to be an instrument of coordination without politics and how that is the case 
of the Internet through the concepts of instrumentality (Agamben, 2015) and the 
political (Agamben, 2009; Marder, 2010; Ojakangas, 2007; Schmitt, 1996), although 
introducing a decolonial orientation in the understanding of the latter concept. The 
chapter explains the concept of coloniality and points towards the inclusion of 
decoloniality by opening up a space for a different approach to the political – one that 
is not limited to include human beings – and to the relation between technology and 
politics, bringing together a poststructural (Agamben, 2009; Marder, 2010; 
Ojakangas, 2007; Schmitt, 1996) and a Zapatista (Gelman in Ceceña, 2004), Maya-
inspired (Lenkersdorf, 1999; López, 2015), understanding of such a concept, to be 
further developed in Chapter 7.  
 
Regarding the concept of the political, this is initially understood as an experience of 
openness and encounter in which the existential affinity of those who happen to live 
together is brought about, offering spatial order and collective orientation to a group of 
people, and thus entailing a shared existential referent, sense or interpretation and 
awareness of their being together (Agamben, 2011; Gelman, 1996: 21 in Ceceña, 
2004; Marder, 2010; Ojakangas, 2007). Within this understanding, a Schmittian 
definition opens up within a Western tradition of thought an opportunity to move 
beyond and into other understandings of living together without establishing an 
insurmountable gap, which is possible due to Schmitt’s rejection of disembodied 
abstract concepts and his awareness that colonialism was not a political phenomenon 
(see Marder, 2010: 70). In turn, that other understanding of living together is the Maya 
and Zapatista experience of politics, which, although having some similarity with 
Giorgio Agamben’s (Agamben, 2015, 2009) proposal for rethinking the political from 
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within Western metaphysics, opens the possibility to include non-human beings as 
part of a political community. The two concepts of instrumentality and the political, 
based on Western conceptualisations and critique in their initial formulations, are 
brought together into the idea of an ‘instrument of coordination without politics’, which 
is used throughout the thesis to describe the Internet in its basic design, expansion 
and use in Mexico.  
 
In addition to the above, it is important to notice that Giorgio Agamben’s critique has 
not been an epistemological critique of modernity or modern epistemology but a 
philosophical one of Western metaphysics with an ethical and political proposal. 
Giorgio Agamben’s thought has always been an invitation to turn inoperative Western 
oppositions and dissociations and its mechanisms of government towards a different 
political praxis. Ultimately, the idea of an instrument of coordination without politics in 
this thesis lays the basis for a critique of the metaphysics of technology and argues 
for the inclusion of decoloniality in critical approaches to technology and politics. That 
is, a critique of instrumentality as the technological character of technology, but a 
critique that further unfolds through the Maya intersubjective approach of respect and 
recognition of all beings as being in equality and evenness (Chapter 7). In the same 
way, the idea of the political is embodied in and referred to the Zapatistas as an 
existential experience of openness and definition of a relationship among partners on 
the basis of ‘intersubjectivity’ and in contrast to ‘domestication’ (López, 2015) and 
‘thingification’ (Césaire, 2000: 42) as a clear form of instrumentality.  
 
The Zapatista use of the Internet is the analytical contrast in this thesis to other two 
cases of the use of the Internet in Mexico, which were selected due to their 
significance in promoting the use and expansion of the Internet in order to transform 
this country’s reality as a nation. The first case is former Mexican president Enrique 
Peña Nieto’s digitisation policy, which marked the overarching entrance and horizon 
of digital technologies into public administration and its inclusion as a constitutional 
right. The second case are #YoSoy132 mobilisations, the largest mobilisation 
organised and coordinated through and around digital technologies, which 
consolidated the demand of access to the Internet as a constitutional right and 
spurred optimism amongst Mexican scholars and activists about the opportunities the 
Internet brings for protest and political participation. Both cases are described through 
the concept of an instrument of coordination without politics as the technological 
mediation of collective experiences and action. 
 
An instrument of ‘coordination without politics’ means, for analytical purposes in the 
following chapters, that an instrument works within a ‘dispositive operation’ 
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(Agamben, 2015: 72) and a colonial economy that exclude other forms of being. That 
is, the instrument works according to another’s end and economy (that of the 
coloniser) and thus entails a specific form of coordination and ontology but lacks a 
locally embodied shared political referent and experience regarding the existential 
affinity of those who happen to live together. Therefore, in order to analyse and 
understand what the Internet is particularly doing in Mexico and how it is related to 
colonialism the analysis of the historical design of the Internet and the cases using 
this technology to develop and democratise the country through the use of the 
Internet is performed through the identification of a dispositif (Foucault, 1977: 197) as 
the main method. In a similar manner to theoretical accounts of multiplicity and 
compounds of heterogeneous elements (human and non-human) that have ‘aimed at 
conveying the intertwined and post-anthropocentric form of society’ (Acuto and Curtis, 
2014: 5) the current methodology considers that difference between ideas such as 
‘actor-network’, ‘actant’, ‘assemblage’ or dispositif is one ’of emphasis rather than 
kind’ (Ibid, see also Lemke, 2015). The use of dispositif analysis as method in this 
thesis is in accordance to the theoretical basis of instrumentality and the Internet as a 
form of coordination without politics (see Chapter 2) as it follows the strategic lines, 
interests, values and forms of conducting interactions between elements of the same 
instrument. Ultimately, on this basis, the difference in emphasis with other accounts is 
the need to unfold a more politically, philosophically and historically centered 
approach that puts forth a critique of instrumentality as deeply engrained in Western 
metaphysics. In identifying a dispositif as a specific disposition of things and 
heterogeneous ensemble of elements (including so-to-speak discursive and non-
discursive elements), such analysis looks ‘for the elements which participate in a 
rationality, a given form of co-ordination’ (Foucault, 1977: 197) but bringing about 
such forms paradigmatic metaphysical foundation in order to contrast in Chapter 7 
such form of coordination with the importance of the earth and autonomy for the 
Zapatistas and the intersubjective practice of its Maya roots.  
 
The analysis assesses instrumentality –the quality of a being that serves another’s 
end only to the degree that it realizes its own end and is indifferent to the overarching 
economy and the end that defines its own operation (Agamben, 2015: 70) – and 
identifies the forms of coordination or rationalities4 of government that emerge when a 
set of elements are oriented to achieve a specific goal (open to strategic 
reassessment and reordering) (Foucault, 1997b, 2007, 2008; Lemke, 2002, 2011, 
2015). This entails first, considering and elaborating on the specific form of 
instrumentality embedded in the Internet as this technology was designed in the US, 
																																																								
4 For a discussion on the specificities of the term rationality as understood by Foucault and questioned 
by Guy Le Gaufey and Jacques Allain Miller, see ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ (Foucault, 1977). 
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one that is argued accommodates diversity through fragmentation and simplification. 
On such basis, the analysis locates the main ideas, economies and strategic5 actors – 
those being able to dispose things through a specific form of coordination, design and 
expansion of the Internet in the US (Chapter 3) – in order to identify this technology’s 
overarching economy and strategic function. Regarding the latter, Chapter 4 identifies 
and analyses four forms of coordinating resources operating in and through the 
Internet –Global Connectivity, Free Internet, Personalisation of Identity and Mediation 
of Subjectification, which constitute a world-oriented expanding form of government. 
And second, the analysis entails identifying the forms of coordination deployed in the 
use of the Internet in Mexico (Mexican government’s digitisation policy in Chapter 5 
and #YoSoy132 democratisation efforts in Chapter 6) in relation to the previously 
analysed technological design and its embedded economy.  
 
Chapter 5 identifies three transversal practices that converge in the objective of 
stabilising and giving certainty to the opening and expansion of financial and 
telecommunications markets: Connectivity, Open Data and Single Digital Identity. It 
argues that the strategic orientation and purpose of the Internet and digitisation policy 
respond to foreign parameters of privatisation and expansion of financial markets. In 
so doing, it asserts, the state aims at delegating an important part of the constitution 
of its political subjects and the responsibility of engendering population ́s trust to a 
technological support defined by foreign interests and orientation. The Internet, as an 
instrument of coordination without politics, conditions the possibility of politics and 
reproduces coloniality as it remains instrumental to a foreign orientation and 
management but lacks a shared political referent and commitment.  
 
Chapter 6 analyses #YoSoy132 as a dispositif coordinated as a connected multitude, 
where technological mediation allegedly makes possible ‘the capacity of connected 
multitudes (...) to create and self-modulate collective action’ (Toret et al., 2013: 19-
21). The chapter argues that this collective formation reiterated and made visible the 
Internet as an instrument of coordination without politics. In other words, the diversity 
																																																								
5 The idea of the strategic character of such interventions can be seen either as the means employed 
and the ‘rationality functioning to arrive at an objective’ or as ‘the totality of the means put into 
operation to implement power effectively or to maintain it’ (Foucault, 2001: 346). As Lemke (2011: 44) 
mentions, a focus on government rationalities is not an excluding assessment on the gap between 
reality and programming, or a rationality and its clean enactment through technologies. On the 
contrary, this stands for an awareness of a ‘dynamic relationship’ that is possible to grasp through ´the 
strategic character of government´ and its adaptive openness and ongoing interactive transformation 
in practice (Lemke, 2011: 44). Thus, we can say that a rationality is to be found in the complex 
interaction of a multiplicity of agents, among which specific ones enjoy certain prerogatives according 
to their relative position and overview, entailing awareness of the totality of means to hand and its 
corresponding end and purpose. About a strategy without a subject - ‘so that you get a coherent, 
rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it’ 
(Foucault, 1977: 202-203). 
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of #YoSoy132 members and interests was flexibly articulated within a fragmented 
totality that was technologically mediated in communication and action, reproducing 
foreign values and interests (like free flow of information, freedom of expression and a 
free Internet according to US and Western imperatives) while concealing and limiting 
critical engagement with the extraterritorial elements embedded in this technology  
 
In Chapters 5 and 6 dispositif analysis is complemented with discourse analysis 
(Foucault, 1978, 1997; Mottier, 2005), which, although with important modifications 
and open to revision over time, also draws upon Daniel McCarthy’s (2015: 162-163) 
content-analysis guide (Appendices A and B), applied primarily to policy documents 
and public record speeches regarding the Mexican government’s digitisation policy in 
Chapter 5 and #YoSoy132 activism in Chapter 6. In this light, discourses were 
understood not in opposition to the non-discursive but as ‘specific "truth games" 
related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves’ 
(Foucault, 1997: 224). A ‘truth game’ refers not to a propositional truth but to ‘truth as 
situated, historical, and finite’, to a ‘space of self-reflection’ where meaning is 
constructed and subjects and objects are constituted (Wallenstein, 2013: 15) fostering 
particular interactions and interests through specific techniques (Foucault, 1997; 
Torfing, 2005; Mottier, 2005).  
 
The corpus in Chapter 5 consisted of 15 policy and policy-research documents 
around the National Digital Strategy (EDN in Spanish) in addition to EDN online 
content and related websites. In Chapter 6 the corpus consisted of 10 hours of 
footage produced by #YoSoy132 on issues related to the Internet in addition to the 
interviews collected in Muñoz (2012). In this regard, information on #YoSoy132 was 
complemented with open-ended interviews with members of the group (conducted in 
Mexico City in 2016) and triangulated together with public record documents and 
speeches, videos, TV programmes, and existing literature and ethnographic studies, 
for example the videos broadcast by ’TodosSomos132’ and the ethnographic work of 
Emiliano Treré (2013, 2014, 2015). The analysis of this corpus of texts acknowledges 
the conditions of production and location with respect to the collective goal 
(digitisation and development in Chapter 5 and democratisation in Chapter 6), 
focusing on the regularities concerning the Internet and pointing out commonalities in 
the production of meanings, things and practices by identifying recurring themes, 
assertions of truth and subject positions. The analysis focuses on how specific 
discourses or constructions of meaning produced, reiterated and/or transformed 
specific sets of social relations and the strategic intentions and arrangements 
supporting them (Foucault, 1978: 8; Mottier, 2005: 256-257). In other words, attention 
was paid to how different meanings were coordinated to produce a common 
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understanding and practice of the Internet, entailing specific key themes, assertions 
and locations of truth, oppositions and subjectifications; and how such constructions 
reiterated foreign parameters of instrumentality.  
  
The methodology described thus allows for the identification of the form of 
coordination and strategic functions of specific dispositions of things (Foucault, 
1997b, 2007, 2008; Lemke, 2002, 2011, 2015; Wallenstein and Nilsson, 2013) 
embedded and based on the Internet. The aim is to identify in Chapters 3 and 4 the 
values, interests and forms of coordination embedded by design in the Internet. 
Whereas in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 the analysis shows the continuity or not of this 
technology’s embedded forms of coordination. In contrast to Chapters 5 and 6, 
Chapter 7 analyses a case that allows understand the political implications of using 
the Internet in a colonial context. The chapter underlines the strategic character of the 
Internet for the Zapatistas, which has responded to a main political line of attaining 
‘tierra y libertad’ [land and liberty] instead of being the condition of possibility of 
collective practice. Further analysing the importance of territory as the earth and ‘Our 
Mother’ and with it, its politico-ontological character for the Maya peoples that 
comprise the Zapatista rebellion through the notion of intersubjectivity and the 
concept of the political, the chapter underscores territory as sign and condition of 
possibility of community life and collective practice. In so doing, it questions the stable 
presence of a technological object amongst the Zapatistas and thus the notion of 
instrumentality discussed in Chapter 2, offering a different perspective in which 
beings are other than instruments and showing how all beings are alive and should 
not be considered as being only in relation to another’s end. In other words, Maya 
philosophy can destabilise the predicative basis of technology, contributing in this way 
to the critique of instrumentality, and also, it can add to the understanding of the 
political by including non-human beings as members of a political community, 
Therefore, the Zapatista instance exemplifies what decolonial thinking and doing can 
contribute to critical approaches to technology and politics. Altogether, these chapters 
sustain the thesis’ argument that the Internet has been reproducing forms of 
coloniality in Mexico by working and expanding as an instrument of coordination 
without politics, a situation that demands the epistemological and ontological inclusion 
of decoloniality as an element of critique and/or territorially intertwined politics to limit 
the internet’s embedded forms of coordination. 
 
The general conclusion of the thesis emphasises the implications of promoting and 
using the Internet as an instrument of coordination without politics in Mexico and in 
world politics. On the basis of the preceding chapters it asserts that instrumentality 
entails by definition coloniality as domestication and thingification of beings and non-
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Western embodied politics. The conclusion also addresses some theoretical and 
practical recommendations towards the consideration of coloniality in analyses of 
technological design and use but also towards efforts and political experiences of 
decolonisation. In a world political scenario, it proposes, if politics are to be analysed 
in relation to technology, coloniality and decoloniality need to be taken into account. 
Decolonial politics, the thesis concludes, is not an embedded or intertwined element 










On coordination without politics, coloniality and decolonial 
thinking 
 
This chapter explains what a critique of the Internet as an instrument of coordination 
without politics entails. The chapter first explains the analytic limitations and 
contributions of STS-IR and tecnopolítica approaches. On this basis, the chapter then 
focuses on the idea of politics as understood by such approaches, elaborating on a 
critique of such politics as ‘someone else’s politics’ and linking the latter to the notion 
of ‘instrument’, an entity that serves another’s end only to the degree that it realizes 
its own end and is indifferent to the overarching economy and the end that defines its 
operation (Agamben, 2015). The idea of an instrument of coordination without politics 
is used to understand a being or an heterogeneous ensemble of beings that, 
indifferent, does not participate in the definition of its overarching meaning and 
orientation, which have in turn been decided and controlled by a third party as the 
instrument’s own end. An instrument of coordination without politics, it is argued in 
this chapter, internalises and reiterates the concealment and indifference towards its 
overarching economy and design, reproducing thus the limitations in the possibility of 
participating in the definition or redefinition of this economy and its orientation. On this 
conceptual basis, the Internet is analysed in the following chapters as an instrument 
of coordination without politics. 
 
In defining an instrument of coordination without politics, the chapter also emphasises 
how being cognizant of STS and CTT’s main conceptual assumptions – politics, 
politicisation and technological mediation and futures – renders STS’s attention to 
historicity and tecnopolítica limited emphasis on the technological mediation of 
‘connected multitudes’ analytically useful regarding the design of the Internet 
(Chapters 3 and 4) and its use as a form of collective coordination (Chapters 5 and 
6), respectively, as dispositives. However, in addressing these limitations, the idea of 
politics needs to be situated in relation to technology. Therefore, the chapter draws on 
Giorgio Agamben’s (2015) critique of instrumentality as part of a critique of Western 
metaphysics and as related to coloniality in Mexico in the form of ‘thingification’ 
(Césaire, 2000) and ‘domestication’ (López, 2015). In this light, the chapter develops 
a different approach to politics through the concept of the political, which combines a 
poststructural (Agamben, 2009; Marder, 2010; Ojakangas, 2007; Schmitt, 1996) and 
a Zapatista (Gelman, 1996: 21 in Ceceña, 2004), Maya-inspired (Lenkersdorf, 1999; 
López, 2015), understanding of the political (to be developed in Chapter 7), explaining 
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the concepts of coloniality and decolonial thinking in the fourth section as it argues for 
the inclusion of a decolonial element in critical approaches to the internet. In this way, 
the concept of the political emphasises the concrete and unmediated experience of 
politics rather than an abstract assumption of politics as always present in 
technologically mediated realities or everyday technical experiences. The horizon this 
chapter points to is revisiting the understanding of the political in relation to 
technology by acknowledging coloniality and by being informed by a local use of the 
Internet – the Zapatistas – in arguing for the importance of decoloniality in any critical 
assessment of this technology. On that basis, the analysis of the political implications 
of the Internet in Mexico in relation to coloniality is undertaken in the following 
chapters. 
 
2.1 Con-founding Geographies: Social Construction of Technology, Critical 
Theory of Technology and International Technological Development 
 
While questions of ambivalence – or constraints and opportunities that come with 
technology – could be addressed through the contributions of Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) and Critical Theory of Technology (CTT) approaches (grouped 
as STS-IR), there is a clear limitation in terms of an STS-IR tendency towards 
enclosing technology within a line of development in time, which assumes a subject 
capable of repurposing technology and thus the non-deterministic character of 
technology. This line of development dismisses situations in which some groups in 
different geographies (and timelines), and with different metaphysics and ontologies, 
cannot influence or participate in repurposing technology simply because they do not 
speak the same language as its designers (either informatics, English or Spanish) 
and they do not share their culture and practices, which are then being imposed on 
them in the form of a sociotechnical reality and democratic participation. Participating 
in repurposing technology would mean to embrace a sociotechnical reality they do not 
share, becoming literate in foreign practices and contravening these communities’ 
way of life. On the other hand, not participating means fostering, in a straightforward 
manner, the persistence of the motif of (scientific, technological and/or economic) 
development and its ethnocentric rhetoric that considers these groups as immature or 
backward (even in terms of their alleged lack of so-called democratic participation), in 
addition to an ongoing dispossession and concentration of resources. 
 
Social Construction of Technology approaches (considered in a broad sense) uphold 
technology as socially constructed, comprising artefacts, knowledges and practices, 
paying attention to the social interactions at stake in the process of technology 
production and emphasising the possibility of influencing the direction of technological 
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development without dismissing the way in which technology reshapes human 
activities and meanings (Bijker, 2010; Jassanof, 2004; Pinch and Bijker, 1984). In 
order to explain how a specific technological artefact is present, SCOT approaches 
have pointed out how, alongside technical considerations the historical process of 
social struggle between alternative developments is fundamental in the design 
process of technological devices, introducing different social interests and values as 
different social groups participate (Bijker, 2010; Feenberg, 2009: 80). From this 
perspective, technologies appear as processes and not merely as things, which can 
achieve ‘closure’ or ‘stabilisation’ through the standardisation of a design but are 
always subject to the flux of social forces and therefore the possibility of an alternative 
development (Bijker, 2010). For SCOT, there is no intrinsic logic of technology, no 
instrumental rationality distinct from society because society is considered according 
to ethnocentric assumptions that dismiss other societies that cannot repurpose 
technology from their own social and political praxis and thus are not present in the 
social struggle between alternative developments. Therefore, from the outset, in 
assuming there is no intrinsic logic of technology, SCOT assumes social forces are 
one and the same everywhere and there are no social groups excluded from the 
privilege of participation or who do not share a sociotechnical reality and conception 
of technology.  
 
As SCOT offers ‘a mid-range answer to the question of whether society shapes 
technology or vice versa’, considering ‘that both elements are central to the 
development of socio-technical systems at different moments in time, due to both 
“technical” and social factors’ (Manjikian, 2017: 32), these approaches still do not 
include different geographies that present different processes of social or technical 
determinism, processes in which some groups do not participate, at the same 
moment in time. Therefore, technological systems in the present thesis are not seen 
as having a ‘life cycle’ or exerting a ‘soft determinism’ (Hughes, 1987: 55) as there is 
no technological object or system and there is no subject of an abstract humanity 
(depersonalized and distant) that can be assumed in other cultural and political 
contexts as capable of repurposing such a technology unless they assimilate to a 
technological cultural matrix. While on the one hand, contractedness and 
determination appear as different phases of technological systems´ ‘life cycle’, and on 
the other, determinism appears not as ‘a natural fact, but itself the product of closure 
produced by human agents’ (Manjikian, 2017: 31), these same characterizations are 
restricted to phases in a homogeneous time and to Western metaphysics, not 
conditioned by different geographies, metaphysics and political ontologies. 
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Regarding geographies, the importance of the international and world politics has 
recently drawn on Andrew Feenberg´s (2002) Critical Theory of Technology and the 
literature on Uneven and Combined Development in relation to technological 
development (McCarthy, 2015, 2017). In the words of Daniel McCarthy (2017: 61), 
Critical Theory of Technology in IR (CTT-IR) ’represents a synthesis of critical social 
theory, Marxist historical sociology and Critical IR Theory’, and ‘IR scholarship has 
extended these approaches by considering the role that “the International” plays in 
constituting the politics of technological design and use’. Drawing upon Critical IR 
Theory, Critical Theory of Technology and Science and Technology Studies in 
International Relations, CTT-IR attends to the enduring historical structures of global 
political economy and cultural power dynamics. These studies have emphasized the 
importance of the ways in which technological objects and systems emerge in relation 
to the social and how they play in global politics. While questioning how the social 
shapes technology and vice versa has been the main subject of inquiry in SCOT 
approaches, and this task has been ‘increasingly influential in studies of world politics’ 
and has inspired and engaged IR scholars (McCarthy, 2017: 2), CTT-IR draws upon 
Feenberg´s consideration of concentration of power and resources and political 
economy structures, taking these elements further into analyses of global politics 
(McCarthy, 2015; see Peoples, 2017). However, the prevailing question has been 
how to adequately theorize ‘the role of technological objects in world politics’ 
(McCarthy, 2017: 2), a matter that CTT-IR addresses mainly through attending to the 
‘specific role of “the International” in processes of social development’ (Ibid).  
 
Arguing that Feenberg does not situate technology internationally and does not pay 
enough attention to political economy, Daniel McCarthy (2015) points out the 
importance of situating technology within international politics. Such a 
conceptualization of technology, drawing upon Feenberg´s CTT, considers ‘enduring 
historical social structures’ and ‘how structurally located actors are privileged in the 
design process or the social processes that impel innovation’ (McCarthy, 2015: 51). In 
addition to CTT, this emphasis affirms that ‘the International is always internal to the 
development of technological artefacts, and this imposes a cost upon actors seeking 
to resist [the] values’ embedded into these artefacts (McCarthy, 2015: 160). 
Regarding how technology operates in global politics, McCarthy considers both the 
‘central role played by the state in organizing technological development in the 
modern capitalist societies’ and ‘an element of lateral causality’, challenging the 
notion that ‘technological development is the product of political and social relations 
bounded by the nation-state, [and] foregrounding the international dimensions of the 
politics of technology’ (McCarthy, 2017: 72).  
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Within an international system that is ‘characterized by uneven and combined social 
development,’ which is to say that ‘the international’ is composed by 'multiple 
("uneven") and interacting ("combined") societies' whose social relations express 
historical structured 'forms' of agency and unequal exchange (Rosenberg, 2016: 297), 
technological objects are diffused from ‘social forces acting through – and beyond – 
advanced states… to less advanced states’ (McCarthy, 2015: 66). In this light, 
different ways of innovating in production systems entail particular combinations of 
national and local institutions and values. The interactions established on an 
international level are not exclusively mediated by the state but also have a ‘lateral’ 
causality where relations of production or ‘class struggle between capital and labour 
and between capitalists in different states’ shape the particular development of 
technologies (McCarthy, 2017: 75). 
 
CTT-IR consequently has made many contributions to the understanding of the 
international and global politics of technology. This approach constitutes a crucial 
point of departure for an assessment of how some states and private actors influence 
and constrain the possible actions of other states and private actors, everytime they 
comply with the imperative of technological development. Regarding the Internet, this 
approach helps to understand the historicity of this technology that, biased and 
sometimes ambivalent, conditions other states and societies. Such an account 
compels us to analyse the cultural, economic and social intricacies embedded in each 
technological assemblage.  
 
However, the approach outlined above has limited explanatory reach regarding the 
possibilities for understanding the political implications of technology in colonised 
contexts and in this case the Internet in the margins of modernity, or more precisely, 
in the margins of other political praxes that should not be defined by its relation to 
modernity. In other words, attention to global political economy and enduring 
historical social structures, also considering cultural power, allows CTT-IR for ‘a more 
fine-grained appreciation of technological development within a complex, 
differentiated and multilinear modernity’ (McCarthy, 2017: 72). Regarding U&CD, as 
McCarthy (2017) points out: 
 
A state, of course, exists within a system of states. The presence of multiple 
political communities shapes the politics of technology in manifold ways… Briefly, 
political communities develop economically and technologically at different rates: 
they develop unevenly. As advanced technological objects are created, they 
spread throughout the international system, compelled by security competition, 
emulation and coercion, among other processes. Once social norms, political 
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institutions and technological objects diffuse, they combine within ‘backward’ 
states to create new social forms (McCarthy, 2017: 73).   
 
Despite recognizing a multiplicity of political communities, their influence on the 
interpretation of the politics of technology and modernity as complex, differentiated 
and multilinear, modern technological development and capacities remain the main 
focus and the point of departure and measure for differentiating processes. As 
pointed out by Enrique Dussel (1996), political economy is fundamental in criticising 
this notion of development and differentiating the “Latin-American” horizon from that 
of Europe and US’ present. In other words, ‘the International’ conditions actors 
according to social property relations and the broader structures of global political 
economy in case these actors want to challenge other group´s technological 
capacities on the same level of competition–playing the same game rules, be it the 
marketplace or a nationalist endeavour to counter military capacities or even the 
same everyday technical practice as users. The instrumentality of technology is 
consolidated as opportunities to develop depend on a group’s capacity to repurpose 
technology through combination within the imperative of technological deveopment.  
 
The same limitation is reiterated once technology becomes the starting point to 
distinguish, even if not in a normative way (see McCarthy, 2017: 73), ‘advanced’ 
(developed) from ‘backward’ (underdeveloped) states (see also Manjikian, 2017: 34, 
in terms of primitive and modern see Feenberg, 2010: 109, 208). The consideration of 
global political economy in SCOT, CTT and CTT-IR still lacks a critique of 
technological development as technological and as developmental in terms of its 
failure to consider different ways of life. In this way, and as detailed below, politics is 
constrained to an ethnocentric consideration in which the politicisation of technology 
has to attain the parameters of industrial or productive development at the level of 
design and Western forms of democratic participation. Thus, U&CD and the 
international help explain in good detail one half of the situation, regarding the design, 
development and diffusion of the Internet: its historicity. Nevertheless, they do not 
explain a differential process of politicisation that emerges in the threshold between 
other political praxes and capitalism and modernity, which is not prone to be reduced 
to a centrist motion of development either capitalist or modern but expressing its own 
dynamics and reluctance to be explained through the lens of someone else´s reality 
and politics.  
 
The following section elaborates on the limitations of STS, CTT and tecnopolítica 
theorisations in accounting for other experiences of the political. The latter 
approaches assume the meaning and practice of politics and its relation to 
	 29	
technology. Nevertheless, they ignore how such assumptions hinder other situated 
political experiences from emerging, and thus diffuse technology as an instrument of 
coordination without embodied, situated and local politics. 
 
2.2 The politics of technology, democratisation and an everyday technical 
experience as someone else’s politics 
 
In CTT and SCOT approaches in general, politics has appeared in the form of 
interests (e.g. Herrera, 2002) and values that are embedded into technological 
artefacts which shape and constrain how the object appears and how it might be 
used, expanding its political effects through reiterating specific uses, values and 
interests (Bijker, 2010; Bijker et al. 1987; Herrera, 2002, 2003; Manjikian, 2017: 32, 
McCarthy, 2017). Such is the case as well of radical constructivisms, where the 
meaning of a technology cannot be reduced to its materiality and ‘values (in this case, 
politics) are imputed to an artifact in the course of their apprehension, description and 
use’ (Woolgar and Grint, 1995: 291, in Manjikian, 2017: 32). Assuming politics as 
values and interests, politicizing technology appears first as a matter of embedding 
the interests of a group (be it the majority or a minority) into technological objects, and 
so shaping these objects according to the group´s set of purposes or main purpose. 
Then, politicising technology appears as ‘showing hidden political dimensions, putting 
issues on the political agenda, opening issues up for political debate… Technology is 
socially (and politically) constructed; society (including politics) is technically built; 
technological culture consists of sociotechnical ensembles’ (Bijker, 2010: 72). 
 
This way of thinking of politics and politicization is one that takes for granted the 
existence of a technological culture and a technical experience. Even in the case of 
CTT, politics and politicization in relation to the Internet remain within the framework 
of Western politics as democratic governance. For instance, Feenberg (2014: 110) 
defines ‘technical codes’ as ‘the rule under which a type of artefact or a whole domain 
of artefacts is designed’, translating ‘worldviews and interests into technical 
specifications that can be implemented by engineers or other experts. The translation 
hides the social origin and significance of the codes behind a veil of technical 
necessity’ (Feenberg, 2014: 110).  In keeping with the idea of politicization in SCOT 
approaches, Feenberg affirms that ‘the task of critique is to reverse the process and 
reveal that origin and significance’, then informing democratic agency (Ibid: 110, 122). 
More specifically, the politics of the Internet from Feenberg´s (Feenberg and Friesen, 
2012; Feenberg, 2014) perspective of ‘critical constructivism’ refers to the democratic 
agency that potentially inhabits the Internet in the form of online communities as an 
expansion of the public sphere (see also Bakardjeva, 2008 for an individualized 
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account of collective agency on the Internet). This agency is expressed through 
coordination of these groups´ demands ‘for a fuller representation of participant 
interests’ into ‘new forms of online politics [that even] extend activity in the public 
sphere to technical issues formerly considered neutral and given over to experts to 
decide without consultation’ (Feenberg, 2014: 120). Such understanding, applied to 
Mexico’s situation and use of the Internet would not only diffuse an ideal of public 
sphere as an abstract universal (see Grosfoguel, 2009) but would entail further 
literacy in foreign languages. Accordingly, Feenberg´s broader approach to politics 
expresses resignation about the inevitability of the persistence of the capitalist system 
(see Feenberg, 2010: 122), reiterating an assumed technological reality and technical 
experience. 
 
Critical Theory of Technology and its ‘drive’ to democratize technology (McCarthy, 
2017: 64) recognize technology´s bias, as its design and production is intended to 
favor specific interests and accomplish specific goals (Feenberg, 2002: 80-82, in 
McCarthy, 2017: 69) but reaffirms the ambivalence of every object and the 
indeterminacy of its future developments as even parts of complex technological 
assemblages can be repurposed through democratic opening and participation 
(McCarthy, 2017: 69). Therefore, the bias of technology remains someone else´s 
instrumental capacity over an object, while ambivalence appears as another group´s 
possibility of instrumentalising that object, repurposing it always as a technological 
object and remaining a technological object (see Feenberg, 2002; McCarthy, 2017). 
In CTT instrumentality persists as the technological character of technology is not 
actually questioned and as the subject of politics and such technological character 
are always already assumed. 
 
The same assumptions are present, as will be demonstrated, in the tecnopolítica 
approach diffused across Spanish and Mexican academia after the 15M mobilisations 
in Spain and #YoSoy132 in Mexico respectively. Tecnopolítica has mainly referred 
both to the use of technological networks by social movements in ‘innovative’ ways, 
and ‘to previous theorizations that emphasize either […] the emergence of a new 
political actor (usually dubbed as connected multitudes) or […] the technologically 
mediated logics of contemporary collective action’ (Treré and Barranquero Carretero, 
2018: 48). Such approaches, besides describing and promoting a new paradigm of 
interpretation in which social movements have been inspired by the network-form of 
the Internet (15M6 in Spain and those inspired by this movement) (Alcazan et al., 
																																																								
6 The 15M or Indignados was a social mobilisation claiming for institutional reforms in government, 
corporations and media to allow greater participation and accountability in Spain. 
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2012), also identified and fostered a ‘new kind of self-organized collective political 
behaviour’ (author’s translation, Toret et al., 2013).  
 
Although ultimately on the basis of a Spanish activist context and understanding of 
technology and politics (Treré and Barranquero Carretero, 2018), tecnopolítica 
accurately describes recent mobilisations in Spain and some other countries like 
Mexico. This approach accounts for how ‘movements use technology to call for and 
organize mobilizations’ (author’s translation, Toret et. al. 2013: 19) and refers to a 
specific form of coordinating movements and its members as fundamentally mediated 
by the Internet. Accordingly, this perspective, and the concept of ‘connected 
multitudes’, have tried to bridge academic interpretation and activism but have not 
elaborated on its own notion of political behaviour, thus assuming and reproducing 
pre-established Western values and norms within the tradition of liberal democracy 
and the privileges of an assumed Western subject or citizen.  
 
As above, tecnopolítica emphasises and assumes technological mediation (an 
everyday technical experience) and deems it beneficial by intertwining it with the 
constitution of a collective self and the possibility of collective action (even in those 
countries that entail the complexities of coloniality mentioned above). This approach 
draws upon the idea of a ‘network system’ as a ‘set of nodes, sometimes 
heterogeneous, with high rates of connectivity, robustness and reciprocity, whose 
structure is open and polycentric’ (Toret et. al. 2013: 19, author’s translation). In such 
a network system, networks are not only useful to ‘build up and coordinate collective 
action but, overall, to interweave the sense of their own actions and to create a 
constitutive impulse within a frame of action, thought and social structuration’ (Ibid). 
Network communications thus coordinate and constitute themselves ‘as coherent 
units, capable of modulating complex collective behaviours’ (Ibid). Tecnopolítica 
emerges then as ‘the capacity of connected multitudes, the brains and bodies 
connected to the network, to create and self-modulate collective action’, action that 
can turn digital activism into street protest (Toret et. al. 2013: 19-21, author’s 
translation).  
 
In such understanding and practice of tecnopolítica, the notion of multitude (Hardt and 
Negri, 2004; Pérez de Lama, 2007; Rheingold, 2004) and the role of digital 
technologies have been central, as the ‘connected multitude’ is about the ‘capacity to 
connect, group and synchronize, through communication and technological devices 
and around objectives, the brains and bodies of a great number of subjects in time, 
space, emotion, behaviour and language sequences’, giving accent to ‘the fact that 
there is no multitude without connection’ (Toret et. al., 2013: 20, author’s translation). 
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This approach recognises, in a limited way, that networked or Internet-based 
technologies enhance collective organisation and activism, assuming a political 
sphere, a technological object and a technologically mediated social reality. Within 
this concept of tecnopolítica there has been no questioning of either the meaning of 
politics or the historicity of technological design. On the contrary, there has been an 
‘extension’ of this conception of tecnopolítica to the ‘Latin American context’ (Treré 
and Barranquero Carretero, 2018: 50), mainly by Latin American scholars not only 
analysing recent social mobilisations and reiterating the same assumptions and 
categories of politics and technology but also organising and triggering digital activism 
(see Devichand, 2015) without questioning the provenance of such innovative uses 
and interpretations. 
 
As above, both STS and tecnopolítica approaches have taken for granted a Western 
political subject and the desirability of an everyday technologically mediated 
experience without acknowledging that the politics of technology so far enunciated 
belong to a particular and concrete situation rather than to an abstract universal to be 
found embodied in all instances. In other words, the experience, categories and 
practices that correspond to the category of the political respond to a particular 
ethnicity. In other non-Western realities such politics as assumed in relation to 
technology are someone else’s (Western) politics, both in definition and practice. 
Such politics diffuse, as further analysed in the following section, an instrumental 
mediation whose center of control and design lies elsewhere according to someone 
else’s interests. In this light and as will be demonstrated throughout the thesis, an 
instrument of coordination without politics emerges where politics and the 
politicisation of technology are assumed in non-Western situations according to 
Western ethnocentric parameters.  
 
2.3 An instrument of coordination without politics in a colonial context 
 
While politicisation in a Western context might be understood as a matter of 
negotiation and flexibility (i.e. debate, transparency, democratisation and participation 
in design and re-design), in a non-Western context like Mexico, or in-between 
geographies, a technologically mediated experience of reality entails instrumentality 
as a form of coordination without locally situated and embodied politics. The politics 
embedded in technological design are those of its designers and their cultural matrix. 
Therefore, the lack of access of some populations to the means of participation and 
basic information of the process that is technology (politics and critique in CTT), let 
alone cultural differences, forecloses the alleged democratic potentialities of 
technological objects, as such potentialities are instrumental to development or 
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subject to having someone else make a better design of the technology for those 
excluded from participation in the everyday technical experience of modernity.  
 
Drawing on such considerations, the concept of instrument and furthermore of an 
instrument of coordination without politics are analytically useful with respect to 
Mexico. Being an instrument of ‘coordination without politics’ means that technology, 
designed and used according to specific situated politics, once it traverses cultures 
and geographies, reproduces such politics in the form of an ‘economy’. In other 
words, distant interests and values respond to a distant other’s experience of politics 
and life (more it is in the case of non-Western societies), while hindering other forms 
of life and experiences of politics from emerging. Technology’s bias regarding politics, 
to use a CTT notion, does not only refer to whose individual and collective interests it 
serves but also to the assumption that someone can be served and must be served 
by technology and the specific practice and understanding of politics it entails. In 
order to better understand this concept, which is empirically illustrated in Chapters 3, 
4, 5 and 6, the concept of instrumentality as part of Western metaphysics and 
practice and its relation to the political need to be outlined.   
 
Giorgio Agamben has revisited the idea of instrumentality in terms of its being 
constitutive of technology (2015: 69) and requiring further exploration as it is related 
to the constitution of the political. Agamben draws upon the consideration of medieval 
theories of ‘instrumental causality’, more specifically the one developed by Thomas 
de Aquinas, and the way in which a fifth causality was integrated in relation to formal 
cause, material cause, final cause and efficient cause. In this light, it was medieval 
theologians who theorised the nature of an ‘instrumental causality’ (instrumentalis) as 
a ‘special type of efficient cause’ (Agamben, 2015: 70). Instrumental causality, in 
Aquinas’ understanding, has the distinctive characteristic of guaranteeing some kind 
of autonomy and ‘indifference’ of the instrument regarding the final cause, while its 
operation is fundamental for that final cause or principal agent´s action (Agamben, 
2015: 72). Therefore, the instrument displays a use according to its own form and 
shape but at the same time this immanent way of being is used and necessary for a 
principal cause to be achieved.  
 
What defines the instrumental cause – for instance, the axe in the hands of a 
carpenter who is making a bed – is the particularity of its action. On the one hand, 
it acts not in virtue of itself but in virtue of its principal agent (namely, the 
carpenter), but on the other hand, it works according to its own nature, which is 
that of cutting. That is to say, it serves the end of another, only to the degree that 
it realizes its own end (Agamben, 2015: 70).  
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The concept of instrumental cause is thus born as a splitting of the efficient cause, 
which is divided into instrumental cause and principal cause, thus securing an 
autonomous status for instrumentality (Agamben, 2015: 70). However, it is by drawing 
upon Aquinas’ Summa Theologica that Agamben further describes instrumentality as 
a ‘dispositive operation… an operation that according to its own internal law, realizes 
a level that seems to transcend it but is in reality immanent to it, just as, in the 
economy of salvation, Christ works dispositive–that is, according to an “economy” – 
the redemption of humanity’ (Agamben, 2015: 72). The characteristic gesture of 
instrumentality is that it conceives an immanent ordering, an economy, in which the 
instrument remains ‘indifferent’ but is still, in enacting its own allegedly immanent way 
of being as autonomy, fundamental to the principal cause. Therefore, the principal 
cause is always in relation to the immanence of the instrument and the socio-
technical ensemble, as this immanence is the way they have been designed as its 
own nature – the principal actor selecting the characteristics that define the 
instrument’s nature. The instrument only appears autonomous while working at a 
distance according to a principal cause and within an economy. Whereas 
‘[t]echnology is the dimension that is opened when the operation of the instrument 
has been rendered autonomous and at the same time is divided into two distinct and 
related operations’ (Agamben, 2015: 74, emphasis in original), in this conception, the 
basic ‘autonomous’ form of such instrument is always in relation to, or dependent on, 
a principal cause as part of a broader economy. The object is autonomous only within 
the economy of the principal actor, an economy of which the object is unaware. 
 
Regarding modern technology, Agamben asserts that this is characterised by an 
‘obediential potential’ in which devices ‘have incorporated in themselves the operation 
of the principal agent and can thus “obey” its commands (even if these are actually 
inscribed into the functioning of the [dispositif], in such a way that the one using them, 
in pushing the “controls,” obeys in turn a predetermined program)’ (Agamben, 2015: 
77)7. After emphasising instrumentality in such terms, the bias of technology and the 
Internet comprises the materially embedded values and international and global 
actors exercising power at a distance through norms (see McCarthy, 2015). But also, 
what is at stake here is ultimately ontological and political, not only the idea of an 
autonomous or non-autonomous technology but rather that such attributes 
correspond to the principal agent´s (designer’s) final cause, unfolding as and within 
																																																								
7 For instance, as Ana Delgado (2016) asserts, synthetic biology ‘turns the dynamics of life itself into a 
matter of design’ and the importance of such designs (e.g. in living biological clocks or living cameras) 
relies on their ‘performative power’ or, so to speak, all the activities they do just by living. 
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an immanent ordering or oikonomia.8 In the end, according to such economy, the 
intricacies of modern and digital technologies like the Internet and digital platforms, 
entail an insistent but generally concealed third person or cause as more-than-one 
final user in operation (see for instance Carr, 2015; Deibert and Crete-Nishihata, 
2012; DeNardis and Hackl, 2015; Naughton, 2016; Powles, 2015), blurring the 
distinction between final actor (or end user) and instrument and hiding its own 
principal agents and economy.  
 
The above means that the principal agent is not or hardly is to be the final user or 
consumer employing the technological device to hand. In addition to the proper 
constituency and practice operated within the limits of the technological device´s form 
and goal, and the user with the digital device to hand, there is a third cause or agent 
and an economy to which such instrument corresponds. The Internet, as we will see 
in detail in the following chapters, entails many different users but one overarching 
economy and form of coordination. From hardware technology through to software 
and telecommunications production and management corporations to national 
governments, organizations and individual everyday users, the Internet is only 
possible in a diversified relation of more than two users but always responding to a 
broader economy which just like the ‘ego-politics’ and the ‘theo-politics’ of knowledge 
(Mignolo, 2005) hides the geopolitical location and privilege of its subjects of 
enunciation and exploitation.  
 
Besides bearing in mind that there is always a third actor, principal actor or actors (or 
a specific society and culture) to whom design responds, there is a more fundamental 
gesture of instrumentality: erasing its economy and the subject of enunciation, this 
subject’s interests and moreover his location within a metaphysical tradition and 
praxis. Such a gesture turns immanent this subject’s designs and institutionalises the 
subordination of other beings and their valorisation within a matrix of functionality, 
under the assumption of the need to expand as control and domination. Accordingly, 
Agamben’s analysis has asserted that the instrumental cause is linked to the figure of 
the slave in a fundamental manner as  
 
…it is implied in the very formula “the human being whose ergon is the use of the 
body” and in the definition […] of the slave as the one who, “while being human, 
																																																								
8 Agamben (2011: 1) explains that in Christian theology ‘the idea of an oikonomia, [is] conceived as 
immanent ordering-domestic and not political in a strict sense-of both divine and human life’, contrary 





is by nature of another and not of himself.” The slave constitutes in this sense the 
first appearance of a pure instrumentality, which is to say, of a being that, while 
living according to its own end, is precisely for that reason and to the same extent 
used for another’s end (Agamben, 2015: 75).  
 
As above, instruments are constituted as being not of its own but in relation to their 
function within a specific economy and principal cause. Such an economy, from a 
decolonial standpoint, brings about ‘”thingification”, that is, the relations of domination 
and submission which turn… the indigenous man into an instrument of production’ 
(Césaire, 2000: 42). As Dussel (1996: 5) explains, the exclusion of the slave is not a 
thing of the past but is linked to the notion of capitalist development,  
 
…the "delay" of peripheral capitalism is a "before" with respect to the "after" of 
"late" capitalism. What is not taken into account, in this Eurocentric ideology, is 
that there is no such "before." Since 1492, the periphery is not a "before," but an 
"underneath": the exploited, the dominated, the origin of stolen wealth,' 
accumulated in the dominating, exploiting "center." We repeat: the 
developmentalist fallacy thinks that the "slave" is a "free lord" in his youthful 
stage, and like a child ("crude or barbarian"). It does not understand that the 
slave is the dialectical "other face" of domination: the as-always, the "other-part" 
of the exploitative relation.  
 
The slave is fundamental to coloniality and capitalism not as part of its past but as its 
permanent other-part. However, and along the lines of Agamben’s (2015) 
understanding of instrumentality, thingification not only means the exclusion of human 
beings but also the objectification of the nonhuman (see Schulz, 2018: 51). The 
thingification of beings as instruments is not only a use of them as objects but a 
production of them as instruments, letting them be in the way (whatever way) the 
principal actor (privileged subjects as designers) deems fit. Reducing the gap 
between human and non-human, this notion of thingification also finds an echo in 
Maya tradition and the idea of ‘domestication’ of peoples and other forms of life, 
which refers to the placing of some other people’s ‘modes of feeling-thinking, of 
acting, of being-existing in our hearts […] so we reproduce what they are and how 
they are’ (López, 2015: 268). As developed in Chapter 7, instrumentality not only 
corresponds to slavery or an unclear legal status in between economy and politics 
from a Western critical perspective like that of Agamben or Schmitt but also 
corresponds to coloniality in the form of thingification and domestication. 
 
As the following chapters demonstrate, the Internet has been designed as a 
technology, instrumentally, within a metaphysical tradition it has been embedded with 
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as an obediential potential. This embedded potential has determined and 
accommodated the diverse nature of its components as instruments (doing what they 
have been designed and expected to do although indifferent [or ignorant] of the 
broader economy and the principal cause that they ultimately respond to [see 
Chapters 3 and 4]) and not as political subjects. In contrast to instrumentality and as 
detailed in the following sections, ‘the political’ in this thesis opens up not a different 
use of or participation in designing an already assumed technological object but a 
different being of the technological object, not limited within the figure of a taken for 
granted and concealed economy or government but introducing a decolonial element 
that proposes learning from often undervalued knowledges and praxes.  
 
2.4 Coloniality and decolonial thinking 
 
As Walter Mignolo (2010: 9) points out, a basic understanding of decolonial thinking 
and doing is that ‘there is no modernity without coloniality, that coloniality is 
constitutive of modernity’ (modernity/coloniality). As he further explains,  
 
while modernity is presented as the rhetoric of salvation, it hides coloniality, which 
is the logic of oppression and exploitation. Modernity, capitalism and coloniality 
are aspects of the same package of control of economy and authority, of gender 
and sexuality, of knowledge and subjectivity (Ibid).  
 
From this approach, modernity and the logic of coloniality are entangled and date 
back to the sixteenth century. Then, the colonisation of the American continent that 
began in 1492 constituted the foundational moment of Western modern subjectivity, 
when coloniality, modernity and capitalism intertwined and deployed diverse forms of 
domination, control and exploitation (Quijano, 2010; Martínez, 2012). Consequently, 
in the sixteenth century the capitalist world-system would emerge with the 
interconnection of world-markets (Wallerstein, 2011) and in the eighteenth century, 
with the industrial revolution and relying on a racial division of labour – the imposition 
of indigenous forced labour (Quijano, 2010; see Hornborg, 2016) – Europe would 
achieve centrality in the world-system (Dussel, 2004). 
 
Therefore, Enrique Dussel (1996) argues that modernity has not been an intra-
european phenomenon but has been constituted in relation to the indigenous world 
(see also Mignolo, 2010: 12), which  
 
gave to Europe the first comparative advantage that explains, in part (but it is a 
part of the explanation that is never considered in the interpretations of 
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modernity), the triumph over the Muslim world, vanquished at Lepanto in 1571 
(25 years after the discovery and the beginning of the exploitation of the 
Zacatecas silver mines in Mexico and the Potosi silver mines in Bolivia) (Dussel, 
1996: 134).  
 
As a result, Aníbal Quijano explains (2010: 24), ‘the cultural repression and the 
massive genocide together turned the previous high cultures of America into illiterate, 
peasant subcultures… that is, deprived of their own patterns of formalized, 
objectivised, intellectual, and plastic or visual expression’, forcing them to express 
themselves through the cultural patterns of the dominant, ‘even if subverting them in 
certain cases to transmit other needs of expression’.  
 
In line with such an account of coloniality as the underside of modernity, Quijano 
(2010) distinguishes between colonialism as an explicit form of political and economic 
domination, as constant and systematic ‘immediate repression’, and cultural 
coloniality, the ‘beliefs and images [that] served not only to impede the cultural 
production of the dominated, but also as a very efficient means of social and cultural 
control’ (Quijano, 2010: 23). Coloniality in this understanding ‘refers to long-standing 
patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, 
labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits 
of colonial administrations’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2010: 97). In this way, Quijano 
extended ‘coloniality of power (economic and political) to coloniality of knowledge and 
of being (gender, sexuality, subjectivity and knowledge)’ and argued that  ‘if 
knowledge is colonized one of the tasks ahead is to de-colonize knowledge’ (Mignolo, 
2010: 305). 
 
Drawing on the above, decolonial thinking argues that in the formation of a modern 
subjectivity and a modern European identity the Cartesian ego cogito was preceded 
by ‘an unquestioned ideal of self expressed in the notion of the ego conquiro’ 
(Maldonado-Torres, 2010: 99). In this light, certainty has been present in modernity in 
the preceding form of ‘the self as a conqueror, of its tasks and missions’, and in the 
form of ‘Descartes’s certainty about the self as a thinking substance (res cogitans)’ 
(Ibid). Therefore, ‘the practical conquering self and the theoretical thinking substance 
are parallel in terms of their certainty’ and ‘the ego conquiro is not questioned, but 
rather provides the ground for the articulation of the ego cogito’ (Ibid).  
 
As Quijano (2010: 25) explains, coloniality of power and modern rationality, were 
conceived ‘with the social category of “race” as the key element of the social 
classification of colonized and colonizers’, while ‘the old ideas of superiority of the 
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dominant, and the inferiority of dominated under European colonialism were mutated 
in a relationship of biologically and structurally superior and inferior’. The ego 
conquiro expressed the will to govern through domination and exclusion of its own 
exteriority (other forms of life considered as inferior), commanding from and building 
on its own idea of effective ratio. In other words, there was no modern subjectivity 
before 1492 as ‘Europe did not have its own effective consciousness of superiority’; 
instead, in such terms, ‘Europe was conscious of Muslim, Chinese and Ottoman 
worlds’ political, intellectual and economic superiority’ (Martinez, 2012: 24, author’s 
translation). It was after 1492 that certainty and superiority arose and a modern 
European identity and rationality emerged. 
 
After the ego conquiro and with the formulation of the ego cogito, ‘Descartes placed 
the ego at the foundation of knowledge in a position previously reserved for the 
“Christian God” (Grosfoguel, 2012: 88). The ego cogito was dissociated ‘from all 
bodies and territories’, emptied ’of all spatial or temporal determinations’ in order to 
conceive ‘the possibility of a knowledge beyond time and space’ (Ibid). Accordingly, 
the ego-politics of knowledge (Mignolo, 2005) is ‘nothing less than a secularization of 
the Christian cosmology of the theo-politics of knowledge’, in which ‘the subject of 
enunciation is erased, hidden, camouflaged’ (Grosfoguel, 2012: 89). On this basis, 
from a particular experience and standpoint, universal knowledge was to be 
enunciated through erasing and ignoring its own particularity as grounded on a 
subject of enunciation, founding ‘the privilege of “European man” in the production of 
universal knowledges’ and meaning that ‘a particular defines the universal for the rest 
of the planet’ (Ibid: 90). 
 
In the face of such a privilege, the decolonial option proposes to make visible those 
loci of unaccounted histories, cosmovisions and forms of life produced as 
underdeveloped, backward, traditional, barbarian, mystic or subaltern by ‘de-linking’ 
from Western epistemologies. Decolonial thinking proposes ‘to take seriously the 
critical thinking produced by “subalternized” subjects from below as a point of 
departure to a radical critique of the hegemonic power structures and knowledge 
structures’ (Grosfoguel, 2009: 101).  In this sense, ‘de-linking’ is an epistemic shift 
that entails advancing a ‘geo- and body politics of knowledge that… denounces the 
pretended universality of a particular ethnicity (body politics), located in a specific part 
of the planet (geo-politics)’ (Mignolo, 2010: 307). Such de-linking as an epistemic shift 
brings about border thinking or border epistemology: standing or being-in-between 
worlds and knowledges and unfolding worlds and knowledges otherwise (Escobar, 
2010) and not within an exclusionary framework. 
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In line with the above, while great contributions have been made in denouncing 
practices of colonialism and imperialism through the Internet and on the Internet, the 
assumption of a technological world and its digital futures remain unquestioned. For 
instance, data colonialism in the case of aid work and international development has 
been addressed as ‘ongoing Western control over data’ and having a ‘lack of ethical 
processes around data collection,’ with limited proposals such as local data 
ownership and consent, thus aiming to prevent exploitation and colonialism. But this 
remains a task that starts in the “West” with the creation of sustainable models in and 
by western agencies (Anonymous, 2016). In a similar way, attention has been paid on 
the need either to evenly distribute the benefits of an expanding Internet (Hill, 2014) 
or for each community to develop their own infrastructure, programming codes and 
imagine alternative and decolonized digital futures, without questioning the “digital” in 
such futures (see Kwet, 2019; Martini, 2017; Ogden et al., 2015). Despite recognising 
that a ‘new form of imperialism, techno-imperialism, is conflated with traditional 
political imperialism for what concerns Internet governance’ the conclusion has been 
‘that new governance models should be envisaged so as to achieve true democratic 
and multilateral Internet governance’ (Hill, 2014: 78). In this way, this critical approach 
lacks any assessment of whether and of how coloniality may be reiterated through the 
terms and categories that frame the discussion, embedded and entailed by 
technological and digital expansion as being technological in themselves.  
 
Efforts to decolonise technology and the Internet through equality in access, design, 
production and/or distribution remain within the scope of technological development, 
power politics and/or human rights, finally proposing ‘harm reduction’ (see 
Soundararajan and Flanders, 2017) instead of questioning the colonial character of 
considering an object a technology. The same happens when violations to privacy 
and surveillance are taken to correlate to cyber-colonialism and traditional economic 
domination (‘as a legacy of traditional colonialism’) (Danezis, 2014), a perspective 
which despite having enormous relevance in pointing out economic, military and 
government potential direct control over people, data and resources, remains within 
the intelligibility margins of competitiveness and economic/technological 
development. Therefore and so far, attempts to decolonise the digital maintain the 
digital as its grounding, assuming its place and continuity and dismissing, as analysed 
in the previous section, the consideration that diverse societies may require ‘not only 
new technological directions and designs influenced by more enlightened normative 
commitments, but also new social directions which de facto require less technological 
activity, thus less resource-concentration and inequity, and less environmental 
“turnover” consumption, and destruction’ (Wynne, 2010: xiv, emphasis in the original). 
The preceding sections have explained the contributions and limitations of STS-IR 
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approaches in this regard. One of the main contributions has been STS-IR focus on 
the historical and social process of technological and social design. But also, one of 
the main limitations of STS-IR is the link they establish between development and 
taken-for-granted conceptions of a technological object, an everyday technical 
experience and politics, which unfolds into political and epistemological limitations in 
opening and listening to other already existing and new social directions. On this 
basis, the thesis does not engage in the formulation of a decolonial politics of 
technology or the Internet but rather points towards the necessary inclusion of 
decoloniality in philosophical and critical approaches to technology and the internet by 
bringing together philosophy of technology, STS, the concept of the political and the 
Zapatista use of the internet.  
 
 
2.5 The Political as locus of redefinition of instrumentality 
 
As Walter Mignolo (2010: 352) has explained, de-linking knowledge production from 
western epistemologies entails ‘analysis of the making and re-making of the imperial 
and colonial differences’, in this case, furthering awareness of the constitution of 
technology qua technology. But also, de-linking calls for border thinking to de-
colonise knowledge and being, epistemologies and ontologies. On such basis, 
Mignolo claims, ‘new concepts of economy and social organization (politics) will be 
derived’ as ‘solutions from the political theories of the West… have been exhausted 
and without border thinking any exercise in this arena could only lead to spinning the 
spin within the bubble of imperial modernity’ (Ibid).  
 
De-linking means to remove the anchor in which the ‘normalcy effect’ has been 
produced as to hide the fact that the anchor can be removed and the edifice 
crumbled… The future could no longer be owned by one way of life (‘la pensé 
unique’ of Ramonet), cannot be dictated by one project of liberation and de-
colonization, and cannot be a polycentric world within Western categories of 
thoughts (Mignolo, 2010: 352-353). 
 
De-linking and decolonial border thinking – standing or being-in-between worlds and 
knowledges and unfolding worlds and knowledges otherwise aiming at decolonisation 
(Escobar, 2010) – together with the Zapatista words and experiences, suggest a call 
to rethink and elaborate on the concept of the political, not in order to establish a 
more accurate conceptualisation but to listen to other experiences and knowledges as 
performing the same concept of the political as an encounter between concrete 
modes of being.  
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As mentioned before, while this thesis pays attention to the use of the Internet in 
Mexico, the main contrast and departure point for a different understanding of the 
relation between technology and politics is the Zapatista experience. The reason 
being that the Zapatistas in many ways recall a pending task of dialogue, not only of 
knowledges but also of modes of being in Mexico, as a country constituted by a 
multiplicity of cultures and nations. Therefore, politics are to be discussed on the 
basis of and as an effort to consider praxes, ontologies and metaphysics that seem to 
be other. De-linking and learning from the Zapatista experience refers not only to the 
immediate and exceptional use of the Internet but also to their own understanding 
and experience of politics as a community based on a spatial relationship with earth 
and territory, with their own cosmology, metaphysics and ontology. This theoretical 
outset for an approach to the Internet in Mexico underpins and is complemented by 
the analysis in Chapter 7. The aim is to relocate attention from the strategic use of the 
Internet by the Zapatistas, as an instrument directed towards a goal, to a more 
comprehensive understanding of how politics play in a context of communities where 
the technological character of technology is set against a different praxis, 
metaphysical and ontological backdrop, and ethical horizon of intersubjectivity. 
 
Regarding politics, as a Zapatista member asserted: ‘(…) the future of the EZLN is 
not defined in military terms but in political terms. We are not worried about the 
enemy, we are worried about how we are going to define a new relationship among 
partners’ (Ceceña, 2004: 21, author’s translation). Along with this emphasis on 
partnership over enmity, in the case of the Zapatistas a new relationship among 
partners was to be defined. Underlying such a statement and political praxis, the 
thesis contends and further develops in Chapter 7, is a basic wisdom and experience 
of the equality of all things. Therefore, the political in this respect and for the effects of 
this work is not merely seen as informed deliberation and decision, negotiation or 
plainly as power. The political as proposed in this thesis, is partly inspired in its 
politico-ontological aspects in a Schmittian definition as an event constitutive of ‘order 
and orientation’ (spatial order and the orientation of a particular community), in which 
the self emerges through experience and reflection, from the encounter with the 
‘other’ as this encounter ‘brings about the “existential affinity” of those “who just 
happen to live together”’ (Schmitt in Ojakangas, 2007: 210-214).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, a Schmittian definition opens up within 
Western tradition an opportunity to move beyond and into other understandings of 
living together. As it has been emphasised (Marder, 2010: 70-72), Schmitt rejected 
abstract disembodied concepts like that of a humanity that lacks a body and called 
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attention to the ambiguous ‘legal status of the non-European territory appropriated by 
Europeans.’ The latter ‘testifies to the ambiguous mixture of the economic and the 
political at the origins of colonialism’ and conceptualizes colonialism not as a political 
phenomenon but ‘at best… a vivid example of indecision and vacillation between the 
political and the economic; at worst, and at its most modern, [as] a force of economic 
appropriation’ (Ibid).  
 
From the above recognition of political indefiniteness and exclusion within an 
economy of appropriation, an other experience of encounter in which existential 
affinity is brought about is the Maya and Zapatista experience of politics, which can 
also be interpreted in some similarity with Giorgio Agamben’s (2015, 2009, 2000) 
proposal for rethinking the political from within Western metaphysics and towards 
turning the latter inoperative. Instead of a Schmittian emphasis on otherness as 
brought about by enmity, the political is understood here as having to do with the 
Zapatista assertion regarding how partners define themselves as being together and, 
as we shall further see in Chapter 7, open and in respect towards every ‘other’ being 
(and the multiplicity of worlds that coexist). This ‘other’ that appears and is recognised 
can also be seen as the friend: who ‘constitutes the political’ and shares no positive or 
predicative identity but the pure fact of existing and ‘original con-senting’ that his 
friend exists (Agamben, 2009: 36). From the latter perspective politics appears as a 
‘becoming other of the self’ (Ibid: 34-35) and not exactly a becoming a self from the 
experience of the other. The different emphasis lies in the importance of war or 
philosophy (or knowledge about such con-senting as ontology and ethics). This 
flexibility in the interpretation of the political, in terms of enmity or friendship, does not 
exclude one another but speak of the political as openness at the level of facticity and 
the emergence of a collective self from that experience and reflection. In turn, political 
ontology can be seen as an ‘inquiry’ into the political and the ‘interpretation of… 
collective existence’ (Marder, 2010: 4).  
 
Inspired in the Maya roots of the Zapatista insurgency, as detailed in Chapter 7, the 
understanding of the political and decolonial politics ultimately refers, in this thesis, to 
the constitution of a collective heart – ko ’tantik – and cosmic-kolektive  Xch ‘ulel wo 
‘tan –‘guardian spirit-consciousness of all that exists’ – in ich’el ta muk’ – recognition-
respect for every being, knowing to listen, knowing to feel, being awake – together 
with an experience and reflection that constitutes itself as matter of interpretation as 
sna’el k’inal – ‘knowing the world [saber el mundo], meeting/getting to know the world, 
knowing to be-exist in it, knowing to direct the word, knowing to live in the ich’el ta 
muk’ (author’s translation, López, 2015: 267). Therefore, this thesis emphasises the 
constitution of a collective heart as an open questioning and ethics – the ongoing 
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drawing and/or redrawing of boundaries between what is a partner and member of a 
community – or collective existence – and what is not, which is self-aware and 
unmediated (undecided or alienated) by other groups. Politics initially appears as 
experience, in a constant revisiting of ontological grounds and the possibility of 
meaningfulness and vitality to collective existence (Marder, 2010: 4). But ultimately, 
drawing on the Zapatista experience and tojolabal and tsotsil – Maya – philosophy in 
the final chapter of this thesis, politics has to do with recognition and respect, knowing 
the world, con-senting, co-existence, meaning, practice, form and/or purpose 
regarding collective unity through and as territory and the awareness of their 
existential importance, which recalls as fundamental the ethical Maya horizon of the 
equality of all things and opens up the possibility of including “non-human” beings as 
members of a political community, as decolonial politics, in contrast to the assumption 




The chapter has formulated an approach to technology and the Internet by 
questioning a taken-for-granted everyday technical experience and concepts like 
technological development, politics and even technology itself against the background 
of coloniality. While important contributions have been made to the understanding of 
technological artefacts, knowledges and practices as socially constructed, the 
inclusion of a decolonial element offers to listen to unaccounted histories, 
cosmovisions and forms of life produced as underdeveloped or backward, 
denouncing the pretensions to universality of a particular ethnicity and a particular 
geography’s knowledge and practices.  
 
The critique outlined in this chapter has considered the analytic limitations of STS-IR 
approaches by pointing at the link between development, everyday technical 
experience and the political, and epistemological limitations in opening and listening 
to other already existing and new social directions. Within this critique, western 
approaches to technology and the political have not been dismissed but carefully 
considered and complemented within a shared experience of the political. STS and 
STS-IR approaches are important as a first analytic step towards conceptualising the 
thesis’ central concept of an instrument of coordination without politics. Particularly, 
McCarthy’s (2015) work has contributed to this thesis in terms of a consideration of 
the provenance and structure of the Internet in order to contrast such embedded 
interests and values with the ones reproduced in Mexico when using this technology 
(Chapters 3 and 4). In addition, while the thesis is critical of tecnopolítica as 
reproducing coloniality (see Chapter 6) this perspective contributes to the thesis in 
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describing the way in which social mobilisations have been organising as a collective 
self and performing their own understanding of the Internet and activism. Yet and as 
analysed, these considerations cannot explain the political (as defined above in this 
chapter) implications of the Internet in Mexico. 
 
Regarding the Internet’s political implications in Mexico, and insofar as the 
experience, categories and practices that correspond to the category of the political 
obey an exclusive ethnocentric formulation, such politics have been identified as 
someone else’s (Western) politics, both in definition and practice. Therefore, such 
politics are seen as diffusing an instrumental mediation whose center of control and 
design lies elsewhere according to someone else’s interests. In this way, the chapter 
has initially defined an instrument of coordination without politics as that which 
emerges where politics and the politicisation of technology are assumed according to 
western ethnocentric parameters but located in non-Western situations. 
 
The ‘instrument(al)’, as developed in this chapter and throughout the thesis, has been 
further defined as a being that serves another’s end only to the degree that it realizes 
its own end and is indifferent to its arrangement within an overarching economy and 
the end that defines its operation. Further situating the categories of technology and 
politics in Mexico the thesis moves towards decolonial border thinking by considering 
instrumentality in a colonial context as bringing about ‘thingification’, the turning of 
originary peoples ‘into an instrument of production’ and the objectification of beings 
(Cesaire, 2000), together with ‘domestication’ as the placing of some other people’s 
‘modes of feeling-thinking, of acting, of being-existing in our hearts […] so we 
reproduce what they are and how they are’ (López, 2015: 268). Therefore, the 
chapter has sought to establish the ways instrumentality, colonisation, ‘thingification’ 
and ‘domestication’ intersect.  
 
Drawing on the above, instrumentality not only corresponds to slavery or an unclear 
legal status in between economy and politics from a Western critical perspective like 
that of Agamben or Schmitt but also corresponds to coloniality in the form of 
thingification and domestication as a clear exclusion of other embodied experiences 
of the political. As a form of coordination without politics, the instrument does not 
participate of the definition of its overarching meaning and orientation but has been 
instead limited to unfold in the way it has been intended or designed to work as it is its 
own end. The Internet as an instrument of coordination without politics, emphasises 
how this technology internalizes, systematizes and reiterates the concealment and 
indifference towards its overarching economy and design, reproducing thus the 
limitations in the possibility of participating of the definition of this economy and its 
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orientation (to be analysed in Chapters 3 and 4). But furthermore, the Internet as an 
instrument of coordination without politics brings coordination and collective 
experience to its users by reproducing this technology’s embedded values and 
interests, the same that have been shaped according to another’s end and economy, 
concealing, mediating and hindering other situated and local political experiences 
(see Chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Regarding the political as an experience, this concept has been understood in 
similarity to Agamben’s (2009: 36) idea of the political, as constituted by friends and 
the ‘original con-senting’ that the friend exists, but more decisively as having to do 
with a Maya Zapatista approach. The latter emphasises the way in which partners 
define themselves as being together and, as to be further elaborated in Chapter 7, 
open and in respect towards every ‘other’ being (and the multiplicity of worlds that 
coexist). Therefore, the Zapatista experience of politics is understood as it has to do 
with con-senting, co-existence, meaning, practice, form and/or purpose regarding 
collective unity through and as territory (see Chapter 7) and the awareness of their 
existential importance, which recalls an ethical Maya horizon of intersubjectivity or the 
equality of all things and opens up, through concepts like ko ’tantik, sna’el kinal and 
ich’el tamuk the possibility of including non-human beings as members of a political 
community in contrast to the assumption of a hierarchy of beings and the inferior 
objects of instrumentality and exploitation. In this way, the chapter is significant for the 
overall argument of the thesis as it draws the trajectory from western theories and 
concepts to the consideration of the Zapatista use of the Internet and mode of life as 
a contribution towards considering alternative knowledges and praxes before 
assuming an everyday technical experience and analytical concepts like technology 
and politics. The chapter has set the theoretical background for explaining how the 
political effects of using the internet in Mexico go beyond taken-for-granted 
assumptions of technology and politics, putting forth the epistemological inclusion of 
Maya philosophy and Zapatista praxis as a decolonial element to be taken into 






Governing Design/Designing Government 
The Internet as an instrument of coordination 
 
 
The chapter analyses the main ideas, actors and economies involved in the 
emergence, design and expansion of the Internet by drawing on the notion of 
dispositif (Foucault, 1977) and in order to identify this technology’s overarching 
economy or form of coordination with a strategic function. The chapter explains how 
this form of coordination entails ‘instrumentality’ as a specific relation between a 
certain degree of autonomy of its components and the overall stability of the system 
or its ‘economy’ (Agamben, 2009, 2015). Such a relation increasingly conceals its 
own overarching and single processes, its points of control and decision-making, 
fragmenting knowledge of the overarching economy of the system by its users and 
components in exchange for simplification, flexibility, adaptability and functionality. 
This embedded form of coordination, it is argued, is one that produces, manages and 
conceals a complex social and technical environment, hindering knowledge and 
understanding of this technology’s operation as a system. In this way, such a form 
fosters ignorance and fragmentation under the appearance of technology’s political 
neutrality while offering simplicity and delegation of decision-making, not only in the 
realm of informatics but also in mediating social life.  
 
In relation to the overall argument of the thesis, the chapter explains how the Internet 
as an ‘instrument of coordination without politics’, has, by design, internalised, 
systematized and reiterated the concealment and indifference towards its overarching 
economy, managing interactions on behalf of others and reducing the possibility of 
politics and a shared definition of this technology’s economy and orientation. The 
Internet’s technological and social development despite having a strategically 
balanced relation between military, entrepreneurial and scientific interests and values 
in the US, has increasingly developed into the commodification and mediation of its 
users (see Chapter 4). Once exported to the world, and as this thesis sets out to 
demonstrate in the case of Mexico, the Internet as an ‘instrument of coordination 
without politics’ has entailed concealment and ignorance without attainable control on 
a self-determined local collective basis.  
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As Michel Foucault (1977: 197) proposed: ‘In trying to identify [a dispositif], [we] look 
for the elements which participate in a rationality, a given form of co-ordination’. This 
approach allows understand the Internet through analysing the intersection and 
disjunction between strategic orientation, values and processes of technical 
knowledge and development, on the one hand; and technology’s concrete operation 
as comprising a multiplicity of actors and agents, human and non-human, on the 
other. From this perspective, the particular form of coordination embedded in the 
Internet, as part and product of broader political and economic dynamics and a 
national and international context, functions as a ‘right disposition of things’ in practice 
(Foucault, 2007: 134-137; Lemke, 2002, 2015), whose form of coordination has 
developed over time and has its own historicity and symmetries with other practices 
across social interactions. Throughout such process, the Internet’s embedded form of 
coordination makes sense and is reiterated in its operation regardless of having or not 
specific identifiable authors to whom strategies and calculation could be attributed to 
(Foucault, 1977: 202).  
 
The chapter is organised in three sections, which follow the design trajectory and 
identify its underpinning strategic imperatives and values, emphasising the 
interactions and integration between the defence, scientific and entrepreneurial 
sectors in the US. The first section analyses how in designing the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), beyond the technical realm and 
ARPA’s scientific, economic and military components and members, values like 
flexibility, adaptability and control corresponded to design strategies and processes of 
modularity, fragmentation, accommodation of heterogeneity and expansion. The 
section argues that all these concepts and processes integrated a form of 
coordination that relied on its capacity to simplify and manage the system to be 
functional without disrupting it as a whole and superseding fragments’ awareness of 
the overarching logic that governed them altogether. This form of coordination 
developed not only within a technical realm but also as instantiated in ARPA and its 
scientific, economic and military components and members oriented towards national 
superiority, economic efficiency and commercial benefit.  
 
The second section explores the Defense Communications Agency’s (DCA) 
investment in ARPANET’s expansion and how through UNIX, main operating system 
of the Internet nodes, the DCA expanded a form of coordination that managed to 
accommodate heterogeneity in a symmetrical way to processes of social inclusion 
and exclusion of social and cultural difference in the US. This section argues that 
control, despite being evident in DCA’s funding and support to the protocol’s 
expansion, was nevertheless complemented with a form of informatic and social 
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management that simplified processes by bonding them to government control and a 
national orientation. It did so first, it is argued, through concealment of its own 
operations, control stakes and security imperatives, and, second, through 
fragmentation of the system components, where decentralisation and adaptability 
were seen as oriented by fast-changing markets and technologies.  
 
Finally, the third section analyses how from a security imperative that oriented the 
initial international expansion of the ARPANET, the Internet would become a general-
purpose technology, projected to a global level but whose design distinctively 
developed in the US in accordance to values of privatisation and economic 
liberalisation, oriented towards consolidating a global network as a global market 
familiar to US values. The section argues that while control and the imperative of 
national security in defence and economic terms has always been present and has 
crucially conditioned the design and expansion of the Internet, its capacity to conceal 
internal processes, decision-making and control, according to its technical values, 
processes and strategies, has allowed its commercial orientation to thrive as if the 
Internet was a politically neutral technology, autonomous from the fast-changing 
markets society and this technology’s new subject and object of commodification, 
users, have to adapt to. 
 
3.1 Designing the management of a complex technical and social system 
 
This section identifies the main features, strategies and form of coordinating and 
conceiving the ARPANET, which was to become the Internet, to understand an 
underlying common practice and form of disposing components altogether. Such a 
form of coordination, at a so-to-speak technical level, included the strategies of 
modularity or layering and the accommodation of diversity and heterogeneity in order 
to avoid disruption and preserve the whole of the network in operation. In order to 
preserve the overarching operation of the whole network, ARPA needed to manage a 
complex system through fragmentation and simplification of tasks and knowledge. At 
an immediate contiguous institutional level, ARPA (Advanced Research Projects 
Agency) embraced and promoted a very particular form of management that cannot 
be understood through traditional forms of bureaucracy: an informal management that 
combined efficient management, subtle control and open systems of free inquiry. 
These two managerial environments, ARPA conducting federal human and non-
human resources for research and development within DoD’s effort to achieve 
technological vanguard for defence, and the network (ARPANET and the Internet) 
technically coordinating informatic resources to fulfil the aim of networking research 
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communities, were characteristically flexible and efficient but were supported on a 
stable although informal structure of control and orientation.  
 
3.1.1 ARPA and new forms of informal management 
 
It was 1958 when the institution that made the ARPANET possible, ARPA, came into 
existence. This agency was formed amidst concerns about the Soviet Union 
increasing its nuclear capabilities with the launching of the Sputnik in 1957. The 
agency was then formed to respond to ‘‘‘Presidential Issues,’’ assignments coming to 
it directly as the result of White House concerns about its most critical technical 
concerns’ (Lukasik, 2011: 6). It was part of the response of the US defense 
establishment, mobilizing diverse resources, funding research projects on science 
and technology and fostering ‘high-risk programs to prevent technological surprise’ 
(Lukasik, 2011: 12), all in order to develop military and nuclear capabilities beyond 
those of the USSR.  
 
From its inception, the agency was flexible and endorsed an informal way of 
management with less than 200 employees and a ‘modest internal structure’ of 
program managers usually ‘recruited for only a few years’, and who were also 
‘masters of their subjects, equal to the most expert specialists with whom they work’ 
(Lukasik, 2011: 5). The agency would conceive, fund and manage projects while 
specialized research and development was a contractors’ task, be it academic or 
industrial. This informal form of management, as a ‘corporate research operation’, 
was something that Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy had encouraged and which he 
was proud of, a practice that he had initially developed in his previous position at 
Procter & Gamble –‘blue-sky’ research and vast funding of it in order to ‘produce 
remarkable, if not always predictable results’ (Hafner and Lyon, 1998: 17). In general, 
the agency could combine scientific inquiry and research with flexible empathic, 
although elitist, management and executive direction; but also ARPA was always 
conceived as fundamentally dual, military and commercial in application, developing 
‘technologies that would have both defense and civilian economy payoffs – aiming to 
make the economy more competitive, while maintaining leadership in defense 
technologies’ (DARPA, 2018: 15). 
 
Under such a flexible management and dual application, as a command and control 
assignment, the task of networking computing resources emerged as an ideal of J. C. 
R. Licklider, appointed director of the ARPA program in 1962. Licklider’s underlying 
motive was that of ‘cooperative interaction between men and electronic computers’, 
involving ‘very close coupling between the human and the electronic members of the 
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partnership’ with the main aims of letting ‘computers facilitate formulative thinking’ 
and enabling ‘men and computers to cooperate in making decisions’ (Licklider, 1960: 
4). Regarding a computing network, his motivation and aim was his certainty about 
‘the need to aid cognition by facilitating the interaction of people and data as broadly 
as possible—what [he] called the Great Intergalactic Network’, and the means 
towards this ideal was ‘a general-purpose network that could be used for as many 
decision-support purposes as its users had the imagination to conceive’ (Lukasik, 
2011: 8). Licklider’s vision of the network was one of an instrument for decision-
making, always linked to problems and ends defined by its designers and that were 
‘essentially as important, in the research context as in the military context’ (Lukasik, 
2011: 9). 
 
In 1966 Lawrence Roberts would come to ARPA recruited by Robert Taylor, then 
director of the Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO). Formal research on 
networking and the ARPA Network project started in 1967 (Naughton, 2000: 83). A 
few years later Stephen Lukasik took over the ARPANET project as deputy director 
and Roberts developed the idea of a distributed packet-switching network. By 1968 
further limited funds and the increasing scrutiny of the US Congress into defence 
budget complicated the situation making it more urgent, as networking already 
existing computing resources among ARPA’s contractors meant important financial 
savings and thus served as an important incentive (Lukasik, 2011). The goals 
envisioned were those of developing advanced research in a new field of study 
(networking), ensuring financial savings and achieving resource sharing and 
interaction among research communities but always according to the national and 
military objective of developing secure and useful communications (Abbate, 1999: 
46). However, on the way to achieve that, the network designers realized that the 
diversity and heterogeneity of computers, systems and researchers would have to be 
accommodated in order to surpass incompatibility (Ceruzzi, 2003: 194).  
 
Soon after the project started, in 1969, four initial nodes for the network were 
established at University of California in Los Angeles, Stanford Research Institute, 
UC-Santa Barbara and the University of Utah, then expanding to fifteen computing 
centers part of the IPTO and to ARPA research centers by the end of 1971. In this 
way, the form of coordinating state resources incarnated in ARPA’s flexible 
managerial practice although flexible, always had direction and hierarchy, meaning 
decision-making capabilities that could make sense of the use and disposition over 
available resources. As the following sections explain, this managerial style, letting its 
members to freely do what they know but always in relation to an established 
direction and purpose, specific cultural values and quite significantly in a Cold War 
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context, would be reflected upon the technology itself, in this case, the network 
design and its initial materialisations. 
 
3.1.2 A different emphasis for a network model in a Cold War context: Paul Baran’s 
idea of packet-switching and the evident imperative of command and control 
 
The context and conditions that made the Internet possible were those of the Cold 
War. Although some of its conceptions can be traced further back to the beginnings of 
the twentieth century when engineers ‘began to think deeply about control, 
communications, and human-machine interaction’ (Mindell, 2002: 5; see Naughton, 
2000), it was not until ‘mutual assured destruction’ (MAD) was assumed amidst an 
intensive technological development and a corresponding mobilization and 
administration of resources that the aim of networking control and command 
communications, and computing and research resources, arose as an explicit state 
concern (Naughton, 2016). As Paul N. Edwards (1996: 2) has explained, ‘the 
historical trajectory of computer development cannot be separated from the 
elaboration of American grand strategy in the Cold War’. In the face of a nuclear 
threat, and the imaginaries of a nuclear exchange, defence efforts envisioned a 
‘flexible response strategy’, comprising ongoing communications and the 
maintenance of ‘central command and control’, as the ‘highest military priority’ 
(Edwards, 1996: 133). Such a goal was to be achieved by redistributing information 
and guaranteeing its safe arrival in such a scenario. 
 
Initial concerns regarding a nuclear attack and the need to achieve ‘survivability’ were 
main features of the network model developed by Paul Baran in 1962, a research 
member of the RAND Corporation whose ideas would become embodied, subject to 
further development and adaption, into the Internet. The principles of packet-
switching and ‘high levels of link redundancy’ were the singularity and foundation of 
Baran´s design (Hafner and Lyon, 1998: 51; Naughton, 2016: 7), which consisted of a 
‘distributed communications’ system with highly connected switching nodes and a 
promise of (efficient) ‘survivability’ and retaliatory capability (Baran, 1960: 3, in 
Abbate, 1999: 11). In the case of failure of some of the nodes integrating the system, 
many others would support communications by making sure information found an 
alternative pathway to its destination. Individual nodes would be intelligent enough to 
automatically ‘switch signals to surviving links’ without the need of ‘one or a few 
centralized switching centers’ concentrating the capacity (intelligence) to route 
messages (Baran 1960:3, in Abbate, 1999: 16). 
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Regarding the innovation of packet-switching, its main characteristic relied on the 
translation of information into a digital language, enabling the capacity to manipulate 
all sorts of data in a different (standardizing) manner, fragmenting messages by 
dividing them ‘into axed-size units that he called “message blocks”’ instead of dealing 
with complete messages and its different sizes, risking saturation of the network 
(Abbate, 1999: 17). In synthesis, this model of networking relied on a basic co-
dependence between autonomy and overall operation of the network, just like 
instrumentality entails an alleged autonomous instrument that (intelligent enough) 
follows its own design and responds to an overall economy (Agamben, 2015). As 
Paul Baran affirmed, in this model ‘there is no central control; only a simple local 
routing policy [that] is performed at each node, [and] yet the overall system adapts’ 
(Baran, 1964b: 8, in Abbate, 1999: 13). In the end, despite the complex evolution of 
ARPANET and then of the Internet, this kind of autonomy-overall system stability 
relation and the process of fragmenting in order to obtain a basic degree of flexibility 
will be at the core center of the adaptability, expansion and accommodating 
capacities of the networks. 
 
Although Baran’s model did not succeed in being implemented due to bureaucratic 
and other technical conditions, his ideas were important in the upcoming plan for 
networking research resources under the management of ARPA. Besides Baran’s 
role as advisor in the design of the ARPANET, his ideas and model endorsed and 
resembled specific values. Even though neither ARPANET nor the Internet 
responded to the sole value of survivability or exclusively served the purpose of 
keeping command and control under a nuclear attack, ‘the packet switching concept 
did endow the network with some resilient, self-healing properties’, and in line with the 
aim of resource sharing, there was always the ‘justification that the computer 
resource sharing and communication applications of the network would enhance the 
technology of military command and control’ (Cerf, in Veá, 2010: 7). 
 
The telecommunications network design that preceded the Internet exposed a visible 
and explicit aim of command and control in a context of confrontation. This aim took a 
new form with ARPA’s network design and its informal form of management. In 
designing the ARPANET, values like flexibility, redundancy, adaptability and control 
would correspond to processes of fragmentation, accommodation and expansion, 
which traversed both the technical and social realms. A broader form of coordination 
instantiated in ARPA and its scientific, economic and military components and 
members would be then embodied in a telecommunications network. In the end, in 
designing the ARPANET a specific strategy of modularity, as further detailed in the 
following section, was employed, which despite not emphasising a command and 
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control imperative, would develop in correspondence to familiar values like 
redundancy, resilience, adaptability and flexibility, together with processes of 
standardisation and fragmentation and a general balance between autonomy and 
overall stability of the network. 
 
3.1.3 Technical and Social Strategy: Modularity, or the production of ignorance 
through hidden layers of control and operation 
 
In correspondence with ARPA’s informal and decentralised management style, the 
main strategy to surpass and accommodate diversity and be able to build up and 
expand the network was layering or modularity (Abbate, 1999: 50). Layering refers to 
limiting technical complexity to make it manageable, specifically through its 
fragmentation into modular blocks or layers, which respond to specific functions that 
follow specific rules of interaction within a system. This same principle of limiting and 
hiding complex technical processes and interactions would in the last instance allow 
the computing market to expand by offering more user-friendly interfaces to include 
users who were unfamiliar to programming (Ceruzzi, 2003: 345). Hierarchy played an 
important role here as it differentiated between layers, in this case between physical 
layers and more abstract ones like those of final user-computer interaction through 
commands and screen displays, or concealment, of such commands and processes. 
As Abbate explained, this strategy had implications for designing the system but also 
for managing and using it: 
 
The designer of a particular layer needs to know how the layer is expected to 
interact with other layers but does not need to know anything about the internal 
workings of those layers. Since the layers are independent, they can be created 
and modified separately as long as all those working on the system agree to use 
the same interfaces between layers. Thus, layering has both technical and social 
implications: it makes the technical complexity of the system more manageable, 
and it allows the system to be designed and built in a decentralized way (Abbate, 
1999: 51).    
     
As above, knowledge was limited to an expectation of interaction with other layers, 
working together but independently and fitted together and synchronised through 
using the same interfaces. This process meant losing specific knowledge of the 
intricate processes such a technology involved, developing an independent task and 
relying on the way exchange and interaction had been established to be. 
Decentralisation depended on a minimum common understanding of how things were 
to engage with each other and what it was expected from such engagement, enacted 
both by designers at a social and managerial level and by the components of the 
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network and computing systems at a technical one. Then, in addition to coordinating 
human and non-human resources and establishing a minimum of knowledge and 
compatibility in interaction, the network being developed required accommodating the 
heterogeneity of computers by means of a packet-switching software employed in 
common. Standardization was necessary to guarantee distribution.  
 
At first, instead of having to design a packet-switching software adapted to each type 
of computer, the packet switching operation was developed by an additional interface 
consisting of minicomputers named ‘Interface Message Processor’ (IMP) (later 
terminal IMP (TIP), which interfaced terminals using an IMP to connect several hosts 
to the network). The same principle of limited knowledge and minimum standards of 
interaction were iterated as IMPs played as nodes of the network and interfaces to 
the hosts or the terminal of hosts. These nodes formed the subnet and oversaw 
fragmenting messages into packets, adding a standard header containing source and 
destination as well as control information, transporting the packets and reassembling 
them (point-to-point transmission) before delivering to the host (Abbate, 1999: 61). As 
well, the IMPs directed traffic control and routing of messages, making the routing 
system distributed and adaptive. As much as nodes were independent in terms of 
routing decision-making, hosts needed to know nothing of how this subnet worked (or 
it would mean dealing with more complex ways of storing and processing more 
information; undesirable in economic and military terms of efficiency and rapid 
response).  
 
Just like Baran’s model, IMPs allowed the overall system to keep working under 
disruption, being flexible enough to distribute the routing task and minimize 
‘dependence on any one component’ (Abbate, 1999: 62). In this manner, control and 
functionality were guaranteed through hierarchy and division, not only at a technical 
level. As part of the developing process for the initial ARPANET, the system had 
independent IMPs with whom students could not experiment on their own and which 
were encased into military weatherproof hardware, thus maintaining, stabilizing and 
automatizing functions while displacing direct human intervention in favour of remote 
monitoring and control. In the end, this rationality of modularity and separation in 
order to coordinate made it possible to conceive a network composed by a 
communications layer and a host layer, each with diverse although coordinated tasks 
– the former switching packets through the network and the latter offering final-user 
resources.   
 
In the same way that network functions were distributed according to layers, the 
organization of the project distributed tasks among groups: the communications layer 
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was under development by the private corporation Bolt Beranek and Newman 
(BB&N), UCLA and the Network Analysis Corporation (NAC), while the host protocols 
were assigned to the Network Working Group (NWG). Layering offered a way for 
users to ignore complex technical and social processes in operation while using the 
system, turning it into an instrument, not only in terms of the computing system but 
also in terms of its human social institutions9. Each component appeared to be and 
function on its own, independently, while developing a specific task and being able to 
make decisions regarding that task. However, members of the system were not of its 
own or operated on its own, they were dependent on the system and the task they 
oversaw. On the other part, users and the overall system ignored the singular 
existence of components outside its operating functions. They only existed as long as 
they developed their task and were turned invisible within the significance of a higher 
function (a user would never notice there is something wrong with a singular 
component if it does not manifest itself into a visible problem in the functionality of the 
system). The system was not dependent on any single component, as it had already 
decentralized its operation in terms of managing the flow of information. 
Decentralisation entailed disposability of singular components. 
 
In terms of host protocols, the same prerogatives prevailed in its definition: minimum 
level of standardization in order to keep interoperability and avoid chaos, and further 
fragmentation of its layers (functions) to achieve such standardisation. In terms of 
management, flexibility and collegiality were upheld as the NWG in charge of the 
design lacked established authorities and expertise on the new subject. The group 
was evolving formal standards informally10, but consensus on protocols reached by 
the group ARPA would certainly turn into policy (Abbate, 1999: 74). Freedom or 
autonomy were given final meaning by turning it within the control of ARPA and its 
broader security agenda into policy. For instance, the informal management ARPA 
engaged with was always tempered by limits on how and to what extent external 
users could participate into the design of the network: there was a capacity to 
manage the extent to which users outside of the ARPANET project could modify or 
attempt innovation of the system, moreover while standards were in process of being 
set (Ibid). ARPA held the authority to make plans for the network rather than resting 
with individual users. 
																																																								
9 The Network Control Center was established in 1970. It monitored and offered information and 
trouble assistance, supporting and promoting user indifference for the operation of the 
communications layer and thus working as a ‘managerial reinforcement of ARPA’s layering scheme’ 
(Abbate, 1999: 66). 
10For instance, Requests for Comments [RFC] were documents designed to promote the sharing of 
ideas and discussion on technical proposals in a new open field of inquiry, RFC were a standard for 
no standards of ideas, where all ideas were acceptable to open debate and informal communications 
that evolved into technical standards. 
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Modularity and accommodation of diversity were the technical and social strategies 
employed and embedded in this technology, fragmenting into “autonomous” functions 
and accommodating diversity and heterogeneity according to a minimum of rules of 
interaction in order to manage a complex technical and social system and 
successfully expand it. This layering strategy increasingly concealed the established 
hierarchies and the allocation of decision-making capabilities along with knowledge of 
the overarching operation of the system. This flexible and subtle form of management 
entailed certain degree of decentralisation, as each component had a function but 
none of them was indispensable. A specific balance between autonomy and overall 
stability of the system was achieved ‘instrumentally’ (Agamben, 2015) as autonomy 
that enacts design as the instrument’s own nature, indifferent and built to perform its 
functions without knowing anything about the principal end this performance is 
serving at a systemic level.  
 
The following section engages with the analysis of the parameters of control and 
orientation of the overarching economy of the networking system being designed. 
Although generally dismissed in favour of a more academic and scientific reading of 
the motivations that promoted and designed the Internet (Townes, 2012), the 
following section argues that military, entrepreneurial and scientific interests were 
intertwined in the design and expansion of the Internet, conditioning participation and 
shared knowledge through concealment by design. Just like instrumentality, the 
principal actor and his agenda are generally ignored by the elements of the system, 
which, limited to perform according to their design, reproduce an economy that 
conceals the principal actor’s ends as the instruments’ own nature. 
 
3.1.4 Points of authority and what government means: Military, entrepreneurial and 
scientific control and orientation 
 
Despite the flexibility and common background and collegial style of technical 
procedure, ARPA held authority and the key decision-making position, determining 
the direction of the project, mediating any disputes between members of the project 
and limiting the degree of external participation. This was clearly seen for instance 
when Charles Taylor, IPTO director in 1965, recruited Lawrence Roberts from the 
Lincoln Lab by conditioning funding to his participation in the project (Lukasik, 2011: 
11). Such enforcement capacity became quite evident when Roberts recalled a 
fundamental dynamic saying: ‘The universities were being funded by us, and we said: 
“We are going to build a network and you are going to participate in it”’ (Roberts, 
1989: 16). The collegial style, flexibility in management, and the open inquiry model 
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(doing basic research while postponing its explicit military and defence application) 
were framed and made possible by the funding scheme and decision-making capacity 
of ARPA and the state apparatus. Therefore, although there was vast space for 
freedom of inquiry and freedom in terms of technical management and problem-
solving, the US government through ARPA integrated the system on the basis of an 
already existing cultural environment of elites and social networks, producing new 
managerial forms. 
 
The actors involved in the project shared a common practice and values as they 
came from a common background and as ARPA, in connecting research centres, 
gathered computer scientists from all across the country, also aiming at generating a 
shared sense of purpose and values, a shared sense of community through a task in 
common. There was a collegial style amongst members of a managerial and scientific 
elite. As Lukasik would explain, ARPA made an ‘extraordinary effort… on recruiting 
[what he considered] the best people for its programs’, which implied as well that 
‘ARPA operated based on partnership with, and consensus among, its world-class 
contractors. It was not about to pull rank and tell national experts they were wrong, a 
position that would be inconsistent with why they were part of the ARPA program’ 
(and as it was a relatively new development where not much experience had been 
garnered) (Lukasik, 2011: 11). Despite the participants’ temporary adscription, be it a 
private corporation like BB&N, a university like UCLA or the IPTO, they were all 
represented in the effort to put together the network and collaborated despite 
competition among them.  
 
In addition to a sense of purpose, underlying social schemes and practices allowed 
members social mobility, performing as scientists and entrepreneurs or scientists and 
managers, or even scientists, managers and future entrepreneurs. This is the case of 
Robert Kahn and Lawrence Roberts, the former assistant designer of the ARPANET, 
coming from BB&N and working on the Internet, and the latter already director of 
IPTO in ARPA by 1969. In an entrepreneurial fashion, Roberts for instance, ‘began 
looking for ways to spread ARPANET out of the US’ and by 1971 had programmed a 
demonstration of ARPANET for which Kahn was the main responsible (Townes, 
2012: 49). According to Vinton Cerf (Cerf and Kahn, 2006), another member of the 
project, BB&N had gotten interested in the possibility of commercial networking and 
that manifested itself in the form of a company called Telenet´ (Cerf and Kahn, 2006: 
35-36). The idea of Telenet came from BB&N and was planned and created by Steve 
Levy and Robert Kahn a few months before the latter joined ARPA and almost a year 
before Roberts left the agency to join Telenet as president of the company. The same 
happened with Barry Wessler, member of DARPA who later joined Telenet.  
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As Vinton Cerf (Ibid: 36) claimed, it was a ‘small community’ and there was ‘an 
amazing amount of interaction and coincidence’. The ‘government’ ARPA practiced 
was a government consisting of individuals like the researchers and entrepreneurs 
involved, the managers of ARPA were scientists as well and had been involved in 
military and government affairs in addition to their provenance from high rank 
corporations and potential as entrepreneurs at any time (Hafner and Lyon, 1999). 
Therefore, to divorce state management, research, and military and entrepreneurial 
interests and values becomes increasingly difficult considering the high degree of 
‘interaction and coincidence’, as Cerf claimed (Cerf and Kahn, 2006: 36), and as it 
was the same government and cultural structure that allowed all these interests and 
values to interplay. In simple terms, informal and new management mechanisms and 
high mobility within a community of elite members allowed innovation, efficiency and 
adaptability of immediate goals, although always framed by entrepreneurial, scientific 
and military efforts to obtain national benefit. 
 
Silicon Valley and the computing industry preceded ARPA’s environment of 
innovation and freedom of inquiry, or participation and collegiality, as such an 
environment was related to government participation and management. All within a 
defence and security-related economy. This industry did not develop in the United 
States out of nothing; it did not simply ‘blossomed’ to use the words of Steve Blank 
(2011), who is clear about the benefit unclassified companies have had in writing the 
history of Silicon Valley. As an expression of a ‘new culture of technical 
entrepreneurship’, Route 128 was substituted by Silicon Valley, while the 
Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT) was replaced by the Universities of 
Stanford and Berkeley and the US Navy and the US Air Force were substituted by 
DARPA (Ceruzzi, 2003: 140). 
 
This transition started during WWII, when the state systematically began recruiting 
the best faculty members and graduate students for weapons laboratories. The US 
government set up the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) in 
1941, which meant calling for researchers’ collaboration with the government. 
Researchers worked as civilians and maintained a certain degree of freedom in the 
way they organized themselves around technical production: developing research 
within the university while receiving government funding and classifying research 
products. After the war, in the case of the University of Stanford, where the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Navy and the Air Force had 
invested interests, Frederick Terman, dean of the School of Engineering, disposed all 
university resources as available for those graduate students willing to develop 
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private companies, start-ups that would become defense contractors, encouraged by 
Terman and his own experience developing technology during WWII (Blank, 2011; 
Saxenian, 1996). Terman, and William Shockley and the rise of risk capital in 1958, 
changed the relationship between start-up companies and entrepreneurs and 
universities. As Blank (2011) emphasizes, companies were not only producing 
components but entire systems for the military as contractors. This is how Silicon 
Valley was made possible, with the crucial support of universities and government 
amid a shared call for entrepreneurial effort and national superiority and combining 
the right dosage and version of freedom of inquiry, spontaneous innovation, national 
security and central management.  
 
As AnnaLee Saxenian (1996) emphasised, Silicon Valley employed a ‘network-based 
industrial system’; understood as a whole that nevertheless required the ‘system´s 
decentralization’, unfolding as a network in ‘the pursuit of multiple technical 
opportunities through spontaneous regroupings of skill, technology, and capital’, just 
what technological development in informatics demanded (Saxenian, 1996: 9). Like 
ARPANET, the innovating firms of Silicon Valley were ‘organized to adapt 
continuously to fast-changing markets and technologies’ (Ibid.), and the way they did 
so was through an entrepreneurial scheme of flexibility and high-risk high-gain in 
research and development; funded, oriented and managed within national defence 
prerogatives but always consistent with commercial applications. This means that 
from the beginnings of the informatic boom in the US, collaborative work between US 
government, universities and private sector was fostered by academic commitment to 
the war effort and National Security first, in Terman´s case, and to commercial benefit 
in the case of his colleagues and students. 
 
The foundations of Silicon Valley and ARPA are the best examples of how free 
inquiry, National Security and commercial benefit intersected in an entrepreneurial 
effort of national superiority, in which decentralisation and adaptability were oriented 
by fast-changing markets and technologies. The following section explains how in 
correspondence to the informal forms of management that appeared in the US, the 
Internet would emerge through a standard protocol, concealing its control elements 







3.1.5 The internetworking/Internet project and the Transfer Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP): Management through a simplified version of the system  
 
By 1975 a packet radio network (PRNET) was already experimentally running based 
on the ARPANET technology but for radio transmission. By then, also satellite 
technology was also being fostered and envisioned as a global system: the Atlantic 
Packet Satellite Network (SATNET) project. In the case of PRNET, the aim was to 
develop ‘packet switching in command-and-control in battlefield conditions’; in the 
case of SATNET, the aim was ‘linking seismic monitoring stations in Scandinavia 
(established to monitor Soviet nuclear testing) with the US’ (Naughton, 2016: 9). By 
the second half of the 1970’s three networks (ARPANET, PRNET and SATNET) were 
working on packet-switching technology and the effort to incorporate them in an 
overarching ‘Internetwork’ brought the necessity to develop a shared language or 
protocol.  
 
Although it was not an explicit element of ARPA’s project of networking, the 
internetworking project was developed in the process of networking military 
technology by the US military. Crucially, as the internetworking project aimed at 
interconnecting heterogeneous networks, it required a host protocol or transmission 
standard to be implemented (O’Regan, 2012: 104). Even more flexible and 
decentralized than ARPANET, ARPA contractors Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf would 
manage to model this new network of networks, starting in 1973 with an idea for ‘A 
Protocol for Packet Network Interconnection’ (Cerf and Kahn, 1974). Such standard 
protocol would connect and adapt once disparate networks and still appear seamless. 
 
The protocol was the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and was designed to work 
on reliable and unreliable networks (like PRN). TCP would verify packets, correct 
errors and control the data flow. It integrated the divided functions of the subnet and 
the host protocols of the ARPANET. In 1978 the TCP was divided into a Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) and an Internet Protocol (IP), the first a host-to-host protocol 
in charge of ordering packets and overseeing and controlling data transfer, and the 
second in charge of routing and fragmentation of packets, selecting paths for ‘moving 
data across a network’ (Galloway, 2004: 42-44).  
 
This flexible routing system is achieved through a “hopping” process whereby 
data is passed from computer to computer in sequence. None of the computers in 
the chain of hops knows definitively where the desired destination lies. But they 
do know in which general direction the destination is… Each node in the network 
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knows not where the final destination is, but simply which direction, or “next-hop,” 
will get it closer to its destination (Galloway, 2004: 45).  
 
Fragmented and flexible but always oriented, the form of coordination that is the 
protocol corresponds to the overall strategy of modularity and the underlying 
commitment of its designers to manage complex processes and accommodate 
difference through limitation of knowledge and simplification. In this way, the Internet 
is modulated and ‘Information does flow, but it does so in a highly regulated manner’ 
(Thacker, 2004: xiv). Despite concealing it in the form of flexibility, ‘the founding 
principle of the Net is control, not freedom— [as] control has existed from the 
beginning’ (Ibid).  
 
‘TCP/IP is a modular family of protocols’ that contains and provides ‘a wide range of 
highly segmented functions’ (Hall, 2000: 6). This protocol is a common and all-
encompassing language and orientation for segmented elements and functions; it ‘is 
not a single monolithic protocol, but instead is a collection of protocols that range from 
application-specific functions like web browsing down to the low-level networking 
protocols like IP and TCP’ (Ibid). Information is controlled and regulated although 
such controls have been embedded deep into a shared language and its imagination 
of autonomy: the network being ‘made up of intelligent end-point systems that are 
self-deterministic’ (Hall, 2000: 6). As it has been defined, the ‘“Internet” (with a capital 
“I”) refers to the specific global network of TCP/IP-based systems, originally 
consisting of ARPAnet and the other research networks’ (Hall, 2000: 5). Envisaged as 
global, self-determination depends on being part of a globalising and seamless 
network that offers an increasing variety of “general-purpose” applications. 
 
While layering produced ignorance about the complex and overarching operation of 
the system, the US government through ARPA’s management directed and 
integrated the whole technical and social system. Researchers did not have to know 
anything about the workings of other layers of the system but shared a common 
orientation, imperative and social values. Within technical task groups a collegial style 
was implemented that was only possible amongst members of a managerial and 
scientific elite carefully selected by ARPA officials. The informal management style 
with a command and control imperative consolidated then into a protocol, 
implemented hierarchically and designed to maintain the appearance of a seamless, 
scientific and general-purpose network that simplifies communications. In terms of 
instrumentality and the concealment of the principal actor and its ‘economy’, this 
appearance as seamless and its concealment of control would last and eventually 
become an imperative clearly expressed by Google’s Eric Schmidt when stating ‘that 
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“the Internet will disappear”,’ referring to an all-encompassing mediated experience – 
the Internet of things – in which tech companies would manage the environment for 
users, creating a ‘seamless experience that makes the line between reality, 
technology and technology companies impossible to distinguish’ (Simmons, 2015).  
 
Knowing-nothing-about has been a recurrent theme throughout the hierarchical 
layering of ARPANET, the internetworking project and the Internet, helping to manage 
a complex environment and offering a simplified version of the system, hiding 
diversity and accommodating it within an established function and standard of 
communication, always aiming at the ongoing expansion of the system. Accordingly, 
as the protocol developed and initially expanded, ARPA was increasingly seen as ill-
suited as a communications services provider. The interest in encouraging and 
promoting the adoption of TCP moved beyond the limits of ARPA researchers and 
into the international arena as a successful instrument of coordination whose control 
features were embedded although increasingly concealed.  
 
3.2 Expanding the protocol: Managing diversity through governed distribution, 
simplification and concealment 
 
As part of broader instrumental dispositions directed towards the expansion of 
mediation, economic benefit and ‘simplification’ of communications and interactions, 
the Internet depended on the standardisation of the TCP/IP protocol, making 
operating systems include the protocol by default. DoD’s decision-making and control 
position made possible such expansion and was crucial to establishing a market. In 
this way, the establishment of a networking industry marketplace was dependent on 
state direction and funding, meaning that the protocol and operating systems and 
infrastructures were conducted and adapted accordingly. In the same way, the 
international expansion of the Internet depended on the expansion of open operating 
systems like UNIX, which included and distributed, for free, the TCP/IP protocol thus 
enabling heterogeneous systems and computers to connect to the Internet. Beyond a 
happy or for-free technical coincidence at the level of computing resources, this 
technical and increasingly global level of operation and coordination of computing and 
networking technologies expressed broader social and political underpinnings, mainly 
linked to National Security and social stability through accommodation of diversity.  
 
The Internet and software programming (e.g. UNIX operating systems) were similar in 
terms of flexibility and accommodation of heterogeneity in the management and 
control of technical complexity. These similarities, beyond the technical sphere and 
underpinning Eric Schmidt’s ideal above, point to the symmetries between managing 
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a complex system in computing and networking developments and doing so in terms 
of political and social life. The following sections underscore generally 
unacknowledged and concealed vectors that bridge social, cultural and computational 
environments using one common form of administration and set of values, a dispositif 
that would instrumentally and strategically conceal the indissociable links between 
state government control and commercial opportunities within the aim of national 
superiority, on the one hand; and on the other, the general system’s operation of 
managing a complex system on the basis of fragmentation, simplification, minimum 
standardisation and limitation of knowledge and participation.  
 
3.2.1 Defense Investment in the Commercial Potential of the networks 
 
Despite the evident promotion of the protocols and packet-switching by the DoD 
through the DCA, these agencies’ interest was not only set in military terms but in 
terms of a general use of packet-switching. Expansion of the network had already 
been envisaged and commercial applications and competitiveness were seen as 
beneficial to US networking industry, the military and civilians (Kuo, 1975: 13, in 
Abbate, 1999: 135). Once DCA took over control of the ARPANET, freedom was 
tempered with a higher degree of control, fostering the expansion of the protocol and 
consolidating its commercial potential. Activities related to freedom of inquiry, 
collegiality and informality now had to comply with more formal management, 
recognition and observance of ownership permission in information sharing and 
identification of users in terms of network security (the latter as personal computers 
already appeared in 1975 and hackers could penetrate restricted areas). As part of a 
more controlled management of the network, identification of users (logins and 
passwords) as a practice emerged as an important trait of the Internet amid the 
expansion of personal computing and military management and consolidating security 
both in commercial and military terms.  
 
The final decision to push for general implementation of the protocols would come not 
from the research community but from DCA and its interest to boost the World Wide 
Military Command and Control Systems. The DCA decided to implement TCP/IP in all 
ARPANET nodes, considering that costs would fall thanks to the use of commercial 
technology and as result of a competitive dynamic in components market (Abbate, 
1999: 134-140). As a main strategy of wide diffusion of the TCP/IP, ARPA would start 
funding implementations for different operating systems. That is the case of both 
Unix, which incorporated the protocol thanks to the funds the agency conceded to 
BB&N, and IBM (Ibid). In this way, in the case of UNIX, DCA harnessed the open 
system’s strategy of ‘free adoption’ for spreading a standard and achieving its own 
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goals (Ceruzzi, 2003: 285), and in the case of IBM, it covered the main commercial 
production of computing resources. Both means would prove fundamental as well for 
international diffusion and expansion of the Internet. 
 
In 1981 a deadline was set for all ARPANET nodes to replace the Network Control 
Program (NCP) with the TCP/IP by January 1983. Flexibility was forced into an 
expansive network of networks, in a decreed and enforced manner. In addition to the 
order, ARPA’s funding of the computing industry to implement TCP/IP on their 
operating systems accomplished its general diffusion among computer scientists by 
1990 (Abbate, 1999: 143). After the ARPANET split into MILNET, operational military 
network, and ARPANET, a research oriented one, in 1983, its international expansion 
could be now mainly attributed to scientific concerns and interests. However, it is 
crucial to notice how the US government was interested in spreading the protocols for 
free rather than considering them a commodity. In this sense, Europe and Japan ‘got 
infected with TCP/IP for free (as it were)’ as their research communities imported 
workstations running BSD UNIX’ (Townes, 2012: 57). In so doing, military concerns of 
heterogeneity, decentralization, as much as simplicity and adaptability of network 
protocols, related to survivability and robustness of the system, were not only quite 
useful for civilian applications but depended on the expansion of the network. During 
this development process, commercial application was still limited but not absent. 
Furthermore, it was the specific interplay between government, scientific and private 
corporate actors and dynamics of direct control, informal management and free 
inquiry and research development, which in a broader social and political scope gave 
it the perfect formula for future commercial success, fostering, offering and then 
conducting the standard protocol to manage and accommodate heterogeneity without 
disrupting the whole system or, in this case, US political economy.  
 
3.2.2 Harnessing the fragments of a complex system and accommodating 
heterogeneity in informatics, security and social life 
 
In relation to US imperatives, the protocol constituted a fundamental management 
style to be expanded and exported through higher degrees of control, necessary in 
order to force flexibility into expansiveness. Through DCA, direct control propelled 
free development into commercial success, informatically and technically. 
Preinstalled, free and open software was fostered by DCA to expand the protocol. In 
the case of the UNIX system, necessary to run the Internet nodes, this operating 
system worked by hiding internal operations, simplifying processes, accommodating 
multiple languages of coding and distorting clarity in particular ways. This logic, 
beyond the informatic sphere constituted a process of social management that 
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promised to simplify operations through concealment and fragmentation. No true way 
in coding had its symmetries with social reality as neoliberalism diffused specific ways 
of accommodating cultural diversity through the management and accommodation of 
identities (or so-called politics of identity). 
 
In relation to the broad intricacies, interplays and correspondences between public 
service, defence, private corporations and researchers in connection with social, 
cultural and computational environments, UNIX and the Internet mirrored each other 
in terms of their social implications. Accordingly, Tara McPherson (2009) has 
identified modularity and diversity as rules and strategies that emerged not only in 
computer programming but also in response to security imperatives proper to the 
Cold War era and that permeated into the broader cultural, racial, academic and 
political areas of life in the US. These imperatives emerged as fundamental to 
operating systems in computer programming in line with developments in hardware 
design starting in the 1950’s (Kernighan and Plauger, 1976; McPherson, 2009).  
 
Modularity had an important role in hiding information about the functioning of the 
system, fragmenting knowledge of the whole into interchangeable parts and 
functions. This is the same operation Unix, ‘created as a multiuser, multitasking 
system for use by programmers’ (Byrd, 1997), performed as the operating system of 
‘the most common nodes on the Internet´(Ceruzzi, 2003: 247). This operating system 
was designed to comprise autonomous yet flexible elements, embedded with the 
philosophy of providing ‘simple, yet powerful utilities that could be pieced together in a 
flexible manner to perform a wide variety of tasks’ (Byrd, 1997).  
 
The Unix system endorsed coding as a clean exercise and connected independently 
designed tools for general purpose tasks, tools that were replaceable without 
disrupting other parts of the whole system and making the system ´hidden from the 
user, silent in operation’ so ‘the user can´t tell what state the system is in’ (Norman, 
1981: 1). Instrumentality, hiding the frame of reference of the system’s end and 
concealing its intricacies through “general-purpose” applications, guaranteed that the 
instruments’ nature/design although appearing autonomous, corresponded to the 
system’s overall economy. In situ, while ‘hidden data are often talked about as a 
matter of simple standardization and efficiency… they also clearly work in the service 
of new regimes of security, not an insignificant detail in the context of the cold war 
era’ (McPherson, 2009). Such regimes included practices of hiding information 
through ‘pipe’ mechanisms in order to avoid a ‘clear-text version of the data’ 
(Kernighan and Plauger, 1976: 3), strengthening encryption and secrecy. Thus, as 
McPherson (2009) explained, ‘programming manuals and UNIX guides again and 
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again stressed clarity and simplicity (don’t write fancy code; say what you mean as 
clearly and directly as you can), but the structures of operating systems like UNIX 
function by hiding internal operations, skewing “clarity” in very particular directions’. 
 
In addition to modularity, Unix accommodated heterogeneity. The ‘Unix tradition 
[included] a healthy mistrust of “one true way” approaches to software design or 
implementation. It [embraced] multiple languages, open extensible systems, and 
customization hooks everywhere’ (Raymond, 2003: 50), just like the form of 
coordination and management embedded in the Internet and its TCP/IP protocol. As 
McPherson insisted, in a broader context, this form of coordinating diversity, along 
with that of modularity in the development of computing systems, would resemble ‘the 
tenets of neoliberal multiculturalism’ and ‘post-Fordism, a mode of production that 
begins to remake industrial-era notions of standardization in the 1960s: time-space 
compression, transformability, customization, a public/private blur, and so on’ 
(McPherson, 2009). But not only that, for McPherson it is social life in the US that was 
reflected in these forms of coordination, in which ‘neoliberal pluralism’ works as a 
cover for more explicit racial logics in that country (Ibid). ‘These covert racial logics 
take hold at the tail end of the civil rights movement at least partially to cut off and 
contain the more radical logics implicit in the urban uprisings that shook Detroit, 
Watts, Chicago, and Newark… Across several registers, the emerging neoliberal 
state begins to adopt the Rule of Modularity’ (Ibid). This can be seen, according to the 
author, in ‘the emergence of identity politics in the 1960s as a kind of social and 
political embrace of modularity and encapsulation, a mode of partitioning that turned 
away from the broader forms of alliance-based and globally inflected political practice 
that characterized both labour politics and antiracist organizing in the 1930s and 
1940s’ (Ibid). Such broader forms of association were weakened by the expansion of 
communication and digital technologies along the process of trans-nationalisation of 
production and the spread of financial capitalism (Harvey, 2007; McCarthy, 2015: 86, 
Spivak, 2015).  
 
Modularity and diversity were ‘meant to decrease “global complexity” and cleanly 
separate one “neighbour from another”’ having an impact and correspondence with 
politics and the increasingly niched and regimented production of knowledge in the 
university after World War II’, itself transforming from bureaucratic into Taylorist11 and 
																																																								
11  According to the Encyclopedia Britannica (no date), Taylorism is the ‘system of scientific 
management advocated by Fred W. Taylor. In Taylor’s view, the task of factory management was to 
determine the best way for the worker to do the job, to provide the proper tools and training, and to 
provide incentives for good performance. He broke each job down into its individual motions, analyzed 
these to determine which were essential, and timed the workers with a stopwatch. With unnecessary 
motion eliminated, the worker, following a machinelike routine, became far more productive’. 
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then managerial forms of organisation (McPherson, 2009). Universities in the US 
performed a regimented production of knowledge, bringing knowledge together as 
functional, rather than truthful, within a system whose principal end is generally 
unknown. In turn, informatics bridged and concealed the social system’s general 
economy of harmonising military, economic and scientific interests. Along these lines, 
designers’ prerogative to create and manage a complex technical and social system 
on behalf of others concealed its forms of coordinating difference and reordering 
inclusion and exclusion, bringing together knowledges and practices without a 
general sense of its overarching economy and purpose or an effective way to 
participate in its overall definition, but introducing ‘decentralised’, fragmentary and 
simple understandings and meanings regarding these economy and goals. In 
managing a complex environment modularity as a form of coordination 
accommodated difference but concealed its own parameters of inclusion and 
exclusion, the latter increasingly subtle and more effective.  
 
3.3 Commercialising the Internet: Privatisation, decentralisation and new 
markets 
 
The social and cultural context in the US not only affected the design of the Internet 
and its embedded values but also contributed to reduce the visibility of government 
participation and importance in the production of a new market. Once entrepreneurial 
efforts were put in place and a market had been consolidated through federal support 
and funding, the Internet acquired a more politically neutral image through 
privatisation. As a general-purpose technology, its distributed organisation and control 
appeared as a fully decentralised network underpinned and possible thanks to 
scientific and research interests and agendas. However, it was the combination 
between an informal management and control exerted by the government, the free 
inquiry model followed by scientists and researchers, and the entrepreneurial effort 
always present amongst participants (i.e. government, science and business 
altogether) that made the network and its ongoing expansion possible. More 
importantly, as the following subsections show, this combination became possible as 
it was based on shared values of private property, commercial opportunity and 
defence applications, whose sense of purpose and orientation consisted of 
commercial benefit and national superiority through adapting to new fast-changing 
markets and expanding into a global marketplace of new resources. In this new global 
marketplace, instrumentality would be consolidated in a new form with the emergence 
of users as main resource of commercial value. 
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The following sub-sections show how the characteristic form of management of the 
Internet and its relationship to federal support is a reiteration of the form of 
coordination and strategy present in ARPA, the consolidation of the computing 
industry and the emergence and burgeoning of Silicon Valley after World War II. Such 
a relationship introduced a broader form of establishing collaboration and 
coordination within national limits and between high-level actors in the US. As a 
result, this relationship enhanced the active role of the state in terms of funding, 
coordination and decision-making, while maintaining and administering scientific 
practices of open inquiry and exchange of information, collegiality and 
decentralisation. Beyond its digital tenets, such form of management has entailed a 
dynamic interplay between National Security, defence concerns, economic and 
technological development, network protocols and structure, on the one hand; and, 
on the other, open inquiry and basic research, decentralisation, collegiality, 
spontaneity and innovation, drawing attention to either of them depending on the 
circumstances but generally consolidating the capacity to hide its control and direction 
prerogatives.  
 
3.3.1 Exporting a protocol: The international expansion of TCP/IP and governed 
decentralisation 
 
The initial International expansion of the ARPANET was only possible within the 
military and defence prerogatives of data provision to US policy makers about Soviet 
nuclear testing (Naughton, 2016: 9; Townes, 2012: 50) and its opportunities for 
commercial and scientific development expectations of researchers. The idea of the 
network’s global expansion was always present among the architects of ARPANET 
and the Internet, not only regarding a globalizing economy led by corporations and 
the military apparatus, but also yielding the more ingenious scientific minds, revolving 
around ideas of a network that would connect the entire world, a ‘global’ expectation 
of expansion or ‘dreams of worldwide networks of computers’ (O’Regan, 2012: 103). 
This was as much the case of Licklider, Cerf and the scientists working at Bolt, 
Beranek and Newman, as it was of command, control and communications 
imperatives among the military (Cerf and Kahn, 2006: 37). However, the decisive 
matter would be national security in military terms. This means that the first 
international connection of the ARPANET was possible thanks to the Nuclear 
Monitoring Research Office (NMRO), which was looking to connect a seismic station 
in Norway to ARPANET in order to have a faster way for data transmission to the US. 
Despite researchers’ efforts in the US and abroad to establish a connection to the UK, 
where Donald Davies had developed important research on packet-switching 
technologies, it was too expensive and the UK connection only came as a result of 
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connecting the Norwegian seismic monitoring station (Lukasik, 2011: 15; Townes, 
2012: 50). The tempering element in the balance between research interests and 
security was then dependent on the latter and its broader dispositions within a 
national security agenda. 
 
In turn, the Internet seemed to find general acceptance as an international technology 
(as ‘it is difficult to imagine that any other sort of Internet could have replaced what 
was already the Internet by the early 1990s’) when ‘the countries connected to the 
TCP/IP Internet included most of NATO, most of the OECD and all of the G-7… [and] 
most of the critical users – especially academic computer scientists – in these 
countries were using TCP/IP’ (Townes, 2012: 62). A crucial underlying principle of the 
network was and is that ‘the larger the network is, the far more efficient it becomes’, 
according to the ‘law of large numbers, in as much as a large population of unknown 
players or messages collectively behave in a very predictable fashion, a fashion we 
can write down exactly. And therefore we can predict the performance of the network 
when it is large’ (Kleinrock, in Herzog, 2016). The Internet was expanding both civilian 
and commercial, but also military, nodes across the world, to be connected according 
to their own (designed and embedded) way of imagining and designing management. 
If we consider a protocol as ‘a distributed management system that allows control to 
exist within a heterogeneous material milieu’ (Galloway, 2004: 8), then the US has 
been exporting a distributed ‘matrix of practical reason’ (Foucault, 1997b: 225), a 
subtle embodied technique that corresponds to a broader disposition of things 
(Lemke, 2015). This means that this protocol as a dispositif, entails a strategic 
general orientation and spatial order, those of national security, commercial benefit 
and global expansion, and a form of coordinating a heterogeneous ensemble 
accordingly. As a flexible and distributed system and form of coordinating, governing 
or disposing things within an economy that displays freedom and innovation, the 
Internet persuades and convinces, simplifies and manages a complex technical and 
social environment on behalf of its users, in order to expand its reach, while 
concealing its economic foundation and its constitutive complexity and overall 
structure as a whole.  
 
Layering and modularity were crucial for the stable development of the system, 
managing disruption by isolating components through fragmentation without 
disrupting the whole. The decentralized nature of control made it robust, resistant to 
disruption, while its adaptability was always in relation to its expandability, both 
relying on a simplified version of the whole and reducing the intricacies of and for its 
new elements. Everything was open to instrumentalisation within the system: its 
components were considered autonomous to the extent they performed the task they 
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had been designed to perform without understanding or participating of the definition 
of the overarching economy that governs them. Decentralised authority and 
distributed management were a function of control at a distance and from within. 
Therefore, the growth of the Internet can be understood as a decentralised process 
whose expanding motion was already prescribed in its design; once the protocol was 
standardized, the network was expected to grow on its own and diffuse operation 
responsibility. Further additions would follow on combining centralisation and 
decentralisation, for instance the Domain Name System (DNS) and efforts to organise 
network resources. However, the main values and social structure endorsed were 
stable. Beyond characterisations of the Internet as an open field of participation and 
scientific, active commitment, specific frameworks for social groups, interests and 
values were defined from its beginnings. 
 
3.3.2 From computer programmers to final users: Privatisation as a shared cultural 
value 
 
As John Unsworth (2001) has put it, ‘UNIX is deeply indebted to culturally determined 
notions such as private property, class membership, and hierarchies of power and 
effectivity’. Additionally, the author argues, ‘the constellation of cultural elements 
gathered together in UNIX’s basic operating principles seems particularly Western 
and capitalist—not surprisingly, given that its creators were human extensions of one 
of the largest accumulations of capital in the Western world’ (Ibid). A statement not 
only applicable to Unix but to the Internet and many other technologies spurring at the 
time and more specifically related to US cultural values as confronted and 
harmonized with national security imperatives. 
 
Regarding the Internet, once ARPANET systems were outdated and the NSFNET 
took over the sites of ARPANET, the next step in the expansion of the network was 
privatisation and commercialisation of its products. Then, the ‘issues that the NSF 
faced in trying to privatize the Internet were in some ways very characteristic of US 
attitudes toward the role of the federal government’, as people in the US ‘tend to 
disapprove of government involvement in providing commercial goods or services […] 
(Abbate, 1999: 195). In this way, the development of the network responded to 
cultural values and was conditioned by its rentability in its expansion as a finished 
product. The state cannot sell services to its citizens, as this contravenes well-
established values of equality of opportunities and competitive self-interest of 
individuals safeguarded in private property. However, in many instances the state can 
set the entire conditions for the emergence of new markets by funding and managing 
research and development (see Chapter 4). Commercial networks emerged quite 
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quickly as the Internet was privatised, arising from NSFNET’s spin-offs, just like 
Telenet emerged from ARPANET, or from large already existing communication 
carriers (Koenigsberger, 2014). Commercial opportunity was fostered by the state, 
and its contractors were tailored to profit from it.  
 
Privatization and decentralization obeyed to revenue expectations and national 
benefit not only stated in formal policies or programs but embedded in a more 
complex context and set of relations and values. In the last instance, shared values 
and interests commonly acknowledged as politically neutral or commercially and 
scientifically oriented fostered capitalism and its renewal, and they they did so while 
paying blind eye to government funding and involvement. As McPherson (2009) has 
pointed out: 
 
Computer programmers in the 1970s are interestingly situated. They are on the 
one hand a subculture (often overlapping with the counterculture), but they are 
also part of an increasingly managerial class that will help society transition to 
regimes of neoliberalism and governmentality. Their dreams of libraries of code 
may be democratic in impulse, but they also increasingly support postindustrial 
forms of labor (McPherson, 2009). 
 
This kind of ambivalence and unintended collaboration accommodates alternative 
thinking into diverse forms of unfolding capitalism. This instrumental situation 
harmonizes democracy and freedom with developmentalism and security through 
concealing the general economy of the system or making it tolerable, even desirable, 
within a common set of values, be it competitiveness and rejection of state provision, 
or freedom and democracy through digital literacy and technology.  
 
Computing programmers were key in helping transition to neoliberalism and the 
computing industry crucial in increasingly attracting people into a shared set of values 
that portrayed the Internet as a politically neutral technology, a super-information 
highway and a new market. However, internationalisation of the TCP/IP protocol did 
not come from a worldwide or international community of programmers and users 
who agreed on such protocols as the best fit to this community’s shared needs. To 
globalise it had to standardise, accommodate and turn its components compatible, all 
within a decision-making process that stayed anchored in the US and the 
homogenisation imposed by the DoD and the imaginations of a global network upheld 
by ARPANET designers. The internationalisation of the Internet was possible only 
within the security imperatives of nuclear monitoring, imperatives that once the 
protocol expanded as a managerial style were concealed under commercial 
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practices. Privatisation and the creation of new markets were values that allowed the 
network expand and be further commercialised, always fostered and funded by the 
state according to long-established US values and ideals.  
 
While it was difficult at first to make sense of the commercial benefits of the Internet 
outside its scientific, defence research and security applications, during the 1990’s it 
became clear how the current main asset of the Internet, people, started taking 
central stage in its expansion, as the intricacies of a complex technical and social 
system kept being presented in more simple terms. Overall, the privatisation of the 
Internet would correspond to the emergence of Web browsers and the expanding 
diffusion of personal computing. From the personal computer to the World Wide Web, 
everything was done to guarantee people were attracted to computing and its 
networking possibilities. The computing market was seducing people into learning 
how to use computers, and the Internet. The Web was making things easy and 
allowing users to create and diffuse more contents and media in increasingly 
alternative ways. Multimedia features could accommodate different technologies and 
types of information while favouring electronic commerce (Hughes, 1995), fueling an 
expanding market and a ‘technical utopia’ of an ‘information superhighway’ shared by 
designers, businesses, politicians and individuals (Flichy, 2007). The following section 
explains how the globalising expansion of this ‘general-purpose’ technology was 
promoted and supported by the US government on the basis of capitalist expansion. 
As a consequence, the expansion of the Internet would increasingly transform users 
into exploitable data and thus increasingly mediate social interactions. 
 
3.3.3 The flexibility, adaptability and expansion of US governmental, entrepreneurial 
and scientific orientation: Towards a global marketplace of new resources 
 
Once the Cold War was over, the military imperative modified from weaponry to 
information technology but the central role of US government continued, expanding 
the coordination model initiated with ARPANET and the Internet and further 
developing its commercial value in a global market. What private industry and free 
inquiry could have never developed on their own, a globalizing and public appealing 
technology, was in turn developed while supported by US government funds and 
(informal) management.  
 
By 1989, the potential of the Internet and computing expansion for the US as a 
dominant nation was expressed by Senator of the US Al Gore in his High-
Performance Computing and Communication Act (HPCA) and then developed into 
Bill Clinton’s High-Performance Computing and Communications Initiative. This 
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meant more federal resources for the IT sector and stronger bonds between 
government, private industry and academia. Private-public partnerships were 
endorsed and promoted by the federal government, drawing a closer link between 
federal research laboratories and the potential commercial ventures for new products. 
And once again, research products were not immediately out, dealing with a 
competitive international market, but research was ‘precompetitive and generic’, 
aiming to standardise and find application in ‘specific industrial sectors for product-
based research and development’ before exporting its products to foreign markets 
(Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 58).  
 
A global market and the imperative of global expansion were being steadily 
constructed through a complex dynamic of public and private funding jointly prompted 
towards a new space and market. This new market, and new world (see Gore, 1994), 
required legal modifications and the liberalization of the telecommunications economy 
in the US and abroad (Cowhey et al., 2009; Hills, 2007), allowing the rhetoric of free 
flow of information, now invested with all the economic power of commerce, to 
expand through economic and governance models like the Internet governance 
model, where private actors are favoured under the cover of civil society 
organizations (Carr, 2015; Powles, 2015; Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 62).   
  
Increasingly, the IT sector in the US was crucial for US and world’s economy with 
estimates of ‘40 per cent of productivity growth between 1995 and 2002 [being] down 
to communications technology’ (McCarthy, 2015: 87), until the dot-com bubble crisis. 
In 2001 the inflated value of the telecom and Internet industry shares led to the asset 
bubble collapse and huge losses in the sector. Then, while venture capital fled, the 
government was in a good place for a crucial move that would relaunch the industry. 
The CIA through its venture capital firm In-Q-Tel would start funding entrepreneurial 
efforts, linking ‘technology companies with real-world problems–via its massive 
intelligence apparatus–’ and serving as indicator of potential development and 
profitability in a struggling uncertain sector, bringing confidence and attracting 
additional private investment for start-ups (Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 66). Once 
again, the US federal government was able to safeguard and fund a space for field 
research, fostering its development and supporting it as a basis for more meaningful 
commercial and security developments.  
 
The reemergence of the sector however, would rely as well on the awareness of the 
fundamental resource and product of the Internet: people. The crisis required a 
shared effort of renewal, and the Web 2.0 and social media platforms would perfectly 
underline the new resource scope that was being called upon to support the industry, 
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although drawing on the promotion of already existing applications sold as novel in 
order to convince investors into the new start of the industry. Web 2.0, with its main 
alleged characteristics – ‘radical decentralization, radical trust, participation instead of 
publishing, users as contributors, rich user experience, the long tail, the web as 
platform, control of one’s own data, remixing data, collective intelligence, attitudes, 
better software by more users, play, undetermined user behaviour’ (Fuchs, 2017: 34) 
– were an updated version and extension of ARPANET and the Internet’s necessity of 
expansion. Expansiveness, once crucial for technical improvement, predictability of 
network performance (see Kleinrock in Herzog, 2016) and technological vanguard, 
became the foundation of commercial profit through market and resource expansion 
and the predictability of both market and individuals’ behaviour. As Fuchs (2017: 35) 
remarks, Tim O’Reilly, who coined the term Web 2.0, recognized this term was meant 
to attract investment through restoring confidence, but more important, O’Reilly 
recognized too the importance of users in co-creating ‘the value of platforms’ (e.g. 
Google, Facebook, Amazon, Wikipedia).  
 
Global expansion into a global market emerged as a US imperative and more federal 
resources and the liberalisation of the telecommunications market followed. The main 
resource of this expanding market was clear: users as information resources and co-
creators of products and data, which accounted for the value of platforms. Ultimately, 
instrumentality in the form of concealing decision and its processes was a constant in 
this form of coordination and general orientation of the network. The Internet as an 
instrument of coordination, in hiding its internal processes and managing the technical 
and social environment on behalf of users, began instrumentalising these same users 
by turning them into an exploitable resource: an instrument that behaves according to 
its own nature but for that same reason behaves according to a general economy and 




The chapter has shown how the Internet was designed and shaped instrumentally. As 
a dispositif, the Internet has fostered the imagination of a neutral and decentralised 
technology while serving a specific economy and particular interests that correspond 
to a Western and US cultural matrix. What has been argued in this chapter is that 
within such an economy and principal end, a complex technical and social system 
needs to be managed and diversity accommodated without the elements and users of 
the system knowing about the overall operation of this system, which runs according 
to capitalist imperatives of commercial benefit and national superiority and through 
advancing the creation of a seamless experience ignorant of this technology’s 
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mediation of reality. This chapter is significant for the overall argument of the thesis – 
that the internet has been reproducing colonial forms rather than politics and that a 
decolonial element needs to be included together with philosophy of technology and 
critical approaches to the internet in understanding this technology and world politics 
– as it identifies the basic form of coordination embedded in the internet and that is 
being reproduced in Mexico. Accordingly, such forms of coordination have only 
become intelligible through analysing the historicity of the internet’s design and by 
inquiring through the concept of instrumentality and the political, which destabilise 
taken-for-granted assumptions on the neutrality of critical approaches to technology 
based in a western cultural matrix.   
 
Notably, there has always been a flexible relation between control and free 
development in designing the Internet, in which the former, despite always being 
present, increasingly adopted an informal management that corresponded to the 
values and processes required to fulfil the task of building up a network of 
communications and computing resources sharing. Across different levels of technical 
operation, the underlying imperative of knowing nothing about other layers operation 
was iterated (instrumentality), which is related to the systemic invisibilisation of control 
and the emphasis on free development and innovation. This means that an 
expanding but concealed practice of control and standardisation through hiding 
operations and points of authority underpins the more popular, although always 
limited, aspects of free inquiry and development of applications and content on the 
Internet.  
 
The emphasis of the Internet’s embedded form of coordination has relied on its 
alleged capacity to create, simplify and manage technical and social complex 
systems to be functional. It has done so first, by turning systems and components 
flexible and then, through fragmentation and accommodation of diversity without 
disruption of the whole system, superseding fragments’ awareness of the overarching 
logic that governs them altogether. Therefore, flexibility has been endorsed while 
maintaining limitations and control. In the end, such form of management works as a 
form of coloniality as it is a dispossession of people’s knowledge and decision on 
setting the conditions that govern/mediate their lives (the political). Such form of 
coloniality has become visible through analysing the design of the internet and its 
strategic arrangements and will become visible in the case of the operation of the 
Internet through the so-called Web 2.0 (Chapter 4), the Mexican government’s 
digitisation policy (Chapter 5) and #YoSoy132 (Chapter 6). A characterisation that 
corresponds to the concept of instrumentality (Agamben, 2015), as explained before 






Governing the Internet and governing through the Internet: 
A globalising instrument and its coordination of resources 
 
 
Drawing on the notion of instrumentality (analysed in Chapter 2) this chapter identifies 
the distinctive form of coordination embedded in the Internet, which was detailed in 
the previous chapter, as able to instrumentally condition other societies’ behaviour 
and knowledge at a distance. It then identifies and analyses four forms of 
coordinating resources operating in and through the Internet that constitute a world-
oriented expanding form of management. The chapter argues that the form of 
coordinating resources embedded in the Internet and its more recent developments 
(Web 2.0 onwards) consists of a mediation and management able to accommodate 
different agents, ideologies and economies, even ontologies, through 
commodification and within an alleged neutral and tolerant whole that conceals its 
own overarching logic and economy and with that, its stable mediating capabilities. 
This way, the Internet has been consistently, by design, conditioning the possibility of 
a shared collective existential experience and orientation amongst its users. The 
chapter contributes to the overall argument of the thesis that states that ultimately, the 
Internet has been designed to manage intricate technical and social processes on 
behalf of others, expanding, through simplification, adaption and mediation, to 
different contexts and ideas as an instrument of coordination without politics, which 
preserves and conceals its specific control foundations in capitalist values and 
colonial practices.  
 
The chapter is organised into three sections. The first section explains how 
instrumentality is related to the Internet´s embedded form of coordination, detailed in 
the previous chapter, through specific attributes, strategies and values 
(fragmentation, simplification, functionalisation, flexibility, accommodation, limitation 
of knowledge). The section identifies and analyses four distinctive forms of 
coordinating resources expressed in new ways of conducting the government of the 
Internet and governing through the Internet: Global connectivity, Free flow of 
information, Personalisation of identity and Mediation of Subjectification. The section 
argues that control is exerted through these forms of coordinating resources based on 
concealed and specific capitalist imperatives and agendas that increasingly mediate 
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the constitution of persons as social and economic subjects and limit the possibility of 
shared collective existential orientation, understanding and conviviality. These same 
forms of coordination are to be identified in the following chapters as they are 
reiterated by the Mexican government’s digitisation policy and #YoSoy132 promotion 
of the Internet as a constitutional right.  
 
4.1 On instrumentality and the Internet: Who controls what and how? 
 
An instrument is ‘a being that, while living [acting] according to its own end [and form], 
is precisely and for that reason and to the same extent used for another’s end,’ 
although remaining unaware of such an end (Agamben, 2015: 75). Regarding modern 
technology, Giorgio Agamben (Agamben, 2015: 77) has asserted that this is 
characterised by an ‘obediential potential’ in which devices ‘have incorporated in 
themselves the operation of the principal agent and can thus “obey” its commands 
(even if these are actually inscribed into the functioning of the apparatus, in such a 
way that the one using them, in pushing the “controls,” obeys in turn a predetermined 
program)’. In this light, modern and digital technologies as the Internet and digital 
platforms, entail a third person or cause as ‘more than one’ agent and user in 
operation (see for instance Carr, 2015; Deibert and Crete-Nishihata, 2012; DeNardis 
and Hackl, 2015; Naughton, 2016; Powles, 2015). This consideration blurs the 
distinction between final user and instrument while concealing the operation and 
decision of principal agents as those who understand and define the economy and 
principal ends of the system, programming and incorporating their operation into 
technological devices.  
 
The principal agent is not or hardly is to be the specific subject or so-called final user 
employing the technological device to hand. Instead, in addition to the principal 
agent’s or designer aims and interests–the proper constituency and practice operated 
within the limits of the technological device´s form and goal– and the agent with the 
digital device in hand, there is a third cause or agent always making use of such 
instrument. That is to say that the Internet, as we will see in detail in the following 
sections and chapters, entails many different processes and users whose presence 
and operation are not visible. This multiplicity of interactions, the intricacies of the 
system, is managed, simplified and concealed by design. Take for instance the case 
of the infrastructure of the Internet, hardly accounted for by common users who 
ignore the transatlantic submarine cables that connect different regions and countries; 
or the unawareness of the fact that “the cloud” always entails data storage 
infrastructure; or at a more local scale, ignorance of whose companies’ cables have 
been deployed and operate within which block and neighborhood. Another example is 
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the ignorance that prevails regarding the algorithms used to process data and the 
privacy terms and conditions of online platforms.  
 
From hardware technology to software and telecommunications production and 
management corporations through to national governments, organizations and 
individual everyday users, and by design, the Internet is only possible in a diversified 
and hidden relation of more than two users and more than one instrument. Once the 
final users’ data and behaviour started being the main resource of the Internet and its 
new Web 2.0 platforms, users increasingly became instruments, labour (Fuchs, 2014) 
and resource in a network that conceals its own orientation, operations and control 
over its resources.  
 
One of the problems here is to know whether, when and how an instrumental or a 
principal cause and actor are at stake: i.e. whether, or in what proportion, a user is 
using or being used. In the end, what is at stake is the possibility for users of being 
other than objects of administration, data packets and thus instruments (while doing 
what they “need” to do and what they “like” according to its own end, they are 
fundamental and used for another’s end). This means, in terms of the use of the 
Internet by, say, governments different to those with privileged positions, like the US, 
in the tech and computing industry and Internet governance structure, or social 
movements and activist groups with immediate goals, being able to know whether 
and how these other agents can move off the margins of a specific governmental 
configuration. In order to achieve such knowledge, the specific form of coordination 
working on and through the Internet is explored in more detail in this chapter as 
responding to US values, interests and forms of management. Following this line of 
argument, the form of coordination and rationality of government embedded in the 
Internet corresponds to the conditions in which control is meant to remain in the social 
structure of the US while autonomy and flexibility are instrumentally required.  
 
Embedded in the Internet, and as detailed in the following sections, is a form of 
instrumentality that has unfolded into a huge capacity to articulate autonomy and 
diversity within a specific understanding and practice of capitalism. This economy and 
its specific form, previous to and over the years the Internet has been developed (see 
the previous chapter), has acknowledged the necessity to manage complex 
processes through the fundamental assumption that reality (or in the computing 
technical sphere the system or the network) can and must be simplified through 
fragmentation, functionalisation and appropriation, turning it flexible and adaptable. 
Such a reality or system entails the possibility of autonomy and freedom in terms of 
commercial opportunities, self-interest and social existence framed within a shared 
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motivation and sense of national superiority. As detailed in the previous chapter, the 
design and broader disposition of the Internet stands for the capacity to coordinate 
and manage, make sense and spread the efficient interplay between flexibility, 
adaptability and autonomy, on the one hand; and control, expansion and general 
orientation, on the other. By design and through limitation in the production of shared 
knowledge and truth about the whole system, such form of coordination hides its 
points and logics of control while emphasising its flexibility. Through the lens of such 
a dynamic, more recent forms of coordinating and designing the Internet (the so-
called web 2.0 and the cybersecurity and social media) become visible once its state 
and commercial dynamics are not seen as divorced but as constitutive and 
indissociable parts of a whole.  Therefore, security and control concerns involving 
surveillance, along with freedom concerns about the flow of information and freedom 
of expression, unfold together through four basic rationalities currently underpinning 
the Internet: global connectivity, free flow of information, personalisation of identity 
and mediation of subjectification.  
 
4.2 Government at a distance: Global connectivity, Free flow of information, 
Personalisation of identity and Mediation of Subjectification 
 
As explained before, the Internet does not only resemble freedom or autonomy, it is 
not only about open inquiry and communications, but has always been dependent on 
the capacity to enact control in terms of technological vanguard, resource sharing, 
safe communications, financial savings and market expansion and military and civil 
applications in order to deliver national benefit. As such, the development of the 
Internet further intertwined a control imperative and the flexibility and advantages of 
autonomy, although in a qualitative and quantitatively differentiated way. The form of 
management that corresponds to such intertwining entails a more complicated logic, 
once the primary object to be managed and exploited stopped being computing 
resources and communications and started being everyday life data and people. This 
section draws upon Agamben’s (2015) conception of instrumentality to distinguish the 
actors that have shaped both dynamics of control and autonomy, mediating 
subjectification within and regarding the Internet. Considering the link between control 
and freedom as expressed in new ways of conducting the government of the Internet 
and government through the Internet, this section analyses how commercial interest 
and US security are intertwined in the main rationalities of the Web 2.0 (mainly in 
terms of commercial security) and how these rationalities constitute an extension of 
an overarching disposition of things. Once the Internet surfaced as a mediation of 
subjectification hand-in-hand with commercial and state prerogatives, it is argued, it 
started developing a governmental task, instrumentally mediating and orienting the 
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constitution of persons as social and economic subjects through managing, on their 
behalf and at a distance, their sociotechnical reality.  
 
4.2.1 A resource for security and freedom: Data 
 
The Web 2.0, despite its promise of participation (‘radical decentralization, radical 
trust, participation instead of publishing, users as contributors, rich user experience, 
the long tail, the web as platform, control of one’s own data, remixing data, collective 
intelligence, attitudes, better software by more users, play, undetermined user 
behaviour’ [Fuchs, 2017: 34]), has expressed a general economy of data exploitation 
and commerce, alongside behavioural modelling, profiling, prediction models and law 
enforcement. In this general economy, one crucial element – resource – unites 
freedom and security through commerce: Big Data.  
 
The concept of Big Data refers first, to the shortcomings of traditional data 
management techniques and tools in relation to the vast amount of data generated in 
everyday life through digital devices and services (Panneerselvam, Liu and Hill, 2015: 
3). Then, it refers to an ideal and a way of understanding reality that entails a ‘change 
in scale’ and state, from causality to correlations. Regarding the latter, it entails an 
optimistic ideal of being able to extract new knowledge and profit from massive data 
through analyses ‘one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller one’ 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 17). In this understanding, the world can be 
quantified and managed in large numbers and with ever-increasing ranges of 
accuracy, demanding and fostering ongoing technological development. However, 
despite these technical and idealist images, Big Data emerged as well as a general 
lucrative practice in a 9/11 context and its security imperatives (Fuchs, 2017: 53) and 
has been crucial since then, with its obstacles to surpass, for US economy to prevail 
and expand in the world economy (McCarthy, 2015: 87).  
 
Accordingly, the capacity to process large amounts of unstructured or ‘raw’ data, 
which accounts for the vast majority of data production, into ‘structured’ and more 
useful data, was a task highly developed by corporations like Google, Facebook, and 
Twitter, as their massive data input was mainly unstructured and required refinement 
(Panneerselvam, Liu and Hill, 2015: 3). In this data economy real time results in data 
processing were expected and such corporations developed an ever increasing 
storing and processing capacity through hardware and algorithms – a capacity 
fostered by the US government and security sector. 
 
	 82	
As mentioned before, US government agencies like the CIA were crucial in the reboot 
of ICTs industries in Silicon Valley, sponsoring and fostering research and 
development with intelligence and military application but more than useful for civil 
commercial applications (e.g. Keyhole, a mapping software acquired by Google and 
founding core of Google Maps and Google Earth; or Systems Research Development 
[SRD], a data mining tool for law enforcement, now property of IBM) (Henn, 2012; 
Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 66-67). In this scenario of industrial recovery and 
security mobilization, data production, processing and exploitation were at the center 
stage. And following the expansion of digital devices and applications among civilian 
users, the freedom of participation and communication experiences were now 
bounded to parameters of security in technical, commercial and state-government 
terms. Big Data came to be a preeminent practice and ideology related to ICTs and 
the Internet, bonding together government agencies, private corporations and security 
contractors into the mass exploitation of data (Fuchs, 2017: 53) and the consolidation 
and securing of cyberspace. Therefore, implying that the world and everything in it is 
to a large extent quantifiable, predictable and exploitable, a (Big) Data economy is 
one in which data is a commodity and algorithms a technology for both information 
and surveillance industries, and where surveillance operations and marketing end up 
being the same (see Vanian, 2015). Combining joy, participation and commerce 
under the guise of freedom, with surveillance and control under a commercial and 
military security imperative, big data finally consolidates itself through a more secured 
venture labeled as ‘cyberspace’. But also, data generation and exploitation underpins 
coloniality as ‘control [or management] of economy and authority [and] of knowledge 
and subjectivity’ (Mignolo, 2010:9) through the embedded rationalities of the Internet, 
which entail expansion, instrumentality and ‘thingification’ and turn ‘man into an 
instrument of production’ (Césaire, 2000: 42) and security calculation.  
 
4.2.2 Global Connectivity: Global interoperability, cybersecurity and global commerce 
in everyday life 
 
In such a big data economy, besides security and commercial overlapping in 
technological applications, a more explicit and visible framing of the Internet through 
security is associated to cybersecurity. As commercial possibilities for the Internet 
further developed in the 1990’s, its link to national security followed suit. Commonly 
referred to as ‘a collaborative system that embodies all of the successful features of 
the World-Wide Web and other community-friendly services’ (Hughes, 1995: 35), by 
1998 Cyberspace12 was already a national security policy area of its own under Bill 
																																																								
12 Cyberspace in cybersecurity policy refers to ‘the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems and 
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Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 63, which established security measures for 
protecting cyber systems. Following such objectification and securitization of 
cyberspace, in 2003 President George W. Bush defined it as ‘the nervous system’ of 
critical national infrastructure (Reveron, 2012: 5), and in the 2005 National Defense 
Strategy, it became a theatre of operations potentially altering ‘long established 
concepts of warfare’. In addition, the 2008 National Defense Strategy acknowledged 
the capacity of individuals and small groups to attack and ‘disrupt commerce and 
daily life in the US’; along with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review that stated 
cyberspace as a domain for defence activities next to land, sea, air and space. As 
cyberspace and cybersecurity developed, the former was constituted as an organic 
extension of the US, from an operations domain to US daily life basis and its 
corresponding place in national security as a global technology. Accordingly, the 2009 
Cyberspace Policy Review (CPR) assumed the importance of ‘a globally-
interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure’ as critical for 
‘the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national security” (Executive 
Office of the President of the U.S., 2009: iii). While the 2011 National Military Strategy 
emphasised the potential of cyberthreats and the limitations of international law in 
dealing with it, putting forth the importance of active engagement and effective 
operation. Engagement that needs to be fostered, as clearly stated in the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review, through DoD’s investment in its development and 
innovation capacities ‘within the defense sector and beyond’ (Secretary of Defense, 
2014: VI).  
 
Underpinning the above-mentioned measures, ‘strategic thinking equates national 
security with global security in a world inhabited by threats without borders’; where 
threats are so diffused and individualised that ‘traditional nation-state approaches to 
national security cannot address contemporary challenges like those in cyberspace’ 
(Reveron, 2012: 10). Accordingly, the US is compelled to appropriate cyberspace 
both through innovation and investment and through securitizing it against threats. As 
the Internet commercialised and spread, it gained a central role in US economy, not 
only producing profit but producing new ways of coordinating and producing 
resources. As its importance increased, it became a distinctive object and domain to 
secure; however, its basis is not far from the values and strategies the ARPANET had 
already embedded in its operation.  
																																																																																																																																																																													
embedded processes and controllers in critical industries,’ and adds that ‘common usage of the term 
also refers to the virtual environment of information and interactions between peoples’ (CPR 2009: 1). 
Also, cyberspace in this understanding is regarded as a new domain in warfare, where ‘an operational 
environment must consider the five domains and the EMS [Electronic Magnetic spectrum]. The four 
traditional domains (air, land, maritime, and space) and the EMS exist naturally. The fifth domain, 
cyberspace, is manmade’ (Department of the Army, 2014: 1-3). 
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When designing ARPANET, BB&N and ARPA already imagined an ever-expanding 
network integrating every piece of informatic hardware, which made it more resilient, 
robust and efficient. This gesture of embedding a globally expansive rationality into 
the Internet and endorsing it through specific security policies reaffirms the link 
between security and government, although, more recently, some authors give 
government control a distinctive guise as a latecomer in harnessing the Internet for 
security purposes (see Reveron, 2012: 8; Deibert and Crete-Nishihata, 2012).  
 
When Obama´s International Strategy for Cyberspace (ISC) emphasised the 
necessity of openness and interoperability of cyberspace, it did so along the lines of 
making it secure and reliable, able to ‘retain the trust of individuals, business and 
governments’ and ‘resilient to arbitrary or malicious disruption’ (Executive Office of 
the President of the U.S., 2011a). Its openness and interoperability, and the 
importance of the imaginary of the global, has been stated in terms of security and in 
terms of everyday life interconnectivity, demanding a supranational government and 
law enforcement in an international society beyond borders. This supranational 
momentum has been fostered by the natural expansiveness of the network and its 
users’ increased need for this technology, followed by US central role as designer, 
leader and governor. As expressed by the Obama’s administration, echoing the US 
Chamber of Commerce, in the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review, it is a shared task of 
government and private sector to ‘ensure the stability and global interoperability of the 
Internet, while increasing security and reliability for all users’ (Executive Office of the 
President of the U.S., 2009: 21). Achieving global interoperability of networks is not 
only one of the most important concerns of the US in terms of cybersecurity or even 
security rhetorics; it has been fundamental for the existence and basic operation of 
the Internet since its inception and has developed inextricably linked to security 
measures that have moved beyond the technical and communication realm into more 
deeply embedded ways of living everyday life. As global security and global 
interoperability of networks are conjoined into the Internet through a global rationality 
of government, two other rationalities emerge as in-between commercial and state 
security: the free flow of information or free Internet and the personalization of 
identity.  
 
4.2.3 Internet Freedom and the Free Flow of Information or the mediation that 
fragments collective meaning and orientation before capitalism 
 
Internet freedom was declared a human right by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council in 2012 and reaffirmed in 2014 and 2016, condemning intentional disruption 
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of Internet access (see Boyle, 2016). However, Internet freedom was long before 
promoted by the US government, along with the free flow of information and other 
human rights. As emblematically synthesized in relation to the three main concerns of 
the ISC (Executive Office of the President of the U.S., 2011a) (an open and 
interoperable, secure and reliable, and stable through norms cyberspace): 
 
The United States is committed to international initiatives and standards that 
enhance cybersecurity while safeguarding free trade and the broader free flow of 
information, recognizing our global responsibilities, as well as our national needs.  
Too often, such principles are characterized as incompatible with effective law 
enforcement, anonymity, the protection of children and secure infrastructure. In 
reality, good cybersecurity can enhance privacy, and effective law enforcement 
targeting widely-recognized illegal behavior can protect fundamental freedoms. 
The rule of law—a civil order in which fidelity to laws safeguards people and 
interests; brings stability to global markets; and holds malevolent actors to 
account internationally—both supports our national security and advances our 
common values (Ibid: 5).  
 
According to such an account, the role of the US regarding cyberspace entails 
diplomacy, defense and development, all in order to achieve market expansion, law 
enforcement and defense under US parameters. In this respect, the promotion of a 
free Internet and a free flow of information by US foreign policy can be interpreted as 
part of a strategy of liberalisation based on opening foreign markets and expanding 
liberal democracies (Carr, 2013; Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 37; McCarthy, 2015). A 
drive that, in the US, ‘has informed international communications strategy and policies 
in their political and economic aspects’ since the first decades of the 20th Century 
(McCarthy, 2015: 74). The institutional power of the Internet helps to achieve the 
international order the US envisions and expresses through its foreign policy goals, 
aiming to extend capitalism as an economic and cultural order (Foley, 2007). 
 
Complementing such a foreign policy approach and program, at least after the First 
World War13 and more intensely during and after the Second, US efforts to seduce 
through propaganda, broadcasting an “American Way of Life”, have drawn on 
´diplomatic programs that were designed to persuade, inform, and attract global 
public opinion in the service of American national interests´ (Graham, 2015: 1). Such 
efforts have then produced and used international cultural norms and symbolic –
liberal– values that advance their own goals. That is the case of numerous efforts by 
																																																								
13 Jablonski and Powers (2015: 37) refer to ‘an 1869 memo from U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton 
Fish describing U.S. policy “to initiate this movement for the common benefit of the community and 
civilization of all”’. Free flow of information, global communications, world peace and access to foreign 
markets constituted the equation. 
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the Obama administration to promote the use of the Internet even for social 
mobilisation abroad (see US Department of State, October 2009). For instance, 
Hillary Clinton’s support to circumvention technologies and sponsorship of the World 
Youth Summits (see Mejías, 2013) speak of how US government harnessed digital 
technologies and the Internet in order to advance US foreign policy interests in 
specific countries.  
 
While in the 1980´s people would be attracted to computing appliances and were 
becoming literate into a user-friendly version of them, creating a huge market for the 
computing industry, the 1990´s would start selling communication services that 
increasingly focused on people and data. By the 2000´s, it would be clear that people 
are not only harnessed as customers but as instruments of data production and 
commodities, and by 2009 with Clinton’s international promotion of digital activism 
(Ibid), diplomatic channels could be restated through new ways of enhancing public 
diplomacy by the US via the Internet and social media platforms. The normative 
framework of Internet freedom and human rights appeared then as both ‘expression 
of US structural and institutional power’ and an ideology central to US foreign policy, 
particularly clear since Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State (Carr, 2013: 622). 
 
In addition to the Internet´s supporting normative and ideological framework, the 
multi-stakeholder model of global Internet governance – which brings together the 
private sector, the public sector and civil society – has been a reinforcement of the 
current status quo in international politics. This model has benefited the actors 
involved in this technology´s design and development, dating back to the support Bill 
Clinton´s government provided to the development of the US private sector and the 
Internet (Carr, 2015). It is a model dominated by the interests of the US (Powles, 
2015), in which civil society figures as a legitimising actor under the predominance of 
US multinationals and US and aligned governments (Carr, 2015: 642). But 
furthermore, it is a model that entails a form of managing participation on a world level 
by specialised elites, coordinating different transnational and national actors and 
promoting Internet exceptionalism through multi-stakeholderism or the exclusion of 
‘sovereigntist and anti-marketisation [advocates and] perspectives on Internet 
governance… from the debates’ (Chenou, 2014: 206).  
 
Nonetheless, even leftist and progressive activists and intellectuals have endorsed 
Internet exceptionalism through the multistakeholder model and the promotion of a 
free Internet. While emphasising civil society’s participation potential, these activists 
have ignored that Internet exceptionalism has largely responded to right-wing ideals 
and values. As David Golumbia (2015: 15) explains: 
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Certainly, many leaders in the digital technology industries, and quite a few 
leaders who do not work for corporations, openly declare their adherence to 
libertarian or other right-wing ideologies. Just a brief list of these includes figures 
like Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, Eric Raymond, Jimmy Wales, Eric Schmidt, and 
Travis Kalanick. Furthermore, the number of leaders who demur from such 
political points of view is small, and their demurrals are often shallow. But the 
group of people whose beliefs deserve to be labeled “cyberlibertarian” is much 
larger than this. The core tenet of cyberlibertarianism—the insistence that 
“governments should not regulate the Internet”—appears to be compatible with a 
wide range of political viewpoints. As EFF’s senior global policy analyst Jeremy 
Malcolm […] has written, ‘Even politically progressive activists are inclined to be 
more distrustful of governmental intervention online than offline, in an expression 
of “Internet exceptionalism”’ (Ibid).  
 
As above and as analysed in Chapter 6 regarding #YoSoy132, a specific governance 
model that benefits the commodification of data and users has been supported by a 
diversity of ideological allegiances based on unawareness and a common imagination 
of the Internet as exceptional and apolitical. However, it is not only that governments 
should not regulate the Internet but that governmental control takes a very specific 
shape close to the US government model and its flexible form of management. In a 
context of Internet freedom and exceptionality, big technology corporations want ‘a 
government that’s strong enough to enforce its dominant private power over the 
economy and citizens and protect its wealth, but too broken and too alienated from 
the public’ (Ames, 2015). A very specific practice of government is thus endorsed 
through Internet governance based on a very specific US balance between military, 
corporate and civil agents and its capitalist foundations – for instance, the assumption 
of data and information as a commodity. 
 
Once information became the crucial asset of the market, it increasingly turned into a 
tradeable good to liberalise and exploit under the moral rhetoric and economic 
instrumentation of the free flow of information. In doing so, the political implications of 
denying sovereign governments authority over it (i. e. allowing third parties´ law 
enforcement and broad decision-making) have been concealed. The logics of 
economy have been superimposed to political reasoning while expanding the 
decision and action of the US and allied governments and technology and analytics 
companies, be it through government agencies or private corporations. This means 
that decision moves beyond the sovereignty of states, consolidating information into 
an exploitable asset under the shelter of an international trade law that benefits a 
global market of established actors (Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 10; Reid, 2009: 
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609). Ultimately, this works according to a ‘trend of using telecommunications laws 
and information technology (IT) related exports to promote US political economic 
interests around the world´, in which ´the view of information as something apolitical, 
culturally neutral, and able to be bought and sold as part of the global exchange of 
goods and services´ (Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 22) has been fundamental for 
accessing data, exploiting it and manipulating truths and knowledge according to 
specific agendas (see Ames, 2015 on Google; Grasseger and Krogerus, 2017 on 
Cambridge Analytica).  
 
As a form of coordinating and disposing things (Foucault, 2001; Lemke, 2015), 
beyond laws, exports and the rhetorics of freedom, the ‘free flow of information’ in US 
policy has meant more than ‘a strictly formal right to access information’ (McCarthy, 
2015: 111). Furthermore, and in line with the analysis in the previous chapter, it is the 
Internet´s form and ‘material, physical norms and rules [that also] constrain the way in 
which technology may be used, and thus practices that one may enact’ with such a 
technology (McCarthy, 2015:67). Which means that by ‘including and excluding 
certain practices… [a technology] prevents and promotes goals in line with the goals 
of its designers’ (Ibid.), something that in the case of the Internet will become visible 
while promoting a specific architecture and governance of the Internet that forbids 
governments’ regulation. Instead of simply being a limited right or being insufficiently 
enforced, free flow of information assumes and imposes (by hiding its own ideological 
and practical interests and material processes while accommodating and exploiting 
others’ ideas, concerns and actions), that access must not be denied or restricted 
based on ideological, cultural or symbolic political reasons (other than those endorsed 
by the US and allied countries)– but must be on the basis of market or ‘capital 
accumulation’ (McCarthy, 2015: 121) and other US security concerns.  
 
Such implicit discriminations of the free flow of information are also accompanied by a 
more explicit exercise of censorship and prosecution, dependent on specific Western 
cultural values and security concerns. However, its subtler cultural and symbolic 
discriminations have a wider impact on how individuals are produced as subjects, in 
terms of what Jodi Dean (2009) calls ‘communicative capitalism’ and which refers to a 
'political-economic formation’ that furthers the downturn of 'symbolic efficiency': a 
rupture in collective signification, the fragmentation of the recognition of the 'other´s 
symbolic weight' in the overwhelming flux of contents (or the decay of a shared and 
collectively meaningful truth), and the proliferation of uncertainty when it comes to 
politics (Dean, 2009: 162). The latter means that the ‘other’, be it an individual or 
collective speaking from another knowledge, ideology or culture, is from the outset 
distant and reduced to content and data to be managed and sold as a commodity, not 
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counting as subjects but rather as instruments within the logic of profit that undergirds 
the most popular and successful Internet platforms. As Christian Fuchs (2018) has 
explained regarding the most popular social media platform: 
 
Facebook is the epitome of digital capitalism: It treats personal data as a 
commodity in order to sell targeted advertisements. In 2017, Facebook’s profits 
amounted to $15.9 billion in 2017. Targeted advertising is driven by algorithms 
that are blind for the content of what is being advertised. For Facebook, it does 
not matter if the ad is about chocolate cookies or fascism – it only cares about 
selling targeted ads for the sake of profit. It is therefore no surprise that Facebook 
has tolerated highly problematic data practices. Its logic is that the more online 
activity, data and meta-data is generated, the more potential profit emerges (Ibid). 
  
Digital capitalism has been to a great extent (although in a restricted manner) 
ideologically blind and flexible. Digital platforms have been able to reduce truth and 
ideology to ideas as commodities, which can be used only when developed according 
to the rules of the game of social and economic profitability and western national 
security. This way has been elusive, turning flexible and adaptable through 
dispossessing in a subtle manner other knowledges of its collective existential 
meaning and orientation. In the Internet environment, ideas can bloom in 
heterogeneity as long as they do not disrupt overarching and expanding capital 
accumulation or national security. In the first and the last instance, everything that can 
be turned into a commodity, can be tolerated, offering some sense of ideological and 
cultural neutrality under the image of a free flow of information but hiding its control 
and management decision capabilities and their supporting ideologies and way of life.  
 
Once information and expression are assumed to flow free according to the idea that 
governments should not regulate the Internet, its cultural bias and content 
discriminations are concealed, inhibiting awareness and delegating information, 
communications and even behaviours management to a third party. This means that 
the possibility of producing overall shared knowledge and meaningful collective truth 
is obfuscated by the amount of information and the social limitations this technology 
has by design in being limited to manage social reality in simplified versions. Being 
able to accommodate heterogeneity through flexibility, harnessing alternative visions 
– opinions and practices – of social organisation and economy and increasing 
varieties of user-generated-content and communicative exchange deemed as flexible 
and open ‘free’ performances, the Internet’s ability to produce shared common 
knowledge (beyond basic digital literacy and commodification) is limited by design. 
Multiple instrumental truths and fragmented meanings or islands of information (see 
Berners-Lee, 2010) turn difficult the production of meaningful and purposeful shared 
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knowledge and truth in an overall implicit and concealed economy. In turn, 
instrumentality opens up the possibility of an expansive practice of agnotology (see 
Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008), as the intended production of ignorance and 
ambiguity, or perhaps more recently, a matter of ‘post-truth’, ‘fake news’ and 
manipulation as in the US-UK elections and Cambridge Analytica case, all of which 
develop in line with the delegation of the management of a complex technical and 
social system and decision. 
  
According to the above, a ´free Internet´ and the ´free flow of information´ benefit a 
process of mediation that fragments not only information but also social 
subjectification. This mediation maintains stable although adaptable points of 
authority and decision, managing complex processes on behalf of users and by 
design, intended to spread US ideals and values within a specific economic model, 
thus promoting US and allied agendas and corporations dominant place in 
technological and security industries and coordinating relations among international 
actors and individuals. Such mediation, however, is only possible through more 
elaborated forms of coordinating individual users that articulate specific US and 
Western cultural practices and everyday habits: personalisation of identity or the 
production of a single digital identity and the mediation of subjectification. 
 
4.2.4 Personalisation of Identity or the production of a single digital identity 
 
As already mentioned, the free flow of information as a form of coordination that 
works according to a cultural bias and a practice of delegating decision and 
knowledge, overlaps with other two rationalities and unfolds from and into the 
flexibility and fragmentation of truth in terms of collective existential meaning and 
experience: personalisation of identity and the mediation of subjectification. 
Connecting commercial interest, law enforcement and military security, 
personalisation of identity has been a pressing concern in both commercial and 
defence areas and in-between them. First, it emerged as a military issue in the 
management of access to the ARPANET and the implementation of passwords and 
accounts; disrupting some other civilian or community-based practices that produced 
alternative personalities and characters online and marking the turn from ‘anonymous’ 
to ‘nonymous’ online environments (see Zhao et al., 2008). Then, once the Internet 
was open to commercial use, Internet Service Providers would employ them to 
control clients’ access to the network. Once the Internet was reconfigured through 
reinvestment and data mining after the dotcom crisis, personalisation of identity 
became something joyful and desirable through social media profiling, and, in the last 
instance, corresponding to the urge of data mining under ‘real name’ policies (see 
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Fowler, 2012; Van Dijck, 2012; Zhao et al., 2008). This way, a single profile seeks to 
integrate different social roles (Fuchs, 2017: 50), thus mediating, generating and 
administering social relations (including the one with one´s own self), communications 
and the exploitation of vast amounts of data produced by such mediation. Moreover, 
pursuing personalisation under a single identity entails a rationality that conjoins 
economic exploitation of data and transactions, law enforcement, and cultural values 
of individualism, success and competition.  
 
As expressed in the 2011 US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace 
(NSTIC), counting with trusted identities means ‘enhancing online choice, efficiency, 
security and privacy’, all by making online transactions more secure (Executive Office 
of the President of the U.S., 2011b). The aim then, in commercial and security terms, 
is to achieve an identity ecosystem ‘in which individuals and organizations will be able 
to trust each other because they follow agreed-upon standards to obtain and 
authenticate their digital identities and those of devices’ by having ‘a single unique 
digital identity’ (Stallings, 2016: 26). Nonetheless, trusted personalised identities are 
not only crucial for commercial and security purposes through cybersecurity; 
moreover, its cultural appeal is deeply embedded in profiling, or personal profiles, 
which has become a core practice of social networking digital platforms (e.g. 
Facebook or YouTube) and which establishes a persistent link to cybersecurity and 
US values.  
 
Networking digital platforms offer common users the possibility to model and display 
themselves in private/public networks through the construction of a personalised 
database and its established parameters of accumulation and individualisation 
(friends, likes, images, comments) (Marwick, in Fuchs, 2017: 35). While making this 
practice a user-friendly and joyful experience, these platforms mine data and organise 
it into profiles that are being sold to third parties through advertising or profile packets, 
thus exploiting users’ free labour (Fuchs, 2017; Terranova, 2004). While freedom of 
expression, communication and participation through personalisation and other 
assumed cultural parameters are experienced by an increasing number of users 
worldwide, a particular US cultural assumption underpins commercial, social and 
national success: that political participation depends on private property as 
associated with liberty and recognised by the law to juridical persons (i.e. property 
means the right of economic exploitation and thus freedom). This basic assumption 
has entailed the need for US ongoing expansion and intervention (Walker III, 2007: 
22). In a system where political interest and effective participation arises from 
property and economic interest (Hofstadter, 1948), the personalisation of identity 
works as a vector that communicates through ownership private property, social 
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recognition and the law. In expanding this vector, US and Western cultural, social and 
legal practices are expanded (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
 
4.2.5. Mediation of Subjectification 
 
Alongside global connectivity and the free flow of information, the personalisation of 
identity that is increasingly practiced on the Internet entails a mediation of 
subjectification. This mediation, as the intervention of third parties and the extent to 
which they condition the field of possibility of personalisation and social 
communication, involves a series of, although flexible and generally subtle, stable 
ways of coordinating things, behaviours and knowledges. This, despite promoting and 
enabling user-generated content and social exchange of information or even 
participation,  
 
On the one hand, regarding forms of coordinating and managing personalisation, 
knowledge and behaviours, private companies perform as information intermediaries 
and administrators. These companies even enact global governance by deciding on 
design and user policies, therefore affecting the rights of its users (DeNardis and 
Hackl, 2015: 2). While in very specific contexts these platforms and the 
personalisation of identity they entail may offer the possibility of civility when 
commenting online (see Fredheim, Moore and Naughton, 2015), DeNardis and Hackl 
(2015: 9) assert that ‘a more visible quality is that social media platforms are choke 
points that individuals essentially must pass through to participate in significant parts 
of the online public sphere’. Besides the evident fact that these platforms’ decisions 
affect free speech online (see Rosen, 2013), as this is an explicit concern of their 
service policies, it is less evident how they decide and design first, ‘the intermediation 
of user-generated content’; then, ‘the possibility of interactivity among users and 
direct engagement with content;’ and finally, ‘the ability for an individual to articulate 
network connections with other users’ (DeNardis and Hackl, 2015: 2). In simple 
terms, these platforms sanction users’ name and password, model, manage and 
convey their public speech14 by deciding what and when content may not flow, what 
information they share with third parties and when they censor an account.  
																																																								
14 A ‘digital public sphere’, despite its commonly valued importance in terms of free speech and 
democratic participation, entails the very specific understanding and form of administering such 
freedom. As Jablonski and Powers point out, in treating communications and expression within a 
public sphere, commitments to privacy are overlooked and dismissed superseded by a more evident 
security prerogative. ‘Looking back, Clinton’s articulation of the Internet-freedom paradigm—which 
inculcated the Internet as a shared, public space—wasn’t simply lofty neoliberal rhetoric. It was, […] a 
deliberate framing of human rights online that protects free speech but not the anonymity of that 
speech or the secrecy of one’s communications. According to Western legal doctrine, once one enters 
a shared, public space, their individual rights are curtailed in order to preserve the security and 
integrity of that space’ (Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 201).  
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Social media platforms mediate content ‘via their ability to delete or block’ it; they 
mediate with subscribers, ‘via the technological affordances of system design and via 
terms of service’; also they mediate ‘with governments, by serving as the 
intermediaries that carry out delegated law enforcement and delegated censorship’; 
and finally, they mediate ‘with other institutions, via protocols, business models and 
technological interfaces’ (Ibid). Each ‘information choke point’ –according to DeNardis 
and Haeckl (2015)– determines the way in which information is flowing. Underneath 
its technical architectures and policies, these authors explain, ‘design choices and 
business models predicated upon identity infrastructures and metadata aggregation’ 
threaten first, ‘anonymous speech and individual privacy’ by collecting metadata, 
identifying private information and disclosing it under consideration; second, ‘the 
ability to express ideas’ or ‘freedom of censorship’ by being delegated this function by 
governments or under their own consideration; and finally, ‘interoperability and 
permissionless innovation’ by a closed design and a proprietary approach (DeNardis 
and Hackl, 2015:2).   
 
Every time these platforms, or this form of coordinating online personality and 
interaction, are able to approve and assign a profile, offering users a personality, 
teaching them how to socialize and become visible, these platforms personate 
individuals as profiles, sanctioning individual, collective and – increasingly bounded to 
commercial and national security – legal existence 15 . As such, in terms of 
representation, this means that the elements being mediated are displaced toward 
the periphery of decision-making. Perhaps potentially included, although always 
postponed, under the new parameters of digital literacy and participation of civil 
society, users are also and first of all, authorising a third party as the entity to decide 
over the parameters and values of personation and the basic terms of interaction and 
constitution of a collectivity. This way, and in addition to the lack of control users have 
over algorithms and their own produced data, these platforms are playing as 
institutions that ‘alienate humans from the control of and influence on setting the 
conditions which govern their lives’ (Fuchs, 2018).  
 
On the basis of third parties hidden procedures and decisions over the terms that 
govern personation in a digital environment and its social, legal and political 
consequences, we must remember and emphasise that the most popular and widely 
expanded social media platforms are US corporations and as such involve a 
distinctive link of collaboration with the US government. In line with national security 
																																																								
15 Something exclusively attributed to the State or local and religious communities’ authorities as the 
Third Person that sanctions law and social and political existence (see LeGaufey, 2000). 
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and cybersecurity prerogatives, and the longstanding background of US politics, US 
guidelines reiterate the fundamental partnership and ‘shared responsibility’ between 
Federal government and technology companies at home and abroad (Executive 
Office of the President of the U.S., 2011a: 11). This bond, in the case of big data 
corporations like Google, Facebook and Yahoo!, among others, has also developed 
into more explicit information sharing and collection of data and censorship and 
surveillance capabilities granted to the US government under programs like PRISM16, 
Xkeyscore or MUSCULAR (Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 189; Greenwald, 2013). 
Furthermore, as we have seen, such close relationships obey a more general, 
grounded and overarching dynamic in the US. This means that, for non-US users, in 
the last instance, mediation entails foreign entities not only spying or surveilling but 
also modelling the way in which users see and govern themselves and the ways in 
which they relate to the society and the world they inhabit. Although not exactly and 
always a direct government of things in terms of explicit commands and hierarchical 
imposition (implying confrontation and dissent), informal management emerges as the 
basic, generally assumed and subtle rationality of government that entails a basic 
underlying consent, which currently is the will to use social networking platforms and 
the Internet, to socialise, communicate, participate and be seen, always, as part of 




The chapter has identified the embedded form in which the Internet coordinates its 
components and resources by questioning the design and inquiring into the 
instrumental character of the internet. This form of coordination has developed from 
the technical sphere always linked to commercial and security concerns through to 
the explicit US national agenda and digital platforms’ practices of personalisation of 
identity and mediation of social interactions. This form of coordination has 
accomplished to turn social interactions flexible enough and calculable as data, 
fragmenting information and users’ behaviour in order to simplify and functionalise, 
managing the diversity of social and economic processes and knowledges and 
offering simplified and digested versions that can be easily managed by users.  
 
The chapter has also shown how the transition and further embeddedness of security 
concerns into technological development has expressed corresponding dynamics and 
rationalities, binding commercial parameters and security logics into social media 
																																																								
16	This program allowed the NSA and FBI access to information and to collect data from technology 
companies like Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! or Apple, in compliance with the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Jablonski and Powers, 2015: 187).	
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platforms and applications. These rationalities have been fundamental for US 
commercial expansion and security. Which is to say as well that the Internet and 
social media platforms express the entanglement between autonomy or open 
possibilities for communication, entertainment and commercial development, on the 
one hand; and control linked to national and economic security on the other. The 
Internet, from the technical and material design of its connections through to its 
protocols, applications and use of those applications, is clear as a space secured and 
governed, even if informally, by US national values and prerogatives. 
 
The correspondence between the form of coordination of the Internet and US values 
and prerogatives skews simplicity in certain directions, making exchanges efficient in 
economic terms and according to specific cultural values and aims (accommodating 
heterogeneity) but opening a gap in collective awareness and shared existential 
experience. By expanding the rationalities of free flow of information, global 
interoperability and personalisation of identity, the Internet expands a particular 
social, legal and economic dynamic founded on control, private property and 
individualism. These technologies condition the ways in which these technologies can 
be used but also and more importantly, they condition the way in which individual and 
collective subjects are constituted. The values and interests embedded in the Internet 
are situated and its instrumental form is bonded to such a situation. Once exported 
and across nations and cultures, knowledge of the overarching economy of the 
system, together with its embedded values and interests, are concealed and thus 
express an instrumental form of coordination that conditions at a distance the 
emergence of alternative, non-capitalist, forms of self-government.  
 
The chapter supports the argument of the thesis that states that politics cannot be 
assumed as inherent to technological artefacts and systems and moreover, that the 
Internet, on the basis of its embedded rationality and forms of coordination, 
reproduces forms of coloniality in countries like Mexico, a case which needs to be 
analysed and understood by including a decolonial element. Also, as this chapter has 
identified the embedded rationalities of the Internet, the following chapters question 
the instrumentality of this technology and analyse to what extent, in a situated 
colonised context, the Internet reproduces colonial forms of expansion and control 
according to its own law and autonomy (embedded forms of coordination, interests 
and values). This means, in terms of the use of the Internet by the Mexican 
government (Chapter 5), the Mexican activists of #YoSoy132 (Chapter 6) and the 
Zapatistas (Chapter 7), whether they have been able to distance themselves from this 
form of coordination and move into their own constitution as agents that self-govern 







The Mexican state, Digitisation and the Internet in Mexico 




The administration of Enrique Peña Nieto, a PRI member, as president of Mexico 
(2012 – 2018), established digitisation as the need to massively adopt and 
incorporate ICTs in all aspects of everyday life of people, organisations and 
government in Mexico (Gobierno de la República, November 2013). This chapter 
analyses how and to what extent the use of the Internet in Mexico’s digitisation efforts 
has been one of an instrument of coordination without politics, which means 
analysing whether digitisation has reproduced colonial forms of expansion and control 
according to this technology’s embedded forms of coordination, interests and values 
or instead, it has been part of an effort of self-determination and shared collective 
decision. The chapter demonstrates how digitisation has assumed and fostered the 
necessity to mediate social interactions through technology and how it has been 
rhetorically oriented by the motto of belonging and becoming part of a ‘Society of 
Information and Knowledge’ (Ibid). Such a motif, the chapter argues, has justified the 
adoption of the Internet and digital technologies as a politically neutral and 
economically useful technological fix. In so doing, the Mexican government has 
defined its practice under foreign parameters of modernisation and a 
developmentalist scheme of aspirations, thus reproducing ‘modernity... as the rhetoric 
of salvation’ and hiding ‘coloniality, which is the logic of oppression and exploitation’  
(Mignolo, 2010: 9). Such reproduction and concealment tied to the liberalisation of the 
economy and deployed on the basis of liberalising instruments (on Peña’s reforms 
see Dyer, 2014; el-Erian, 2014) that allow further exploitation of resources (including 
data) by unaccounted actors.  
 
Overall, it is argued that from scientific and economic development to the opening to 
financial markets, the Mexican state and the Internet have been set to work 
instrumentally under foreign parameters and interests, fostering the control of 
resource circulations by financial capitalism. This chapter is significant to the overall 
argument of the thesis – that the internet has been reproducing colonial forms rather 
than politics and that a decolonial element needs to be included together with 
philosophy of technology and critical approaches to the internet – as it identifies the 
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reproduction of the basic forms of coordination embedded in the internet. Therefore, 
the chapter exemplifies the question of US digital dominance in Mexico in order to 
move, in the following chapters, toward an alternative politics and use of the Internet, 
which does not aim to sanction an everyday technical experience but rather aims to 
situate the internet according to its design and its use in relation to colonial forms and 
practices.   
 
In the following sections, the chapter analyses the arrival of the Internet in Mexico and 
the Mexican state’s digitisation effort through the lens of a dispositif (Foucault, 1977; 
Agamben, 2009). The first section argues that the connection was an effort assumed 
by those involved as merely ‘scientific’, research-oriented and politically neutral and 
that such a scientific imperative limited the intervention of the Mexican government 
insofar as the Internet expanded within the parameters of a developmentalist 
uncritical commitment. Then, the chapter analyses the Peña administration’s strategy 
and process of digitisation (the strategies, programmes, official documents, legislation 
and implementation of technologies) through a discourse analytic approach and the 
lens of a dispositif, identifying three transversal practices that converge in the 
objective of stabilising and giving certainty to the opening and expansion of financial 
and telecommunications markets: Connectivity, Open Data and Single Digital Identity. 
These three forms of coordination correspond to those forms embedded in the 
expansive design of the Internet: Global Connectivity, Free flow of information, 
Personalisation of Identity and Mediation of Subjectification (see Chapter 4), and 
shape digitisation as market-oriented in a liberalising fashion. The second section 
underscores how the strategic orientation and purpose of the Internet and digitisation 
policy have corresponded to foreign parameters of privatisation and expansion of 
financial markets. In so doing, it argues, the state delegates the constitution of its 
subjects and the responsibility of engendering population´s trust to a technological 
support defined by foreign interests and their orientation. The Internet, the second 
section explains, conditions the constitution of a national community as it remains 
instrumental to a foreign orientation and management. 
 
5.1 The Mexican connection to the Internet 
 
The arrival of the Internet in Mexico is analysed in this section as part of a dispositif: 
‘a given form of coordination’ between the elements of a heterogeneous ensemble 
that has ‘a dominant strategic function’ (Foucault, 1977: 194 – 196) and produces its 
own subjects (Agamben, 2011). The analysis of a dispositif entails identifying how this 
form of coordination brings together such heterogeneous elements and how these 
elements are produced and interplay in relation to a strategic imperative. In the case 
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of the arrival of the Internet in Mexico the Internet achieved the image of a politically 
neutral scientific instrument. This section explores the imperative and the strategy, or 
lack of one, that made possible and necessary such consideration and connection in 
order to understand how the Internet has increasingly expanded in Mexico as a 
mediation of social interactions and instrument of foreign interests through 
digitisation. 
 
As Gloria Koenigsberger (2015) details, the Internet arrived in Mexico through the 
field of astronomic research in 1988, ‘as a tool for basic scientific research whose 
primary objective was allegedly the expansion of knowledge for knowledge itself’ 
(author’s translation, Koenigsberger, 2015: 13). Such a gesture of reducing the 
Internet to a tool for research, oriented towards a scientific production of knowledge, 
consistently minimises the interests that led this technology’s expansion and 
standardisation across the continent and the world (see Chapters 3 and 4). But also, 
such understanding lacked shared strategic meaning and limited the intervention of 
the Mexican government insofar as developmentalism – the general assumption or 
acquiescent subjection to foreign parameters that establish hierarchies of progress 
and knowledge as different degrees of development within the opposition between 
developed and underdeveloped societies – marked the Mexican adoption of the 
Internet and framed it within an uncritical commitment to foreign political, economic 
and scientific agendas and their technological implementations.  
 
The image of the Internet as a politically neutral scientific tool began in 1985 when 
Mexican astronomers from the Institute of Astronomy of the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM) sought to 
connect to the NASA-funded Space Physics Analysis Network´s (SPAN) 
infrastructure to access the databases and computing services provided through this 
network. However, the incompatibility between hardware and software (the second 
one produced and freely distributed by US observatories) was one of the first 
obstacles to establishing remote access to US databases (Koenigsberger, 2015: 85-
86). The first viable opportunity to have an Internet connection arrived once the 
scientific research institutions and universities in US expanded the NSFnet (National 
Science Foundation) and joined ARPANET. 
 
After a series of communications between Mexican academics and scientific 
institutions in the US (SPAN/NASA, IUE [International Ultraviolet Explorer]), the 
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the US Department of 
Defence gave permission to establish an Internet link between the United States and 
Mexico. The link included ITESM, NSF, NASA and UNAM (Koenigsberger, 2015: 
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155). In Mexico, the funding was granted by UNAM and ITESM (Instituto Tecnológico 
de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey) as they ‘were responsible for the funding and 
installation of that part of the Internet link which is in their country’, while NASA and 
NSF provided ‘funding for the satellite dish and associated equipment to connect it to 
the Internet at NCAR’ [National Center for Atmospheric Research] (author’s 
translation, ibid). The link would be established using the Mexican satellite Morelos 
(Ibid: 161). UNAM granted funding for the connection between its main campus and 
the NCAR´s land station, while the computer with the TCP/IP code was later on 
provided through a collaboration agreement with the University of Massachusetts by 
the end of 1988. The network established then in Mexico was an extension of the US 
backbone and network; the US node in Boulder, Colorado mediated communications 
from UNAM to ITESM (Koenigsberger, 2015: 190). 
 
Throughout the above events, the Mexican government was initially concerned about 
communications across the national territory but never presented consistent 
opposition to depending on US government institutions like DARPA (Ibid: 192). The 
scientific emphasis given to the Internet had much to do with this. On the 
development of the Internet connection to the NSFnet, as an astronomer committed 
to the development of her own specific scientific research, Koenigsberger supported 
the idea of ‘taking advantage of already existing technologies, independently of where 
they came from, and of investing in developing our own technology only for 
convenient or necessary situations’ (Ibid: 174). A perspective that existed in contrast 
to the idea of developing national capabilities for coding and establishing ‘our own’ 
(Mexican) code for a national network, as expressed and supported by the Institute of 
Astronomy´s Director in 1988, Alfonso Serrano (Ibid: 174-175). The specialisation and 
focus on particular fields of research and the professional commitment to the 
development of specialised research inhibited and fragmented the local and national 
re-design and re-appropriation of the scientific network that was being promoted and 
the Internet link and protocol that constituted it. Mexico was articulated as part of the 
US network and the advent of the Internet’s commercialisation further inhibited the 
Mexican government’s participation beyond the boundaries of scientific research 
promotion. The allegedly scientific and academic nature of the initial connections to 
the Internet would eventually and increasingly turn into commercial services.  
 
Starting in 1990, federal funding from Mexican government institutions like CONACyT 
(National Council of Science and Technology) and SEP (Public Education 
Secretariat) supported the acquisition of computers and equipment (Agencia 
Informativa CONACyT, 13 June 2016; Islas, 2011), along with efforts by TELMEX (by 
the time already privatised and privately owned by Carlos Slim) to monopolize the 
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production and installation of optical fibre. In 1992 the group MEXNET was formed 
and the Internet expanded as Mexican universities were connected to UNAM, ITESM 
or independently to other universities in the US as in the case of the Universidad de 
Guadalajara with UCLA (Islas, 2011). In 1994, MEXNET and CONACyT proposed the 
creation of a National Technological Network (Red Tecnológica Nacional, RTN) and 
by October 1995 commercial domains surpassed the number of those from education 
institutions. By 1996 RTN was already established as an academic backbone to be 
marketed for commercial services, while TELMEX was already commercialising 
backbone connections and services (COFETEL, 2002 in Merrit, 2011).  
 
As above, connection to the Internet in Mexico was promoted and supported by 
scientists both in Mexico and the US, with a huge dependency on the latter. 
Dependent on US scientific facilities and developments like software and hardware, 
the Mexican institutions’ endeavour to fulfil academic requirements in terms of 
efficiency and flow of information was deemed valuable on its own and absent of 
political implications. This meant that despite the nuances of coding and operating 
information transfer packages not entirely familiar to Mexican scientists, these were 
seen as technical problems to surpass in order to be connected and part of a selected 
group of ‘advanced countries’ (see Islas 2011; Koenigsberger, 2015). The Internet 
was never questioned as a matter of national politics or autonomous technological 
development despite subtle hints of such concern among Mexican academics like 
Alfonso Serrano (Koenigsberger, 2015: 174-175). The combination of a motif – 
developing scientific knowledge and being part of an elite of developed and 
technologically advanced nations – and a specific form of technical management 
showed itself pervasive and long-lasting, despite its economic adaptations. The 
Internet then turned from an academic-oriented network into a commercial one, 
limiting Mexican government intervention. However, the assumption of its scientific 
knowledge-oriented character has endured despite its market-driven expansion and 
implementation. The Internet was assumed as a desirable component of everyday 
life, concealing the specific interests and values involved in its development (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). Accordingly, as we will see in the next section, recent efforts to 
strategically diffuse Internet access through digitisation have been linked to an 
increasing liberalisation of the country’s economy and subject to specific market-
oriented parameters and goals, although under the banner of national development, 
participation and quality of life.  
 
5.2 Digitisation as a dispositif and a Digital Mexico 
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Since Peña’s government started its mandate, a telecommunications transformation 
has been encouraged as part of a broad political, economic and social reform process 
(Tuckman, 2014). This reform, which was allegedly accomplished in its main 
normative corpus throughout 2013 (a dozen reform bills17 and its secondary and 
regulatory laws – five of them requiring amendments to the constitution) (see Dyer, 
2014; el-Erian, 2014), started its implementation in 2014. As part of the reform 
process, the commitment to expanding access to the Internet took the form of a digital 
policy whose fundamental purpose, as established in the National Digital Strategy 
(EDN in Spanish), was to accomplish a Digital Mexico through digitisation. As a 
concept, digitisation ‘describes the political, economic and social transformations 
associated with the massive adoption of Information and Communication 
Technologies’ (ICTs) (author’s translation, Gobierno de la República, November 
2013: 9).  
 
As mentioned before, the analysis of digitisation as a dispositif entails identifying how 
‘a given form of coordination’ brings together an ensemble of heterogeneous 
elements, how these latter interplay in relation to a strategic function (Foucault, 1977: 
194-196) and how they produce its subjects (Agamben, 2011). In this case, insofar as 
digitization was deemed a strategic imperative by the Mexican government, the 
analysis starts by inquiring through this assumption and employing it as a point of 
departure. This means that digitisation plays here as the starting analytical point as it 
clearly expresses the self-constitutive practice of the Mexican government in relation 
to the Internet. From this digitisation agenda the multiplicity of elements, its form of 
coordination and its overarching strategic imperative (general sense of purpose and 
orientation through layers of meaning) are identified through a discourse analytic 
approach and by drawing on Daniel McCarthy’s discourse analysis guide (McCarthy, 
2015; see Appendices A and B). The section contends that the overarching 
production of knowledge and practices around the Internet and the Mexican state and 
the deployment and coordination of resources – policies, laws, personnel, 
technological systems and money – work within a dispositif whose strategic function 
has been to maintain the benefits of well-established actors and the right conditions 
for market operation through liberalisation and control over the circulation of 
resources.  
 
Digitisation was composed of multiple elements in addition to the EDN action plan. 
These included: the National Development Plan (PND in Spanish) 2013-2018 (GR, 20 
																																																								
17  Reforms in education, telecommunications, labour, transparency, political/elections, energy, 
financial services, tax and revenues, anti-trust, Federal District political reform, National Criminal 
Procedural Code, and right to respond. 
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May 2013), the Constitutional Reform on Telecommunications (GR, June 2013) and 
the Mexican Political Constitution, the Program for an Accessible and Modern 
Government (PGCM in Spanish) –containing the digitisation index as the 
measurement instrument (GR, 30 August 2013), the Investment Program in Transport 
and Communications Infrastructure 2013-2018 (GR, July 2013), and the controversial 
Federal Law of Telecommunications and Radio and Law of the Public Radio System 
of the Mexican State (GR, July 2014). The main regulatory international components 
were: the Open Government Partnership18, the G8 Open Data Charter, the Regional 
Digital Market, Pacific Alliance19 Digital Agenda20, World Summit of the Information 
Society, Internet Governance Forum, eLAC2018: Regional Digital Agenda for Latin 
American and the Caribbean, and the OECD Ministerial Gatherings of Digital 
Economy. Each of these regulatory documents, programs and actions mobilise 
different agents and produce multiple but nevertheless interacting effects.  
 
Across such elements and their respective agents and effects, binding local, national, 
regional and world scenarios, three transversal recurring practices were identified: 
Connectivity, Single Digital Identity and Open Data. These forms of coordination 
reproduced those of global connectivity, free flow of information, personalisation of 
identity and mediation of subjectification embedded in the Internet expansion (see 
Chapter 4) and which have been crucial for US (and allies) foreign policy aims and 
interests. The overarching orientation of the dispositif unfolds through such 
transversal practices as privatisation and the generation of economic value, opening 
Mexico’s economy to better-established foreign markets while allegedly opening 
opportunities for new national agents to compete. In doing so, government institutions 
operate according to foreign standards regarding austerity, transparency and legal 
and procedural certainty for private property and investment. 
 




18 Barack Obama as President of the United States launched the Open Government Partnership 
(OGP) in 2011 at the U.N. General Assembly meeting along with Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, 
Philippines, South Africa and the United Kingdom, ‘to provide an international platform for domestic 
reformers committed to making their governments more open, accountable, and responsive to 
citizens’ (OGP, no date).  
19 Regional Integration initiative integrated by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, created on 28 April 
2011 (México Digital, 30 September 2015). 
20 ‘During the 11th Pacific Alliance Summit, held on July 1, 2016 in Puerto Varas, Chile, by presidential 
mandate, the Digital Agenda Sub-group was created in order to build a roadmap that would allow the 
four countries to implement, develop and deepen specific issues in accordance with what is 
established in the telecommunications and electronic commerce chapters of the Commercial Protocol 
of the Pacific Alliance’ (Alianza del Pacífico, no date). 
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The National Digital Strategy (GR, November 2013) in its main document established 
five objectives that are representative of government efforts towards a ‘digital Mexico’: 
1) Governmental Transformation – which aims to ‘construct a new relationship 
between society and government’, 2) Digital Economy – focusing on the development 
of a ‘digital economic ecosystem’ through the ‘assimilation of ICTs in economic 
processes,’ 3) Quality Education – integrating ‘ICTs to the educative process, both in 
educative administration and in the teaching and learning processes, as well as in 
teacher training,’ 4) Universal and Effective Health – which aims to ‘generate an 
integral digital health policy,’ and 5) Citizen Security – ‘using ICTs in order to prevent 
social violence, articulating the efforts of citizens and authorities’ (author’s translation, 
Ibid). Towards the achievement of such objectives the EDN has deployed several 
resources and actions through implementing 5 enhancers (habilitadores) or 
instruments: Connectivity, Digital Inclusion and Skills Development, Interoperability 
and Digital Identity, Juridical Framework, and Open Data.  
 
Without asserting the effectiveness of the strategy in toto or regarding the totality of 
its explicitly stated objectives, despite the serious limitations in its reach (DeLoitte 15 
March 2018), it is evident that the action plan has mobilised and put forth its agenda 
to a large extent, with 2017 as a crucial year for its accomplishments, including 
bringing international participation into its scope. For instance, and as detailed in the 
following paragraphs, the government awarded to Altan Redes the construction of a 
core national network and has supported more overarching initiatives and 
collaborations regarding financial services and markets like that of Open Banking, 
sponsored in part by the United Kingdom’s Prosperity Fund and the UK Embassy in 
Mexico, the latter in relation to the Financial Technologies Law recently approved in 
2018 and the increasing participation of joint think tanks and start-ups working on the 
exploitation of open data and blockchain technologies for public administration tasks 
and proceedings. Despite the limitations above, digitisation has resulted in a financial 
agenda, privatised the expansion of telecommunications infrastructure and opened 
the communications market and the circulation of data and resources to be exploited 
privately and transnationally.  
 
As originally stated by the Program for an Accessible and Modern Government 
(PGCM in Spanish), its Objective 5 was ‘to establish a National Digital Strategy that 
accelerates Mexico´s insertion into the Society of Information and Knowledge’ 
(author’s translation, GR, 30 August 2013: 27). This objective was justified in turn by 
the necessity ‘to impel a government centred on democratic values which contribute 
to building up a new relationship between the state and society, centred on the 
individual and its experience as user of public services (author’s translation, GR, 30 
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August 2013: 27). This impulse was to be ‘added by using ICTs, allowing the 
development of government´s modernisation and the improvement of public goods 
and services provision [assuming] counting with digital enhancers like connectivity, 
affordability (asequibilidad), inclusion, digital literacy, interoperability, and use of open 
data as well as an adequate juridical framework to those effects’ (Ibid).  
 
The motif of Mexico being part of a ‘Society of Information and knowledge’ is present 
across different documents without ever being clearly explained. For instance, in the 
EDN, Digital inclusion is defined as ‘the democratisation of access to ICTs so that the 
whole population can insert itself successfully in the Society of Information and 
Knowledge’ (author’s translation, GR, November 2013: 16). Regarding the EDN 
objective of Quality of Education, the task is defined as ‘to integrate ICTs into the 
educational process, both in education management and in teaching-learning 
processes and teaching training and the diffusion and preservation of art and culture, 
to allow the population successfully introduce itself into the Society of Information and 
Knowledge’ (author’s translation, GR, November 2013: 22). Indeed, the orientation 
and matter of the EDN is the Society of Information. The PGCM also conceived the 
EDN as ‘a strategy on the subject of the Society of Information and Knowledge and 
Internet Governance’, whose ‘primordial intention [was] to draw the government 
closer to people’ making clear that the Federal Public Administration was to adopt 
ICTs as a strategic tool expected to ‘contribute to generate a real opportunity to close 
the economic and social divide in Mexico’ (author’s translation, GR, 30 August 2013: 
13). (Ibid). 
 
As above, the Society of Information and Internet Governance were subjects of the 
strategy. However, across the EDN and digitisation as a dispositif, the Society of 
Information and Knowledge appears as the end and goal of digitisation, a motif as the 
advent of a different society through a technological fix whose economy is unclearly 
stated but that generates ‘a real opportunity to close the economic and social divide in 
Mexico’ (Ibid.). Reducing the multiplicity of elements involved in Mexico’s economic 
and social divide, this idea is, of course, in relation to the clear statement of the EDN 
that:  
 
the strategy emerges in response to the necessity of taking advantage of the 
potential of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) as a catalyst 
element for the country´s development. The incorporation of ICTs in all aspects of 
everyday life of people, organisations and government, has multiple benefits that 
translate into an improvement of the quality of life of people. Empirical evidence 
has demonstrated that digitisation impacts the growth of Gross Domestic Product 
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(GDP), the creation of employment, innovation, transparency and the effective 
delivery of public services, among other aspects […] 
With conviction that the path of digitisation is the way to a higher development of 
our country, the National Digital Strategy Coordination Office will dedicate its 
efforts to accomplish the objectives of this document, for the wellbeing of Mexico 
and all Mexicans (author’s translation, GR, November 2013: 7). 
 
The articulation between digitisation, economic measures, development and 
prosperity is consolidated as a conviction in the EDN, stating as a clear referent the 
World Economic Forum and the Global Report on Information Technologies 2013 (a 
gesture mimicked by Brito, member of #YoSoy132, see Chapter 6), which states that 
‘regardless the weak economic growth in the world in the last few years, digitisation 
contributed 200 thousand million dollars to world production and created 
approximately 6 million employments during 2011’ (author’s translation, GR, 
November 2013: 13). The truth that supports these claims and reaffirms the ‘path of 
digitisation’ as ‘the way to a higher development of the country’ (Ibid) is the alleged 
empirical evidence provided by such report. On such basis, development is the task 
and goal whose meaning is given through certain parameters of economic growth and 
is now being produced as dependent on the incorporation of ICTs in all aspects of 
everyday life, conditioning understandings of what constitutes improvement of the 
quality of life and thus the actions undertaken on that basis. Then, as a technological 
fix, the relationship between government and people and the quality of life of people 
depend on technology to make possible the transformations required and conceived 
as pertaining to the Society of Information and Knowledge. A society regularly 
reiterated, as the ultimate destiny of societies and whose definition, let alone that of 
digitisation, remains unclear in the EDN.  
 
Ultimately, such unclear status of the Society of Information and Knowledge presents 
‘modernity… as the rhetoric of salvation’ (Mignolo, 2010: 9) and requiring further 
definition that is not to be found within the explicit statements of digitisation. The only 
clear statement of digitisation is that ICTs need to be massively adopted. This, 
because the definition and meaning of digitisation and the Society of Information and 
Knowledge, its sense of purpose and sense of orientation, lie elsewhere, just like the 
experiences and interests to which they primarily and instrumentally respond. As 
digitisation increasingly pervades aspects of everyday life it fits within an economic 
agenda defined elsewhere rather than in Mexico and supports foreign referents of 




5.2.2 The index of digitisation and the Society of Information 
 
Regarding the objective of establishing a National Digital Strategy (EDN) contained in 
the PGCM, the index used to measure the country’s development towards the stated 
goals is the digitisation index established in a study by Raul L. Katz, Pantelis 
Koutroumpis and Fernando Callorda21 (2013). In this study, ‘The Latin American path 
towards digitization’, they define digitisation ‘as the social transformation triggered by 
the massive adoption of digital technologies to generate, process, share and transact 
information’ and present ‘a methodology followed to calculate the Digitization Index, a 
concept originally developed by Booz & Company, the global management consulting 
firm, with the support of the authors’ (Ibid: 6). While the definition of Society of 
Information provided in the EDN resembles the above definition of digitisation, in 
contrast the EDN entirely dismisses the information process (to generate, process, 
share and transact information) and pays no attention to who generates, processes, 
shares and transacts information. 
 
On the assumption of an ongoing technological revolution ‘often called the “Digital 
Era”’ (or the ‘Digital Knowledge Era as mentioned in the PGCM (GR, 30 August 2013: 
13), the Digitization Index ‘represents an attempt to quantitatively measure cross-
country progress along the digitization development path’ and ‘towards this new era’ 
(Katz et al. 2013: 6). The authors ‘argue that the holistic adoption and usage of 
information technology results in enhanced effects that go beyond the contribution of 
specific platforms. Furthermore, to achieve a significant impact, digitization has to be 
widely adopted within the economic and social fabric of a given country’ (Ibid: 7). 
Therefore, the EDN promotes the massive implementation of digital technologies in 
Mexico. It is the massive adoption of ICTs by individuals, enterprises, societies and 
governments that is seen as significant and fundamental to fulfil the promise of 
development. And correspondingly, the colonial form associated to this massive 
implementation unfolds as the index ‘indicates that countries are clustered as Digitally 
Constrained, Emerging, Transitional or Advanced, with varying degrees of 
contribution of digitization to economic growth’ (Ibid: 6). In this manner the study 
works as a developmentalist/colonial assessment ‘of Latin American countries in 
terms of their progression to digitally advanced societies’ and a prescription as ‘the 
region now can follow the path that developed nations already blazed, learning from 
their best practices’ and taking ‘advantage of mature technologies and markets, and 
the resulting price reductions’; always considering that ‘the acceleration between 
stages may derive from increased market liberalization, growing affordability of 
																																																								
21  Based at Columbia Institute of Tele-Information in New York and at ESEADE Business 
Administration Department in Buenos Aires respectively. 
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technologies, growing availability of skills, and the government plans to develop ICT 
in the region’(Ibid: 19). 
 
In other words, the measure of the status of the countries as ‘digitally advanced 
societies’, according to this study and index’, is how much digitisation contributes to 
economic growth. The end goal of digitisation is to foster economic growth and its 
meaningfulness to Latin America is seen through the lens of progress and the 
expectation of becoming a ‘digitally advanced’ society (Ibid). This motif is reproduced 
across different texts and recalls the context of Mexico’s first connection to the 
Internet, when it represented the opportunity to join ‘a selected group of developed 
countries’ (Koenigsberger, 2015; see Islas 2011). In addition, it recalls the EDN in 
relation to the PND’s fifth National Goal, Mexico with Global responsibility, which 
states that ‘within the global society, Mexico requires to take back a more active role’ 
seeking ‘integration with developed nations’ (author’s translation, GR, November 
2013: 33). Becoming a developed nation orients the process of digitisation 
undertaken by the Mexican government. However, the public orientation and rhetoric 
of the process still relies on the eschatological assumption and rhetorical asset of a 
Society of Information and Knowledge to which the population and the country need 
to arrive. 
 
As Armand Mattelart (author’s translation, 2002: 168) concisely synthesises, the 
notion of a Society of Information emerged in the Post-Second World War era in 
opposition to those nations deemed as totalitarian. Although this notion has been 
more recently associated to ‘the thesis of the end of ideologies’, it has also been 
associated to vindications of ‘class struggle, commitment, the intellectual who 
protests’. However, the author explains (Ibid: 108), the 1972-1973 crisis triggered the 
adoption of this notion by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) as well as by United Nations (UN) and the European Economic 
Council (EEC). It was initially linked to the crisis of the economic model but then 
referred to the governability crisis of ‘great Western democracies’ (Ibid). The idea of a 
technological fix, ‘that new technologies [could] solve the economic crisis as well as 
the political consensus crisis’ soon followed and was diffused through a report 
commissioned in 1978 by French president Giscard D’Estaing to Simon Nora and 
Alain Minc, the Nora-Minc report22 on the informatisation of society (Ibid). In 1995 the 
G7 group ratified the concept of a global society of information in Brussels, which 
																																																								
22 The report explained: ‘The insight about informatics and society reinforces the conviction that the 
balance of modern civilisations relies on a difficult alchemy: dosage between an increasingly vigorous, 
even if it is to be better limited and defined [acotado] of state prerogatives and an increasing 
exuberance of civil society. Informatics, for good or wrong, will be a basic ingredient of this dosage’ 
(Mattelart, 2002: 111).  
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promoted the liberalisation of telecommunications as main imperative to improve 
productivity, technological innovation and cultural plurality (Mattelart, 2002: 127). 
Finally, by 1998 a ‘process of deregulation of financial networks and 
telecommunication systems’ constituted the departing point of the official recognition 
by the World Trade Organisation of deregulation ‘as the principle of a new economy 
and a new society’ (Ibid: 168). Deregulation and the advent of a Society of 
Information (a technological fix) have since been inextricably linked as responding to 
great Western democracies’ considerations and decisions. 
 
As articulated in the EDN, the notion of a Society of Information expresses the 
assumption of a technological fix that works under the ideal of liberalisation – the 
deregulation of financial and telecommunications networks on a world level and the 
retreat of public property – as the means and end of an alleged new society and 
economy. In correspondence to market virtues and a process of liberalisation 
promoted in the name of the Mexican society, the overarching orientation of 
digitisation as a dispositif, as further analysed in the following subsections, has been 
towards opening national resources (e.g. the generation, processing, sharing and 
transaction of information) to exploitation and the privatisation and commodification of 
its products, operationalised through three transversal recurring practices: 
Connectivity, Personalisation of Identity, and, Open Data. These practices, it is 
argued, reiterate the expansive forms of coordination of the Internet (global 
connectivity, free flow of information, personalisation of identity and mediation of 
subjectification) and delimit the constitution of the Mexican state in relation to the 




One of the enhancers or instruments deployed across the elements of the digitisation 
dispositif is Connectivity, which the EDN refers to as ‘the development of networks 
and amplification in deployment of better infrastructure across the national territory, 
the amplification of the capacity of existing networks, and the development of 
competition in the ICTs sector to stimulate price reduction’ (GR, November 2013: 26). 
It is important to note that this expansion is said to arise from the awareness that ‘the 
basis of a Society of Information and Knowledge lies on the development of better 
infrastructure, reason for impelling the deployment of networks and competitivity’ 
(EDN website, Connectivity). In line with the liberalisation process triggered by Peña’s 
reforms, the emphasis of connectivity is on infrastructure, which is argued for in terms 
of providing economic opportunity (mainly to foreign investment and entrepreneurs as 
it allows up to 100% of foreign investment thanks to the Constitutional Reform on 
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Telecommunications23) and international alliances to the well-established national 
actors. 
 
Infrastructure, national expansion, private investment and price reduction were to be 
accomplished in an eminently international and private fashion. In order ‘to improve 
the quality of life of people’, the PGCM established, ‘it has been proposed to 
strengthen the inclusion of private resources for investment in public infrastructure 
through the scheme of public-private associations’, through which the State ‘grants 
the best conditions for investment’ (GR, 30 August 2013: 12). In addition, the 
Investment Program in Communication and Transport Infrastructure (GR, July 2013) 
states that the objective of the initiative in relation to the Transversal Strategy of 
Democratising Productivity included in the PND 2013-2018 is ‘to develop logistic 
infrastructure that integrates all the regions of the country into the national and 
international markets, so that enterprises and productive activities can expand across 
the entire national territory’ (Ibid: 21). As such, the objective of integrating the country 
to international markets is reiterated across different documents of the dispositif.  
 
Katz et al.’s paper (2013: 8) equally asserts that ‘Network Capacity’ is based on 
‘international network links’ as ‘international bandwidth is crucial in order to provide 
adequate throughput to remote sites’ and as national bandwidth networks are never 
enough. As well, the international plans and regional digital agendas subscribed by 
the Mexican Government (e.g. RedGEALC, Open Data, Open Banking) combined 
internationalisation and openness to private exploitation. Overall, the aims and 
international agenda included in the EDN relied on the wide expansion of the Internet 
and thus required the construction of a Red Compartida (Shared Network), a 
virtualized core network24 that offers service to retail operators but not to final users, 
so that along with reduced investment costs for such operators, more competitors 
would enter the market, decreasing the cost of services for final users and thus 
expanding service provision to unattended regions. 
 
																																																								
23  Despite including universal access to information and communication technologies as a 
constitutional right, and the creation of regulatory institutions, the reform was criticised, among many 
other points, for allowing foreign investments up to 100% while closing opportunities for indigenous 
groups to participate in the sector (Aristegui Noticias, 23 March 2013; BBC, 22 March 2013). On its 
part, the ‘YoSoy132’ movement questioned the lack of support the reform brings to communitarian and 
indigenous media and the right of the audiences to better content or to a minimum of social content 
(García, 2013). 
24 A core network that functions over the use of 90MHZ out of the 700MHZ spectrum through a 
commercial use concession in abidance to the Article 16 transitory of the Mexican Constitution 
(OEDN, no date b). The aim is to reduce required investment by retail operators and make for them 
profitable to enter the telecommunications market through a wholesale network with national coverage 
designed, built and operated by a company that offers and is not able to sell services to final users but 
only to Telecom service providers or retail operators, who would enjoy reduced operation costs. 
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In order to guarantee connectivity infrastructure, in 2017 the public-private agreement 
between Altan Redes, the Secretariat of Communications and Transport (SCT) and 
the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) was established with the aim of 
reaching 30% of population provision by March 2018. Altan Redes, an international 
consortium created in 2016 and based in Mexico City, counted as its majoritarian 
stakeholder the Marapendi Holding, an infrastructure fund for investment in OECD 
member countries administered by Morgan Stanley Infrastructure with 33.38% assets, 
followed by the Mexico-China Fund with 23.36%; Caisse de depot et placement du 
Quebec, one of the major pensions administrator in North America with 12.68%; 
Hansam, property of the lawyer Miguel S. Escobedo with 9.35%; FFLATAM trust that 
emits bursary certificates constituted in INVEX with 6.54%; Megacable and Axtel, 
Mexican Telecomm Companies that will participate of the capital without right to vote; 
and finally, World Bank’s IFC and Eugenio Galdón president of Multitel Group with 
3.34% respectively (Martinez, 2016). This consortium then selected Nokia ‘to design, 
build and operate the new nationwide LTE and 5G-ready wholesale network in 
Mexico in what [was] Nokia's largest-ever contract win by scale in Latin America’ 
(Nokia, 30 March 2017). As Nokia optimistically stated, ‘the innovative and unique 
"Red Compartida" public-private project is the first of its kind worldwide and expected 
to attract more than USD $7 billion in investment over nine years’ and is ‘financed by 
international and local investors ranging from financial institutions and development 
institutions to industrial partners in Mexico’ (Ibid).  
 
As such, besides the sudden emergence of a consortium formed by multinational 
groups ready to undertake such an important task, the nature of the quest is 
outstanding in terms of its sui generis nature, not only for being a virtualized core 
network operated through a public-private agreement and deploying 4.5G Pro radio 
access based on AirScale25, but for granting vast majority to foreign interests and 
being mostly worried about providing competitive investment opportunities to retail 
operators on a network that would be, according to the rhetoric of the EDN, the 
foundation of so many transformations on which the quality of life of the Mexican 
people depend. Instrumentally, the network and its imperative suit perfectly US efforts 
of expanding the Internet according to a specific economic model that gives access 
and control to privileged transnational actors. Therefore, it contributes to the US 
imperative of Global Interoperability and ‘a globally-interconnected digital information 
and communications infrastructure’ deemed as critical for ‘the U.S. economy, civil 
infrastructure, public safety, and national security” (EOPUS, 2009: iii) (see Chapter 4). 
But also, in deploying infrastructure within liberalising models the network reproduces 
																																																								
25 Using wireless connections through antennas instead of deploying vast networks of optical fibre 
cable.  
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the Internet’s embedded ways of coordinating and producing resources 
instrumentally: at a distance and according to someone else’s politics and interests, 
just as in the following cases of Open Data and a Single Profile Identity.  
 
5.2.4 Open Data 
 
The public-private contract between the Secretariat of Communications and Transport 
and Altan Redes was the first to adopt the Open Contract Data Standard for a public-
private association modality. A standard that has been promoted by Transparencia 
Mexicana, the EDN Office, National Institute of Access to Public Information INAIP, 
the Open Contract Alliance26 and the World Bank (Red Compartida, 31 January 2017) 
and which ends up justifying its own existence asserting that ‘Open data on 
infrastructure and other public procurement is essential to support investment and 
integrity’ (OCP, 20 February 2018).  
 
Open Data as an enhancer [habilitador] stands out from among the rest of the EDN 
enhancers as it traverses all of them and the EDN objectives. Beyond or before any 
assumptions of the goodness of achieving transparency or making information on 
public contracts and government proceedings open in order to eliminate corruption 
from public administration, there is much more about opening data in terms of 
financial and political benefits than those usually made explicit by its advocates as 
transparency or efficiency. Indeed, the Mexican government has stated its own 
transformation – the foundation of a new relationship between government and 
society – through its entire reliance on digital technologies and based on the Internet, 
the parameters of efficiency and efficacy in public expenditures dictated by the Inter 
American Bank for Development (BID in Spanish) (i.e. adopting the index of 
Management for Results 2010) and its commitments to Open Data (GR, 30 August 
2013).  
 
As established in the PGCM 2013-2018, ‘an accessible [cercano] and modern 
government’ is ‘not only a government that spends less, rather it is one that spends 
better’ (author’s translation, GR, 30 August 2013: 1). And the way to spend better is 
by achieving ‘a government with policies and programs framed within a public 
administration oriented towards results, that is efficient, has evaluation mechanisms 
that improve its performance, that optimises the use of public resources, that 
																																																								
26 The Open Contracting Partnership was conceived in 2012, hosted by the World Bank Group until 
the end of 2014. Its members and advisory group are composed by policy experts, leaders, 
campaigners, businessmen, investment and corporate finance workers, constituting a multi-
stakeholder initiative that works ‘to open up government procurement and make sure problems get 
fixed’ (Open Contracting Partnership Website/About). 
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simplifies normativity and government proceedings, is accountable in a clear and 
opportune manner to citizenry, and that uses new ICTs‘ (Ibid: 4). In this description, 
besides the enlisted administrative skills and virtues, ICTs are assumed as 
necessary.  
 
The way of using ICTs is by making ‘intensive use’ of them and impelling 
‘transparency and accountability on the basis of a basic principle imprinted in article 
134 of the Constitution: “the economic resources (de que dispongan) available to the 
Federation, the states, municipalities, the Federal District and political-administrative 
organs of its territorial demarcations, will be administered with efficiency, efficacy, 
economy, transparency, and truthfulness (honradez) to satisfy the objectives they are 
destined to” (Ibid: 3). ICTs are explicitly intended to bring efficiency, efficacy and 
transparency, even accountability in order to satisfy the established objectives; 
however, truthfulness is somehow different, included but never explicitly reiterated 
across and throughout the elements of digitisation.  
 
Among the conditions and properties the Mexican State must observe, truthfulness, 
sovereignty and independence were mentioned when quoting the supreme law of the 
country (Ibid: 17) but never discussed or included again to be observed as central to 
government practices when planning, designing and deploying digitisation. 
Truthfulness however, was reiterated in a different manner, not in relation to 
sovereignty or independence but to managerial skills and attitudes as trust. Peña’s 
administration explicitly, although quite sporadically, mentioned and tried to address 
the issue of trust. 
 
The PGCM has as fundamental purpose that we Mexicans regain trust in 
government, through the establishment of a correct public management oriented 
toward results, that optimises the use of public resources, uses new ICTs, 
strengthens transparency and accountability and integrates different government 
and civil society efforts with the primordial goal of leading Mexico to its maximum 
potential (Ibid).  
 
As above, the means to regain trust in government are those of public management 
techniques. Within such techniques, new ICTs have a fundamental role, as they make 
possible to attain transparency and accountability. Undertaking foreign agendas and 
measurement indexes, the Mexican government instrumentally orients and is oriented 
through borrowed aspirations. The true way, it is assumed, to gain back trust in 
government is elsewhere: uttered by the BID, embodied in so called new ICTs and in 
specific measures towards transparency, accountability and the integration of a very 
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specific sector of a particular civil society – the innovative and tech savvy one as 
detailed below.  
 
The transformations required by the state to gain trust back and establish a new 
relationship with society are based on a specific set of technologies that work through 
the assumption of the anticorruption and positive nature of transparency and 
accountability. That is the case of Open Data and its assumed benefits for 
transparency and accountability. It has been said that in Mexico, ‘an Accessible and 
Modern Government is an open government that, efficiently, fosters greater 
accountability’ (Ibid). However, there is no clarity about for whom accountability and 
transparency work, as the latter has been deemed the watchword of 21st-century 
liberal democracies and as ‘open government initiatives routinely prize visibility over 
intelligibility and ignore the communicative basis of trust’ (Moore, 2018: 416).  
 
Open Data has been meant to produce ‘a change in governmental management 
culture [cultura gubernamental de gestión] and the use of public data as tools to 
foster entrepreneurism, innovation and generate efficiencies with the government’ 
(OEDN, no date g). The enhancer is thus defined as ‘impelling the publication of open 
data to create an ecosystem of co-creation of public services, to trigger innovation 
and entrepreneurism in order to transform information held by the government into an 
asset of social value’ (OEDN, no date c).  
 
Innovation, entrepreneurism and social value triggered by Open Data are linked to the 
PGCM line of action 5.7.3, which ‘promotes trust in proceedings and digital services, 
digital economy and electronic payments’ (OEDN, no date g). As such, Open Data 
traverses all the elements of digitisation as a dispositif, from Governmental 
Transformation, through to Digital Economy, Educative Transformation and Universal 
and Effective Health, and to Civic Innovation and Citizen Participation as it promises 
to build trust across a wide scope of affairs on an instrumental basis. Trust is 
therefore means to the aim of triggering entrepreneurism and innovation as social-
value generative aspects of open data. 
 
While social aspects like public funding and social services to unprivileged sectors of 
the population are intended to increasingly run through mobile devices and platforms, 
which avoids duplicating funding and allows diffuse information on specific health and 
social conditions requiring attention 27 , the entrepreneurial and developmentalist 
aspect of it takes over, subject to foreign parameters and validations. This is the case 
																																																								
27 For example, the program Prospera Digital gives a monthly stipend to single mothers and the Data 
for Development initiave of a maternal mortality project in Mexico 
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of Prospera Digital and its aim of expanding financial services and the use of financial 
products, also termed as ‘financial inclusion’; the case of ‘Data for Development’ aims 
at ‘designing evidence-based public policies through deep and technical analysis of 
open data of big size’ (OEDN, no date f). The latter project’s agenda is set according 
to foreign initiatives like ‘Data Science for Social Good’ and the attribution of Mexico 
as a ‘developing country’. It is important and significant to consider here that 
communication resources of initiatives based on open data were published in English 
with no Spanish version available, showing a lack of intervention of the Mexican 
Government and an overreliance on foreign actors and products over national ones 
(see UoCh, no date; OEDN, no date d; GR, no date). As analysed below, social 
initiatives and transparency were quite limited while the financial use of open data 
received greater attention, projection and deployment linked to a very specific type of 
civil society digitisation puts forth. 
 
The Open Data enhancer unfolded in a subtle manner throughout other enhancers 
and across the EDN Objectives, crucially producing and fostering a specific type of 
civil society constituted around the values of entrepreneurship, creativeness and 
innovation. While inciting public institutions and citizens to share all kinds of data, 
access to the possibilities of exploiting those data and innovating with them in an 
entrepreneurial manner is restricted to specific resources and managerial techniques: 
it is restricted to a limited sector of society and a technosocial culture that, as the 
infrastructure being set, is international and speaks in the language of informatics 
(and English) towards global interoperability (see the initiatives below). As the Open 
Data definition specified: it is ‘public information available online for free, in formats 
legible to machines, and that hold a license to be used, reused and redistributed 
freely by everyone and that are only subject to the requirement of attribution’ (author’s 
translation, GR, November 2013: 39). In other words, such information is only 
intended to be free online and insofar as it is legible to machines. Considering the 
digital divide in terms of access and digital skills that the EDN is pretending to 
address, the social sector included in this civil society that is producing a new 
relationship with the state is quite limited, whereas the need for expansion of 
technological mediation is assumed as global. Open Data takes global interoperability 
and the free flow of information as conceived by the US government (Chapter 4) a 
step further into the interoperability of all sorts of datasets (see ODH, 2018). 
 
For instance, the ‘Labora’ initiative has been supported and funded by the UK 
Embassy in Mexico through the Prosperity Fund and is a collaboration between the 
EDN; the Open Data Institute (ODI), co-founded by Sir Tim Berners-Lee, founder of 
the World Wide Web, and Sir Nigel Shadbolt to connect, equip and inspire ‘people 
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around the world to innovate with data’ (author’s translation, Labora, no date); and 
Demos28, which designs ‘business models that help solve the most urgent social 
problems, while generating economic value’ (Ibid). Labora is said to contribute to the 
PGCM lines of action in that it promotes the use of open data by social, 
entrepreneurial and governmental sectors; it impels citizen participation through 
innovation competitions and digital skills promotion campaigns; it establishes and 
operates a Model of Governmental Innovation based on the co-creation of solutions 
through citizen participation; it promotes financial inclusion through mobile banking 
schemes; it promotes innovation in ICTs to generate products and services of high 
aggregated value; it takes advantage of ICTs to impel civic innovation; and it supports 
the development of a market of digital goods and services (offer and demand) 
(author’s translation, OEDN no date e).  
 
The Labora initiative was based on the methodology the ODI has used to incubate 
new open data enterprises in the UK and Europe and on ‘the experience of Demos in 
entrepreneurial activities of technology aiming to have social impact’ (author’s 
translation, Labora, no date). The self-description of the Labora initiative in Mexico 
emphasized that ‘[this] collaboration between the Federal Government, a local social 
enterprise and an international institute brings the best of local knowledge, 
international experience and government understanding, thus creating a truly unique 
network’ (Ibid). While appealing, this definition obscured, on the one hand, the UK 
Embassy´s role and the importance of funding, and, on the other, assumed local 
knowledge as embodied in an internationalized group of (social) entrepreneurs 
members of a privileged sector of the Mexican society.  
 
Regarding such kinds of entrepreneurial civil society, Demos was also called ‘C 
Minds’ and is part of other UK Embassy funded initiatives like Open Banking 
(analysed in the next section). This entrepreneurial and innovative element stood out 
as prominent and undermined lower profile efforts regarding socially focused 
initiatives. In other words, the Open Data schemes run according to the liberalising 
and commodifying imperatives that uphold the Internet expansion and not according 
to non-economic value generating initiatives. In this sense, trust in government is to 
be found where there is economic value and aspirations of innovation and 
development, following foreign standards and measures that respond to different 
circumstances and experiences where the social can be monetised. That is not only 
the case of Labora but also of other initiatives like OD100MX (México Digital, 26 
November 2014) and Datalab/Goblab (Coordinación EDN, 18 April 2017).  
																																																								
28 The group is some other times labeled as C Minds and is part of ther UK Embassy funded initiatives 
like Open Banking, as analysed in the next section on Digital Identity and the Single Profile Identity. 
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The entrepreneurial emphasis of Open Data must be considered against the 
backdrop of investment and economic interests, which are explicitly expressed by the 
ODI when it asserts its advocacy to expand UK´s presence in the world. Such 
advocacy, the ODI asserts, enables ‘the UK to build on its established strengths in 
data and data analytics, break new ground in creating value from data across 
industry, and ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of data innovation globally’ 
(ODI, no date b). In this light, Mexico is experiencing an Open Data venture whose 
condition of possibility is the liberalisation of the country set by Peña Nieto´s reforms, 
but whose entire coherence and strength comes from the outside, from the expansive 
design of the Internet and US Internet policies and the UK effort to strengthen its 
presence in data innovation. Of course, this entails the diffusion and promotion of 
certain technologies that come with the monetary and logistic support of international 
partners, which explains, for instance, the recent and accelerating developments 
towards new financial services.  
 
Prospera Program and Open Banking as enabling financial inclusion in Mexico are 
agendas set by financial institutions, developed by the kind of civil society that is 
considered specialist in data and public policy – entrepreneurial, innovative and 
digitally literate and specialised, funded by governments like the UK, whose data 
analytic and programming industry is well-established and looking for expansion 
opportunities. As the ODI promotes itself to potential members, it is a matter of a 
‘revenue-generating partnership’ (ODI, no date a) whose Global Network Directory 
includes transnational corporations mainly from the UK and other Western countries.  
 
Specifically, Open Banking is a project of the ODI and the British Embassy Mexico 
City, part of the Prosperity Fund; it is developed by C Minds29 (which used to be 
PIDES Social Innovation) and has been supported in Mexico by the National Banking 
and Securities Commission (CNBV, Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores), the 
Bank of Mexico (Banco de México), the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP, 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público) and the EDN Office. As the report ‘What is 
the potential for Open Banking in Mexico? Recommendations and roadmap for 
adopting an open banking standard’ by the ODI, the UK Embassy and C Minds 
asserted, the introduction of an Open Banking standard is feasible thanks to the 
recent passing ‘of the Law to Regulate Financial Technology Institutions (known as 
the FinTech Law) on 1 March 2018’ (Beardmore at al., 2018). 
																																																								
29 The C Minds website describes the group as ‘an impact innovation agency with over 10 years of 
experience that designs and deploys strategies for economic and social development, that works 
‘mainly in emerging economies, enabling cross-sector collaborations and harnessing the power of 
disruptive technologies’ (C Minds, no date).  
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Regarding the Shared Network project, commentators have considered Mexico as 
innovative, as it ‘became the first country to regulate its FinTech sector’ (nonetheless, 
guaranteeing low profile actors exclusion) and as ‘this [FinTech] law lays the 
groundwork for an Open Banking Standard (OBS) by requiring financial institutions to 
establish open application programming interfaces (APIs) with the aim of making 
financial data open, while respecting privacy and commercial confidentiality’ (Ibid). 
However, the emphasis of such a project has been on making financial data open, 
while privacy and confidentiality have been treated in increasingly contradictory 
terms. Among the products to be developed with the OBS were those building 
‘reputational profiles or “personas”, or sets of parameters that belong to the same 
individual, via an algorithm’ (Ibid: 39). Whereas the end of implementing an OBS is 
unclearly established as ‘to help people to transact, save, borrow, lend and invest 
their money’ (Ibid: 15), the kind of initiatives that create reputations and follow 
individuals’ behaviour – deciding on their behalf through an algorithm – seem 
increasingly oriented towards a cashless society of trusted individualised identities 
(see Chapter 4). mediated and oriented towards strengthening and protecting mainly 
the financial industry from fraud while enhancing market expansion.  
  
As open data leans towards entrepreneurism, the management of a complex 
technical and social system as the main function and form of coordination embedded 
in the Internet consolidates here its market imperatives and through massive 
implementation, supported by the expansion of social media platforms and current 
government and international efforts, is projected to reach further into everyday life as 
an ‘instrument of coordination’. Such an instrument mediates and fragments 
behaviours and social interactions into data, Accommodating such data for analysis 
and intervention, such form of management produces identities and adapts social 
interactions, subjectifications and government actions to foreign standards, values 
and agendas set by favoured actors, turning users into instruments and diffusing 
coloniality through ‘thingification’ or the turning of ‘man into an instrument of 
production’ (Césaire, 2000: 42) and enhancing control and coloniality through a 
mediation that hides its own points of attribution and decision (also see Chapter 3). 
 
As above, Mexico might become an innovator in terms of its liberalising efforts and 
fostering of digitisation. A sui generis case or a sort of financial and digitisation 
experiment trying to expand financial markets (see also Withers, 2017) in a country 
where the informal economy has about 23% of participation in the GDP (Inegi, 2017) 
and the state is concerned about tax and revenues capture. In such circumstances, 
when C Minds (no date) declares that it counts with a ‘civic and social technology 
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development lab [that] allows [them] to develop Machine Learning, Blockchain, Big 
Data and other new technology-based tools to support [their] ground-breaking 
initiatives’, it is about announcing the tools to be employed not only towards the 
financialization of the economy and the digitisation of the financial, the governmental 
and the so-called innovative creation of social values. It is, more crucially, about the 
way in which truthfulness and trust are thought of being attainable, currently, only 
through specific technologies. Among such technologies, Blockchain, in the name of 
transparency, represents the vanguard and promise to guarantee certainty and 
confidence, first of all, to financial markets and tax and revenues capture in countries 
where financial inclusion is a catchword (see EDN, SFP and Campus Talent Mexico, 
2017; on the case of Kenya see Gebre, 2018). 
 
5.2.5 A Single Digital Identity 
 
Another crucial enhancer included in the EDN was Interoperability and Digital Identity. 
As an element of the digitisation dispositif, interoperability has remained limited within 
the explicit objective of Governmental Transformation, while Digital Identity– in terms 
of a Single Digital Identity– traversed the dispositif as a fundamental goal and practice 
that supports the potential of digitisation as a market-led project. A single digital 
identity was fundamental to develop at least 13 out of the 23 Secondary Objectives of 
the EDN and has developed in line with the personalisation of identity promoted by 
US government and corporations according to commercial security measures and 
cultural economic values (Chapter 4). Connecting commercial interest, law 
enforcement and military security, personalisation of identity has been a pressing 
concern in both US commercial and defence areas and in-between them. With 
worldwide presence through corporations like Facebook, Google or Apple and their 
shared parameters of producing an identifiable, exploitable and accountable 
individual, such form of coordinating resources entirely corresponds to the expansion 
requirements of financial markets and enhanced state reach regarding tax and 
revenues and social services.  
 
Besides resource management, the personalisation of identity that is increasingly 
practiced on the Internet entails a mediation of subjectification (see Chapter 4). The 
importance of third parties and the extent to which they determine the field of 
possibility of personalisation and social communication, despite not being unilateral 
and promoting and enabling user-generated content and social exchange of 
information or even participation, comprise a series of, although flexible and generally 
subtle, stable ways of coordinating things, behaviours and knowledges. Blockchain, 
closely related to Open Data, has been deemed as increasingly crucial in terms of the 
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feasibility of developing a single digital identity in Mexico. Present explicitly in the 
Governmental Transformation and Digital Economy objectives of the EDN document, 
Blockchain is part of developing projects concerning Federal Public Administration 
and public service proceedings, like those of Open Contracts and Individual 
Certificates. But more important, Blockchain is intended as the foundation of digital 
official identification and the validation and actualisation of legal effects, both 
fundamental to guaranteeing certainty to financial markets and – mainly foreign – 
investment through securing transactions, safeguarding profits and increasing 
consumers’ confidence under the banner of fighting corruption.  
 
As asserted in a document available only in English both on the EDN website 
reporting on the activities of the Blockchain HackMx 201730 (EDN, SFP and Campus 
Talent Mexico, 2017) celebrated in Mexico City, and on the UNECE (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe) Website31 (UNECE 2017) on the UN/CEFACT 
(Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business) Conference32 on Blockchain, 4 
October 2017 in Rome, Italy: 
 
The use of blockchain technology in the public sector represents the possibility of 
providing highly secure and reliable digital services, at low cost, based on open 
technology, and a transparent process de facto for all participants; which 
significantly increases confidence in public institutions and effectively fights 
corruption (UNECE, 2017).  
 
Security, reliability, low cost, open technology and transparency increase confidence 
and fight corruption. The above assertion goes hand in hand with the aim of 
transparency and accountability as related to open data, in terms of the broad 
transformation the Mexican government required to regain the Mexican population´s 
trust in institutions. As Ethereum, a proposed Blockchain supplier for the initiatives, 
promotes on its website, you can ‘kickstart a project with a trustless crowdsale’ 
(Ethereum, no date). By using this tool, ‘you can create a contract that will hold a 
contributor's money until any given date or goal is reached… without requiring a 
																																																								
30 Blockchain HACKMX is ‘an initiative of the National Digital Strategy and the Ministry of Public 
Administration, in collaboration with Campus Talent Mexico. The main goal is to promote government 
digital innovation using emerging technologies to generate case studies within to improve the delivery 
of digital public services, and to escalate the benefits of digital government’ (EDN, SFP and Campus 
Talent Mexico, 2017). 
31 The website (UNECE, 2017) contains the presentations of the attendees to the UN/CEFACT 
Conference, where Yolanda Martínez Mancilla, Head of Mexico’s Digital Government Unit, presented 
on ‘Government: How to stimulate blockchain innovation in government’. 
32 ‘This Conference seeks to establish some clarity and a collective understanding of the potential of 
blockchain technology for supporting trade and trade facilitation as well as the other business and 
government activities where the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business 
(UN/CEFACT) has projects’ (UNECE, 4 October 2017). 
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centralized arbitrator, clearinghouse or having to trust anyone’ (Ibid). And you no 
longer need to ‘find a trustworthy CFO to handle the accounts, run board meetings 
and do a bunch of paperwork’ (Ibid). Now ‘you can simply leave all that to an 
Ethereum contract. It will collect proposals from your backers and submit them 
through a completely transparent voting process’ (Ibid). However, trust in this ethereal 
environment comes instrumentally embedded, as ‘one of the many advantages of 
having a robot run your organization is that it is immune to any outside influence as 
it’s guaranteed to execute only what it was programmed to’ (Ibid).  
 
Ethereum, as many other Blockchain suppliers, is ‘a decentralized platform that runs 
smart contracts: applications that run exactly as programmed’, thus, allegedly, 
‘without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third-party interference’ 
(Ibid). Moreover, this supplier asserts, ‘these apps run on a custom built blockchain, 
an enormously powerful shared global infrastructure that can move value around and 
represent the ownership of property’ (Ibid). ‘This enables developers to create 
markets, store registries of debts or promises, move funds in accordance with 
instructions given long in the past (like a will or a futures contract) and many other 
things that have not been invented yet, all without a middleman or counterparty risk’ 
(Ibid). In a general sense, this is the promise that comes with the task of identification: 
trust and certainty regarding the ownership of property, control over circulations and a 
robot as mediator instead of a personally acquainted and trusted middleman.  
 
In such a narrative, a robot can run processes effectively and make middlemen 
unnecessary for those entrepreneurial citizens that can create and innovate on their 
own. Yet, these entrepreneurs have already been constituted into those external 
supports that are machines or robots; blockchain is the middleman transformed 
through the desire of achieving a perfectly instrumental environment. This is 
instrumentality as the ‘obediential potential’ in which blockchain and a single digital 
identity ‘have incorporated in themselves the operation of the principal agent and can 
thus “obey” its commands (even if these are actually inscribed into the functioning of 
the [dispositif], in such a way that the one using them, in pushing the “controls,” obeys 
in turn a predetermined program)’ (Agamben, 2015: 77). The program’s designer is 
concealed once the program becomes an abstract law, a pure form of ‘coordination 
without politics’, and allegedly no trust in people is required, only trust in applications 
‘that run exactly as programmed’ and are ‘immune to any outside influence’ (Ibid). 
This concealment of mediation works according to the appearance of a seamless 
Internet-mediated reality, where trust in people seems to vanish and brings about the 
fantasy of immunity with its autoimmune dangers and its hidden ongoing updating 
process of drawing the limits between inside and outside. That is, of assuming who is 
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able to decide/design the platforms, to impose the technology itself as a form of 
government over the “non-technological”, “non-digitised” or “disconnected beings”, 
and who is considered as a neutral designer and governor of property rights, 
circulations and overall, individuals and collectives. 
 
All such processes are forms of ‘coordination without politics’, performed hidden from 
public understanding and responding to someone else’s political experience and 
interests, not only due to a digital divide and digital literacy but thanks to the same 
form of coordination embedded in the Internet, performed by foreign and/or exclusive 
actors on behalf of others. The same operation designed to hide its overarching 
economy and instrumental assumption responding to accelerating times of production 
and control in designing the Internet now reaches further into everyday life of foreign 
countries and promises to bring transparency and trust based on the universalisation 
of a local experience. The political as an encounter in which existential affinity is 
brought about (see Chapter 2) is replaced by efficient immediate and distant 
coordination. This is the case of developing a Mexican Blockchain ‘to generate use 
cases of Blockchain technology within the public sector,’ part of the Blockchain 
HACKMX 2017 (EDN, SFP and Campus Talent Mexico, 2017: 11).  
 
The parts of a digital ecosystem in Mexico to be integrated with Blockchain have been 
identified as: eFirma (or e-Signature) for legal and state-citizen proceedings; Digital 
Identity as a full accreditation of identity of Mexicans at home and abroad; Public 
Registry of Property for the verification of information on property; Certificates of 
deposit and the verification of the authenticity of deposits of the Register of 
Certificates, Warehouse and Goods (RUCAM by its initials in Spanish); and 
Transactional Transfers Supports to trace transactions of ‘supports granted to a 
property or a beneficiary’ in order to avoid duplication of funding (Ibid). The creation of 
a Single Digital Identity is present across such digital ecosystem. eFirma, Digital 
Identity, Public Registry of Property, Certificates of deposit and Transactional 
Transfers Supports are intended to work on the basis of identifying the person that 
subscribes to specific processes, biometrically enhanced by the Digital Identity 
initiative and National Registry of Population (RENAPO) metrics but also linked to 
public health services provision through the development of a public repository of 
electronic medical prescriptions and a Single Health Profile. As a practice oriented 
towards a Single Profile Digital Identity, this personalisation of identity, even if not fully 
operational in a health services provision environment, works well for so-called 
financial inclusion and the possibility of turning people into users of financial services 
and the Internet as there needs to be an individual – consumer and tax payer – 
accountable for each transaction. 
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Insofar as a single digital identity might turn every process more efficient and 
transparent for managerial purposes and help the government comply to 
internationally established austerity measures, the emphasis is always on private 
property. As part of this Digital Identity and in relation to representing ownership of 
property, the dispositif includes the ‘digital management of the national territory with 
cartographic bases, cadastral data and the Public Registry of Property’ (author’s 
translation, GR, November 2013). Along with the Open Data agenda, this mapping 
out of the territory and its turning visible of the ownership order behind it also helps 
bring certainty to transactions and the commodification of the territory, fragmenting it 
through the homogenisation and standardisation of an order of visibility and 
transaction which is abstract and disembodied. The territory as embodiment of the 
political (see Chapter 7) is here replaced by the imperative of management and 
instrumentalisation. This order complies with the privatisation of land ownership and 
exploitation according to the Constitutional Reform of the Article 27, which in 1992 
allowed communal land to be sold as private property, making possible the partition 
and commodification of what used to be inappropriable communal land (see Chapter 
7). The set of Pena Nieto’s reforms followed on this process of privatisation. 
 
Clearly stated in the first page of the Blockchain HACKMX 2017 document (EDN, 
SFP and Campus Talent Mexico, 2017), the Constitutional Reforms put forth by Peña 
Nieto´s administration set the perfect environment for a Digital Ecosystem in Mexico 
(on Peña’s reforms see Dyer, 2014; el-Erian, 2014). In line with these reforms, 
‘Internet access became a constitutional right’ (EDN, SFP and Campus Talent 
Mexico, 2017), a Universal Digital Inclusion Policy was established ‘by law’, 
competition in the telecommunications sector was allegedly granted through an 
‘autonomous regulatory entity’ – the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT, 
Instituto federal de Telecomunicaciones in Spanish)’ – and a ‘legal framework for 
telecommunications and up-to-date broadcasting’ was established (Ibid: 4). 
Digitisation was conceived to expand articulated in a heterogeneous ensemble 
(infrastructure, Internet access on an individualised basis, digital inclusion supported 
by the state apparatus and all the legal instruments for competition, an Open Data 
agenda extended in the name of free circulations and the objective and practice of a 
Single Digital Identity promising control over all kind of resources) towards the 
financialisation and liberalisation of the economy under the form of managing intricate 
processes and a complex environment on behalf of users. 
 
Digitisation and its three transversal practices and aims required and enhanced the 
liberalisation reforms of Peña. The Internet is projected to expand conditioning the 
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operation of the Mexican government and increasingly mediating its functions and, 
more importantly, defining the relationship government-society, promising trust 
through technologies and exploiting their taken for granted value as politically neutral, 
progressive and beneficial to society. Therefore, the digitisation process is projected 
to become a technological fix to the Mexican Government’s failure in achieving the 
economic and political stability of public institutions. Once again, technology as Open 
Data in relation to transparency and Open Government, and the commitment to the 
development of Blockchain technologies, operate as instruments that promise to 
regain trust through the instrumentalisation of users, territory and concealment of 
control and management. Such a lack of trust entails a lack of legitimacy and politics 
on the basis of everyday social interactions and the mediation (intervention) of a 




Through the NDS Peña’s government showed allegiance to developmentalist notions 
of economic growth and modernisation. Digitisation from this perspective, has been 
the pathway and transformation led by specific nations and societies that have known 
and can show the way and good practices to be undertaken by other developing 
nations and societies that must learn how to implement and use these technologies. 
Through digitisation, the state has been constituted into the actor that grants 
technology – and the Internet – its status as the engine of the country´s development. 
In this light, the state must guarantee universal Internet access and its underlying 
demand for connectivity infrastructure, together with a very specific type of civil 
society in order to develop its efficiency and efficacy in the co-administration of all 
kind of resources. Such a civil society is the entrepreneurial, innovative and financial-
leaning one, compliant with basic assumptions on economic growth and 
development. Therefore, openness, accountability, transparency and participation 
have been understood within digitisation through the lens of liberal democracy and 
private property. In correspondence to this, the strategic function of the ensemble of 
institutions, practices and devices – of the dispositif – is the market-oriented 
expansion of the Internet and the achievement of market stability and security on the 
basis of privatisation and the creation of economic value (portrayed as confidence 
and trust) and through the mediation of everyday life interactions and the 
identification, control and management of resources and circulations as guaranteed 
through Global Connectivity, Open Data and a Single Digital Identity.  
 
As analysed in this chapter, Global Connectivity, Open Data and a Single Digital 
Identity reproduce Global Interoperability, Free Flow of Information, the 
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Personalisation of Identity and the Mediation of Subjectification as forms of 
coordination designed in the US according to this country’s politics, values and 
interests and upholding privatisation and entrepreneurism at a global scale. This 
analysis is significant to the overall argument of the thesis – that the internet has been 
reproducing colonial forms rather than politics and that a decolonial element needs to 
be included together with philosophy of technology and critical approaches to the 
internet – as it has identified the reproduction of the basic forms of coordination 
embedded in the internet in the Mexican government’s digitisation effort in order to 
then contrast these forms with the Zapatista practice. Accordingly, the overarching 
form of coordination embedded in the Internet (Chapter 4) and reproduced by 
digitisation consolidates this technology as an ‘instrument of coordination without 
politics’ in Mexico. The way in which the Internet fragments knowledge of its overall 
economy and hides its points of authority and decision, generating an idea of 
neutrality, is entirely reproduced by digitisation. Through the implementation (and 
imposition) of technologically-enabled forms of coordination and supported by social 
media platforms expansion and current government and international efforts, the 
Internet is projected to reach further into everyday life, mediating and fragmenting 
behaviours and social interactions and translating them into data while hiding its own 
points of attribution and decision (also see Chapter 3). In accommodating and 
simplifying such data for analysis and intervention, this form of management 
produces (legal and exploitable) identities and adapts social interactions, 
subjectifications and government actions to someone else’s (privileged) standards, 
values and agendas. In this way, it coordinates users as instruments and diffuses 
coloniality through ‘thingification’, the turning of ‘man into an instrument of production’ 
(Césaire, 2000: 42) that obeys a ‘predetermined program’ (Agamben, 2015: 77) and 
forecloses the experience of politics as an existential encounter with the other 
(Chapter 2). 
 
Connectivity, Open Data and a Single Digital Identity aim to render individuals and 
territory (i.e. digital identity and digital territorial management) legible through a 
cartography of instrumental design, thus offering investment and entrepreneurism the 
possibility of tracing and giving clarity to transactions in a country where communal 
property, informal markets and cash flow are still strong. Therefore, digitisation works 
in favour of those actors whose social legitimacy does not strive from local dynamics 
and experiences. On the contrary, it is juridical certainty and clarity that are being 
shaped to favour private property through the state, bringing certainty mainly to 
corporate and foreign actors. Acoordingly, the legislation on telecommunications and 
the different regulations related to ICTs have been biased to benefit and establish a 
basic coordination with those liberalising reforms Peña administration enforced and 
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implemented. Overall, through digitisation and in implementing ICTs to achieve 
development, economic growth and quality of life, the Internet and the Mexican state 
are being produced and performed as instrumental, unfolding their own way of being 
according to someone else’s parameters of operation and goals and fostering and 
promoting the interests and mediation of specific banking and financial groups, tech 
and data analytics companies and privileged countries. Therefore, the chapter has 
exemplified instrumentality regarding US and allies digital dominance in Mexico in 
order to move toward an alternative politics and use of the Internet by not sanctioning 
an everyday technical experience but rather situating the internet according to its 







#YoSoy132 and the Internet 
On connected multitudes and the flexible coordination of fragments 
 
 
In 2012, public mobilisations under the banner of #YoSoy132 stood against the 
manipulation of information and the imposition of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party’s (PRI) presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto on the forthcoming electoral 
results by media corporations. #YoSoy132´s aim was to democratise media in Mexico 
though they eventually tried to redefine their collective organisation as anti-neoliberal, 
aiming at the transformation of the country´s political system. The movement soon 
included a vast array of activist groups and collectives in assemblies, mobilisations 
and protests. These actors and organisations, identified as #YoSoy132, not only 
employed the Internet and social media platforms to organise and mobilise their 
actions but also promoted universal access to the Internet as a constitutional right 
and foundational element of democracy.  
 
This chapter argues that, despite the fact that gathering such a diversity of 
participants and their collective experience as #YoSoy132 was possible due to the 
use of such technologies, the constitution of a ‘connected multitude’ (Toret et al, 
2013) was only possible as a dispositif (Foucault, 1977). As a dispositif, the 
‘connected multitude’ reproduced the form of coordination without politics embedded 
in the Internet. In other words, in the instance of #YoSoy132 there was no multitude 
as diversity was flexibly articulated within a fragmented totality while concealing and 
limiting critical engagement with instrumentality as control and extraterritorial 
elements embedded in this technology. In so doing, this chapter advances the overall 
argument of the thesis that states that the use of the Internet in Mexico has 
reproduced colonial forms rather than politics, the former intelligible only through 
detailed analysis and the convergence of philosophy of technology, critical 
approaches to the internet and a decolonial orientation. In other words, the Internet as 
an ‘instrument of coordination without politics’, denotes an instrument/being that 
makes collective coordination and experience possible as it is mediated by an 
external third party, hindering collective knowledge and the emergence of shared 
political referents and experiences.  
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The Chapter is organised into four sections. The first section sets the context of digital 
activism in twenty-first century Mexico and problematises the limitations of the 
concept of tecnopolítica (Toret et al. 2013) in accounting for concentration and 
hierarchy in information content, diffusion and strategic and tactic planning. The 
second section outlines the emergence of #YoSoy132 in 2012 and analyses their use 
of the Internet and social media, or their constitution as a ‘connected multitude’, as a 
form of coordination and dispositif (Ibid). This section demonstrates the centrality of 
the Internet for collective organisation and action and the dependence of #YoSoy132 
on this technology as a collective for meaning production and orientation. The third 
section analyses the values and meanings of these technologies for members of 
#YoSoy132 and the actions such meanings mobilised through discourse analysis 
(Foucault, 1978, 1997; Mottier, 2005). This section shows how the use and 
understanding of the Internet by #YoSoy132 reiterated the values and use promoted 
by US foreign policy and its rhetorics on the Internet, particularly, how both actors 
tended to oppose state forms and self-determination in supporting a free Internet. The 
fourth section explores how #YoSoy132 did not account for the underside of using the 
Internet and social media platforms in terms of censorship, surveillance, data 
gathering and extraterritorial reach of US government and corporations, using and 
understanding the Internet as essentially democratic or, in its defect, as the most 
efficient and necessary communication alternative. This section identifies a consistent 
opposition and dissociation between control and democracy and argues that the form 
in which #YoSoy132 coordinated itself as a collective, was one without shared 
political and ideological referents. In turn, the Internet’s embedded form of 
coordination, fragmenting and accommodating diversity, occupied the space of such 
shared referents and concealed its market-expansion and control orientation and 
capitalist foundations.  
 
6.1 Digital Activism in twenty-first century Mexico: Tecnopolítica and the 
concealment of hierarchies and strategic usage 
 
Regarding digital activism in the twenty-first century, Mexico has been the locus of 
several digital mobilisations in response to variegated social concerns. Hashtags 
have emerged since 2009 (Rodriguez Cano, 2016: 44, see Appendix C) denoting the 
use of social media platforms for reaching audiences, organising participants and 
expressing demands and proposals. These mobilisations have been quite visible 
through its presence on Twitter and around particular issues including elections in 
2009 and 2012, corruption scandals and tragedies, organized crime-related violence 
and social response, prepotence, discrimination or unpopular policies, misleading and 
inconsistent judicial and criminal prosecutions, fast track approved and inconsistent 
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and negligent legislations and law proposals, state-related violence and abuse of 
power, and gender-related violence.  
 
In demonstrations like #YoSoy132, #Detenme1Dmx, #PosMeSalto, #YakiriLibre, 
#ContraElSilencioMX, #NoMásPoderAlPoder, #AyotzinapaSomosTodos, 
#AlertaXochicuautla among others, youth dissent and commitment were notable 
features (see Avalos, 2014) that attracted academic attention. Scholars linked these 
demonstrations to other movements across the world, understanding them as part of 
a broader trend of social and global mobilisation (see Avalos, 2014; Feixa et. al. 
2009; Feixa and Portillo, 2012). Hashtagged and globally linked, such social 
movements were considered as ‘new new social movements’ (Feixa et. al. 2009) or 
‘novísimos movimientos sociales’ (Candón Mena, 2013), resting on a technological 
element, combining information technologies and street mobilization (e.g. Avalos, 
2014; Bartra, 2014; Feixa and Portillo, 2012; Portillo, 2014; Rivera, 2014) within a 
networked logic for organization and action (Juris, 2008; Rovira, 2012; 2014) and as 
tecnopolítica (Toret, et al., 2013). 
 
Notably, all such readings of social movements as part of a global trend, have kept an 
accent on the importance of a global space interconnected by networks or working as 
a network whose paradigm is the Internet (Castells, 2012; Feixa et. al. 2009; Toret et 
al., 2013). In this light, movements are generated within the framework of blogs and 
social media platforms and its collectivity is rooted on emotional responses to shared 
perceptions of reality (e.g. injustice and insecurity) in order to then potentially develop 
into social change (Castells, 1996). These perceptions of specific situations have 
been important for collective formation and actions; nonetheless, what has been 
crucial is technological mediation. The idea of tecnopolítica in Spanish academia, 
whose authors (Toret et al., 2013) counted #YoSoy132 as part of this ‘new kind of 
self-organized collective political behaviour’ (author’s translation, Ibid.: 9) has 
emphasised such mediation and turned it into the main element from which a 
collective is produced, merging it into one single self. In this chapter, Tecnopolítica is 
identified as a specific form of coordinating movements and its members as 
fundamentally mediated by the Internet, as ‘connected multitudes’ (ibid). Particularly, 
this section argues that tecnopolítica as a concept and as a practice, conceals points 
of concentration and delegation of self-government, self-awareness and decision. 
Such concealment and delegation of decision have been scarcely addressed 
(Rodríguez Cano, 2016, 2018) and more crucially, have reiterated the same forms of 
management embedded in the Internet and analysed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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Drawing upon the idea of a ‘network system’ as a ‘set of nodes, sometimes 
heterogeneous, with high rates of connectivity, robustness and reciprocity, whose 
structure is open and polycentric’, tecnopolítica is seen as ‘the capacity of connected 
multitudes, the brains and bodies connected to the network, to create and self-
modulate collective action’, action that can turn digital activism into street protest 
(author’s translation, Toret et. al. 2013: 19-21). In this conception of tecnopolítica, the 
notion of ‘multitude’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Pérez de Lama, 2007; Rheingold, 2004) 
and the role of digital technologies are central, as the ‘connected multitude’ is about 
the ‘capacity to connect, group and synchronize, through communication and 
technological devices and around objectives, the brains and bodies of a great number 
of subjects in time, space, emotion, behaviour and languages sequences’ (author’s 
translation, Toret et. al., 2013: 20). This concept emphasises ‘the fact that there is no 
multitude without connection’. 
 
Connected movements, allegedly open and polycentric, perform tecnopolítica as 
strategic and tactical use of digital tools for organization, communication and 
collective action’ (Toret et. al. 2013: 20). On this basis, two main limitations arise 
regarding collective unity and strategic reach, as movements become dependent on a 
technological support. The first issue is the concentration of followers and the flow of 
communications by opinion leaders (Mejías, 2013: 41). The second issue is the 
conformation of unity relying on the aggregation of individuals through the mediation 
of technology (Castells, 2009; Toret et al. 2013). This constitutes a fragmented and 
contingent totality whose unity is based on the disposition of private individuals and 
heterogeneous groups to be aggregated into instrumental collectivities – means and 
not end of collective action (Milán, 2015). Concentration of followers and the flow of 
communication is discussed in the following paragraphs in order to emphasise how 
polycentric mobilisations are still organised through a hierarchical status regarding 
number and strength of connections or followers and concealed potential strategic 
and tactical use. The issue of fragmented collectivities is analysed in sections 2, 3 
and 4 with a focus on the flexible and fragmentary form of coordination of 
#YoSoy132. 
 
Regarding polycentricity and alleged self-organised collective political behaviour 
(Toret et al, 2013: 9), alongside the increasing numbers of people supporting the 
topics on Twitter and speaking their minds on important issues in Mexico, the role of 
public opinion leaders has remained fundamental. Such leaders have offered visibility 
and expansion capacity to these topics, actions and proposals (Rodríguez Cano, 
2016: 42). More specifically, it has been the participation of a very specific plurality of 
actors and already visible ‘new media’ which is crucial. Actors with a shared interest 
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in shaping public opinion from an opposite stance to that of official media and 
corporate entities like Televisa and TVAzteca, have put forth democratisation of 
media against concentration of power in media and telecomm corporations and 
democracy promotion in general. For instance, in an analysis of twelve 
demonstrations33 (Rodríguez Cano, 2016: 45), a few social media accounts34 were 
demonstrated as decisive for promotion, persuasion and action as they achieved 
‘highest resonance’ among their public. In this vein, activists and collectives, citizens, 
journalists, businessmen, entertainment artists and public figures, and academics 
(Ibid), respectively followed in audience those media accounts. Mobilisations were 
thus not void of direction and decision-making as this was preferentially concentrated 
on specific groups, which is one of the limitations of the concept of technopolitics.  
 
Besides polycentric mobilisations still being organised through a hierarchical status 
regarding number and strength of connections, there was a concealed and exclusive 
strategic and tactical use related to decision-capacity over public message and 
actions. As Mukul Devichand (2015) noted from an interview with a Mexican blogger 
who started a campaign to turn the #YaMeCansé35 into a global trending topic and 
who has been at the core of many other protest trending topics in Mexico, there are 
national and international political ties not explicit in this modality of operation, hidden 
as well from the spontaneous supporter and member of mobilisations.  
 
The Mexican blogger, a freelance social media marketing consultant and free time 
activist asserted his operations were inspired in the paradigmatic rise of tecnopolítica 
and the study of ‘online tactics’ employed by the 15M movement in Spain (Devichand, 
2015). An inspiration expressed as well by members of #YoSoy132, saying for 
instance, that ‘when the 15M emerged, they thought Mexico should rise up as well’; 
for many of its members, the 15M ‘politically fed this movement’ (author’s translation, 
Muñoz, 2012: 206). Despite the interviewee´s assumption that ‘[p]eople are not dumb, 
they know this is all tactics’ and the certainty that ‘you have to apply pressure to 
change things’ (Escorcia in Devichand, 2015), there is a whole set of political and 
strategic lines that are not immediately clear and much more complex than merely 
using digital technologies as tools and taking for granted horizontality in local and 
global struggles for rights. There was an elusive tactical and strategic field and 
																																																								
33  Including #JusticiaABC, #SoyProle, #QuitaUnAnuncio, #YoSoy132, #MarchaAntiEPN, 
#TodosSomosPresos, #LadyProfeco, #LeyBala, #PosMeSalto, #PrensaNoDisparen, #EPNvsInternet 
and #EPNbringThemBack. 
34 Sopitas, Animal Político, Proceso, Aristegui Noticias and CNNMexico. 
35 This was the hashtag used to protest against the government for the events in Ayotzinapa and in 
response to the expression used by Jesus Murillo Karam, Mexican attorney general, who asserted ‘I 
am tired’ when being questioned in a press conference about the missing students in order to close 
the conference. 
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different allegiances in the use of these technologies that were not yet clear. The 
concept of tecnopolítica as employed so far has remained unable to grasp these 
complexities. The following sections explain how these gaps and concentrations of 
strategic and tactical vision and capacity of diffusion were possible within a collective 
mediated by the Internet in its self-constitution. The argument these sections advance 
is that a specific form of mediation, a flexible coordination of fragments, concealed not 
only concentration of decision over the interpretation of the situations experienced 
and the possibility of support and actions to diffuse (regarding media actors and their 
concealed allegiances), but also international or extraterritorial ties (values, interests 
and control) that are subtly reinforced together with their colonial assumptions where 
there is lack of shared political referents and orientation.  
 
6.2 The tecnopolítica of #YoSoy132: A connected multitude and the self as 
constitutively mediated by the Internet 
 
On 11 May 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto, the official candidate of the PRI (hegemonic 
party in Mexico for 70 years until 2000), attended an event at the Universidad 
Iberoamericana36 (Iberoamerican University, Mexico) to present his national project. 
At the university, the candidate was received by several students who were holding 
banners with challenging messages on them, handing out flyers37, wearing masks of 
a controversial Mexican ex-president (Carlos Salinas de Gortari38), showing red 
painted hands resembling blood39 and yelling at him (Huffington Post, 30 June 2012; 
Goggin and Albarrán, 2014: 34; Bartra, 2014: 32).  
 
By the end of the candidate’s presentation many of the students criticised and 
challenged Peña Nieto on his actions as governor of the State of Mexico, when the 
Policia Federal Preventiva (Pre-emptive Federal Police, PFP) enacted violence and 
repression ordered by the Federal government on the 3rd and 4th of May 2006 
against the people of San Salvador Atenco, which is located in the State of Mexico 
and was governed by Peña Nieto from 2005 to 2011. The violence enacted was 
supported and legitimated by mainstream and politically tied media. The outcome was 
more than 200 detainees tortured, two young citizens killed, and 26 women and some 
men victims of sexual assault as a form of torture and punishment recently 
																																																								
36 The Universidad Iberoamericana is owned by the Jesuits order in Mexico and its students are 
generally members of high-income sectors of society (Volpi, 2012; Goggin and Albarrán, 2014; 34). 
37 The flyers contained information on the events of San Salvador Atenco in 2006. 
38 A controversial figure in Mexico who as president signed the North American Free Trade Agreement 
with the United States and Canada and is hold responsible for the financial crisis in Mexico in 1995. 
This same character has been linked to Enrique Peña Nieto´s close political group. 
39 The blood of the women killed during his government in the State of Mexico and the blood of the 
people of San Salvador Atenco. 
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implemented by the federal forces (Pastrana, 2011). Though the event was already 
coming to an end, the candidate took back the microphone and responded to the 
students. He stated that he did not regret deploying public force against the 
population, as it was a ‘determined action’ he assumed personally to restore order 
and peace, ‘within the legal right to the employment of public force by the Mexican 
state’ (see Portillo, 2014: 183). The response accentuated the discomfort and 
indignation of the students, who increasingly yelled at him while recording with their 
mobile devices and uploading to digital platforms the images of the events. This was 
immediately followed by the ‘trending topic’ #EPNlaIberoNoTeQuiere 
(#EPNtheIberoDoesNotWantYou) (Bartra, 2014; Goggin and Albarrán, 2014: 34; 
Portillo, 2014: 183-184; Guillén, 2013) and the walkout of the candidate as 
resentment against him increased and he was forced to leave the university. 
 
Once the events and the footage recorded by the students were made public through 
digital media platforms and the web, efforts were made by politically tied media to 
contain and counter the material. ‘Online’, such media employed #LaIberoConPeña 
(#TheIberoWithPeña) and #EctivismoConEPN (#EctivismWithEPN). On TV, radio and 
newspapers the events were either concealed, biased or supported the declarations 
of PRI leaders, members of the political class and officials. Such versions recalled the 
events dismissing the students as ‘infiltrates’ of the Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática (Democratic Revolution Party, PRD) and other leftist organizations 
(Goggin and Albarrán, 2014: 35; Rivera, 2014: 63-64). In a media landscape in which 
the most popular electronic medium is television and its political importance as main 
source of political information reaches 76% of a Mexican population (INEGI-SEGOB, 
2012) and Televisa – the world’s biggest Spanish-language broadcaster with the 
strongest ties to the dominant political and economic groups in Mexico (Villamil, 2010) 
– and TVAzteca – which since 1993 adapted to the business model of the first 
(Gutiérrez Rentería, 2007) – are the two largest conglomerates with a common 
affiliation (see Goggin and Albarrán, 2014; Barrera, 2012), not many options to 
counter such accounts were available.  
 
Nonetheless, some of the students who participated in the demonstrations uploaded 
and started the ongoing transmission of the YouTube video broadcast entitled ‘131 
Alumnos de la Ibero responden’ (‘131 students of the Ibero reply’). The video was 
coordinated through Facebook and became a ‘global trending topic’ that lasted for 12 
hours (Rivera, 2014: 64). It was addressed at those who questioned the students’ 
identity and showed 131 students stating their name, holding their student cards and 
uttering their ID numbers as a way to exercise their ‘right to reply’ before the 
accusations. This reply received increasing support through digital platforms (mainly 
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Facebook and Twitter) and soon students from other universities, academics, and 
other members of civil society nationally and abroad adopted the `hashtag´ 
#YoSoy13240. They were standing against what they claimed was the imposition of 
the PRI candidate as forthcoming president by media, as well as the dominant role of 
Televisa in the cultural industry and political scenario, demanding both impartiality in 
the information provided by media and the inclusion of young people in a ‘democratic’ 
electoral process through the creation of a ‘pro-democracy student network’ (Guillén, 
2013: 474).  
 
The students’ effort sought to draw attention to media concealment and manipulation 
of information, and took the form of the so-called #MarchaYoSoy132 
[#Iam132March]. With a non-partisan commitment, defending access to information 
as a ‘human right’ and standing against biased information, these public 
demonstrations were organised through Twitter and Facebook on 18 May 2012 
(Candón Mena, 2013). Visibly comprising students of private and expensive 
universities, these initial demonstrations were able to ‘destabilize the stereotype’ of 
the protester as generally associated with public universities’ students (Rivera, 2014: 
65). Furthermore, participants were familiar and literate in the use of mobile devices 
and social media platforms as these technologies were already embedded into 
everyday life, as ‘instruments’ used on a daily basis, now serving to protest (see 
Rovira, 2014: 51). In the same line, more demonstrations followed mainly organised 
through digital platforms and messaging applications like WhatsApp although 
increasingly gathering a diversity of actors (Muñoz, 2012). 
 
The day before Peña Nieto’s visit to the Universidad Iberoamericana on 11 May, 
students coordinated their actions and distributed tasks using social media platforms. 
Despite many of those students not knowing each other in advance, they 
communicated through the WhatsApp platform and decided to make some materials 
for the demonstration (María, in Muñóz, 2012: 32). In the same line regarding the 
coordination of #YoSoy132, several members stated that ‘social media made the 
movement possible, [platforms] were a conscience liberation agent… giving students 
the possibility to reach other people’ (author’s translation, Magaly, in Muñóz, 2012: 
240). As many members recalled, ‘social media [made] possible the articulation of the 
movement and the aggregation of diverse sectors of young population attracted by 
the cause of the 132; information [was] dispersed much faster, which [was] a great 
advantage for the capacity of mobilisation’ (author’s translation, Tania, in Muñóz, 
2012: 240). ‘The appropriation of social media [was] useful to turn them [the 
																																																								
40 ‘YoSoy132’ (I am the 132nd) intended to express a personal solidarity through the identification of 
the beholder as participant and member 132. 
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platforms] into flows of information and a link for decision-making and actions’ 
(author’s translation, Vladimir, in Muñóz, 2012: 241). As another member asserted 
(author’s translation, Claudia, in Muñóz, 2012: 232), for #YoSoy132 social media 
platforms ‘potentialized this [as] they have made communication faster, more effective 
and wider… the use of technology with such immediacy, gives way to a new form of 
wider and more diverse mobilisation… using mobiles, Twitter, YouTube, Facebook for 
calling upon to mobilise and inform’. More specifically, as other members asserted, 
Facebook was crucial for groups in other state to establish contact with #YoSoy132 in 
Mexico City and push the latter to decentralise the organisation and recognise that 
#YoSoy132 in the city was not the totality of the movement but only a part of it. In the 
same way, digital platforms made it possible to establish and organise groups and 
assemblies beyond Mexico (Muñoz, 2012: 204).  
 
‘Anyone could act for democracy on behalf of @YoSoy132 as long as they respected 
the principles agreed at the first Inter-university General Assembly: pluralism, 
pacifism and non-partisanship’ (author’s translation, Muñoz, 2012: 204). As the 
number of movements and groups joining or acting under the ‘brand’ ‘YoSoy132’ 
increased, they established meetings, assemblies, an interuniversity council 
comprising more than 130 local assemblies (each one representing one or more 
universities), and 7 commissions (security, logistics, juridical, human rights, citizen 
watch and communication and press release) (Attolini, 2012). Their aims were no 
longer limited to the democratization of media but now included a broader and more 
explicit notion of the problems the country was facing, soon tending towards 
becoming an anti-systemic movement. #YoSoy132 was thus constituted as a 
mobilisation against corporate media and Peña’s candidature and an anti-systemic 
call, enacting demonstrations, campaigns supporting an informed vote, platforms 
against electoral fraud and other forms of collective action, all possible thanks to a 
shared discomfort and the well-established presence and mediation of ICTs, digital 
platforms and the Internet.    
 
Consequently, while objectives and spaces of incidence beyond digital platforms were 
to be defined and coordinated, digital technologies and the Internet were the starting 
point for being involved and part of the group, making it more difficult for those who 
did not have digital profiles to be seen, participate and follow the events. As narrated 
by Magaly (in Muñóz, 2012: 241), ‘a lot of people [opened] their Facebook and Twitter 
accounts because of the movement… [and] more people – like community radio 
stations – saw the necessity to connect in order to participate’. Similarly, Emiliano 
Treré (2015: 912) suggests that it was through using digital platforms that ‘Mexican 
students were able to oppose the negative identification fabricated by the PRI, 
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reclaim their role as heirs of a long tradition of rebellion, generate collective 
identification processes, and find “comfort zones” to lower the costs of activism, 
reinforcing their internal solidarity’. #YoSoy132 used the ‘social media frontstage 
(YouTube videos, Facebook posts, Twitter tweets, etc.) […] the social media 
backstage (Facebook chats and groups) and the WhatsApp ecosystem in order to 
negotiate and reinforce their collective identity on an everyday basis’ (Ibid).   
 
The Internet and social media platforms managed, on behalf of #YoSoy132 members, 
the difficulties that entails inhabiting different locations and not knowing each other. 
They brought members together and made some sort of intersubjectivity possible not 
on the basis of a living together and a collective existential experience but on the 
basis of a practice of personalisation of identity (Chapters 4 and 5) and mediation of 
everyday life interactions as forms of coordination that make possible a functional and 
temporary aggregation of subjects. Technological support in this case responded, as 
Stefania Milan has characterised (Milan, 2015: 887), to an emphasis on the 
importance of private individuals as such, personalising them and putting forth their 
own experiences in contemporary mobilizations where the ‘”collective” was 
experienced through the ‘individual’ and the group is the means of collective action, 
rather than its end’. Which is to say that the individual was constituted within the limits 
of the platform, then grouping in a collectivity as the result of individual aims and 
disperse shared emotions, which grouped around a perception of reality and a 
specific aim (Castells, 1996) that although fulfilled temporarily did not have the 
collective as its end. 
 
Furthermore, besides the use of the Internet and social media platforms for collective 
identification, decision-making, diffusion and organisation of demonstrations, 
platforms were also used to participate in the electoral process. Most significantly, 
#YoSoy132 organised a debate between candidates, broadcast through YouTube. 
The organisation, pointing towards the democratization of media, called on the four 
presidential candidates directly, based on their claims to hear and address the 
concerns of the youth. The call was made through a video broadcast on digital 
platforms (Másde131, 6 June 2012) and would open a space for the participation of 
people through these same platforms, so they could send questions for the 
candidates to respond (CNNMéxico, 19 June 2012; Proceso, 6 June 2012). Although 
the PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto refused to participate, this third debate 
(Másde131, 19 June 2012) was successfully held and transmitted via YouTube 
(despite some technical issues and its exclusion from national TV broadcasting) on 
19 June 2012. This event has been considered one of the main accomplishments of 
the movement (Rivera, 2014: 66), despite its limited reach within the population as it 
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was not televised and would be mainly followed through the Internet by users who 
‘were already informed about the elections’ (CNNMéxico, 19 June 2012). 
 
As above, #YoSoy132 was an expression and promotion of tecnopolítica as ‘the 
capacity of connected multitudes, the brains and bodies connected to the network, to 
create and self-modulate collective action’ that turns digital activism into street protest 
(author’s translation, Toret et. al. 2013: 19-21). According to this understanding, 
#YoSoy132 as a collective subject was a ‘connected multitude’ (Toret et. al., 2013: 
20), connected, grouped and synchronised through digital devices and the Internet. 
The main cohesive element, able to link, coordinate and gather together the scattered 
emotions, discomfort and anger of a multitude, was the Internet and the devices that 
operate on it and through it, bonding individuals and profiles and minds and bodies 
with digital platforms and the streets. However, what is left unattended in the notion of 
a connected multitude is that the self in self-modulation and collective action was 
entwined with digital technologies to the extent of reproducing the Internet’s 
embedded forms of coordination (personalisation of identity and medition of 
subjectification), maing collective coordination and experience possible only when 
mediated by an external third party. Along the same lines, these technologies and the 
way they were used, as shown in the next section, reiterated fundamental values of 
the free Internet agenda as it has been promoted by the US government and foreign 
policy, mainly regarding a clear anti-state tendency abroad and a fragile flexibility.  
 
6.3 Reproducing globalising strategic arrangements: The priority of freedom of 
expression, free flow of information and the free Internet 
 
At the First Joint Pronouncement made public on 23 May 2012 and broadcast via 
YouTube (Yosoy132Oficial, 29 May 2012) and other digital platforms on 29 May, the 
members of #YoSoy132 characterised themselves as ‘a movement preoccupied with 
the democratisation of the country’, a preoccupation followed by their belief ‘that a 
necessary good for it is the democratization of media.’ Their ‘desires and demands 
[focused] on the defence of freedom of expression and the right of the Mexicans to 
information. Understanding both elements was essential to form a conscious and 
participative citizenry’ (author’s translation, #YoSoy132, 2012: 314). ‘In essence, [they 
declared] our movement aims towards the democratization of media with the 
objective of guaranteeing transparent, plural and impartial information, in order to 
foster critical thought and consciousness’ (Ibid).  
 
As the movement claimed, they aimed to ‘make fundamental principles of democratic 
life an effective practice. There cannot be citizenship without full freedom of 
	 138	
expression, which is why we show our most resolute solidarity to all those who have 
seen their voices silenced’ (author’s translation, #YoSoy132, 2012: 315). Here, an 
association of meanings between democratisation of media-freedom of expression-
right to access information-the foundation of a citizenry and the democratisation of the 
country (or democratic life) was produced and bonded to Mexico´s context of violence 
in the reference to ‘all those who have seen their voices silenced’ (author’s 
translation, #YoSoy132, 2012: 315). The importance of and the actions proposed to 
democratize media in #YoSoy132’s joint pronouncement were prompted by 
democracy as a solution to a country’s numerous political and social problems. The 
latter issues were comprised within the urge of becoming citizenry - an active political 
subject assuming a commitment to solidarity with those ‘oppressed’ and ‘silenced’ 
(author’s translation, #YoSoy132, 2012: 315). In their words: 
 
The situation in Mexico demands that we, young women and men, take the 
present in our hands. It is time to fight for change in our country, it is time to fight 
for a freer, more prosperous and just Mexico. We want the current situation of 
misery, inequality, poverty and violence to be resolved. We, the young women 
and men of Mexico, believe that the current political and economic system does 
not respond to the demands of all Mexicans (author´s translation, #YoSoy132, 
2012: 313). 
 
Drawing on Mexico’s situation of ‘inequality, misery, poverty and violence’ and the 
inadequacy of the political and economic system, which ‘demands’ action from ‘young 
people’, the country’s reality and the ‘Mexican youth’ spoke through #YoSoy132 as 
both the casting subject and the subject being called upon (Ibid., 313-314). These 
assertions of truth about Mexico’s reality and common experience of insecurity were 
used to sanction the values of freedom of expression and information as fundamental 
for democratic life. What was overall assumed is that democratisation of the country 
and a democratic life were objectives in common to all the population, valuable of 
themselves; and drawing on such assumption, democracy was given content through 
a chain of signification between democratisation of media-information-citizenship-
democratic life-solution to Mexico’s situation. The values of freedom of expression 
and information were then put forth as a natural alternative to a national reality, as the 
following lines expressed: 
 
We, the united students of this country, believe that a necessary condition to 
amend this situation is to empower the common citizen through information, as 
this allows better political, economic, and social decisions. Information makes it 
possible for citizens to demand from and criticize in an informed manner their 
government, political actors, entrepreneurs and society itself. Therefore, 
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#YoSoy132 makes the right to information and the right to freedom of speech 
their main demands (author´s translation, #YoSoy132, 2012: 313,). 
 
The central importance of ‘information’, and even its agency, arose in relation to the 
possibility of transforming the condition of the ‘common citizen’ into a critical and 
active subject who is recognised first in the ‘Mexican youth’ and then in the ‘united 
students’ on behalf of whom #YoSoy132 claim to speak. Citizenship was not possible 
‘without full freedom of expression’ (Ibid: 315). What was at first deemed as an 
opinion was then produced as a fact of ‘information making possible’ an active 
engagement in politics and economy and thus, justifying information and freedom of 
expression as the main demands of a movement that merges and becomes indistinct 
from the Mexican youth.  
 
Through assembling already common understandings and meanings regarding the 
everyday experience of poverty, violence, inequality and misery and the production 
and reiteration of subjects that corresponded to a ‘critical’, ‘conscious and 
participative citizenry’ capable of ‘demanding and criticizing in an informed manner’ 
(Ibid: 314), #YoSoy132 identified itself with the Mexican youth and the united 
students, shaping its identity within the broader discourse of democracy, freedom of 
information and freedom of expression. But also, through such constructions of 
meaning, they reproduced, produced and sustained specific practices (use of digital 
technologies, voting, informing) and social relations within specific strategies, not only 
at a local level but also at a transnational level. On that basis, in the Manifesto 
broadcast via YouTube and other digital platforms (Yosoy132Oficial, 29 May 2012),  
#YoSoy132 looked to ‘promote an informed and reasoned vote’ making clear their 
belief that in those ‘political circumstances, abstentions and the null vote [were] 
ineffective ways to advance the construction of our democracy’. The causal 
relationship as an assertion of truth that was produced between freedom of 
expression and information, as ‘essential to form a conscious and participative 
citizenry’, and the promotion of ‘an informed and thoughtful vote’ made clear the 
correspondence between democratic participation – the task of advancing ‘our 
democracy’ – (voting and committing to freedom of expression and information and 
dismissing ‘abstentions and the null vote’) and resolving the current situation in the 
country (author’s translation, #YoSoy132, 2012: 314).  
 
Towards the democratization of media, their first demand was ‘real competition in the 
media market, particularly regarding the TV duopoly, Televisa and TVAzteca’. 
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Amongst other demands regarding national media,41 the second one was noteworthy: 
‘making the right to the Internet an effective constitutional right, in the terms 
established by our Constitution in its first article’ (author’s translation, #YoSoy132, 
2012: 314). Access to the Internet was listed as the second demand out of seven, just 
following the demand for ‘real competition in the media market’. In this way, meanings 
were brought together in order to produce the Internet as a human right and to 
include such right in the Mexican Constitution. Within the broader discourse of liberal 
democracy (competition, freedom of expression and freedom of information as 
fundamental for citizenship), #YoSoy132 produced the Internet as essential for 
democratisation of media and democratic life, in opposition to Mexico’s condition of 
corruption, insecurity, poverty and violence, where the national media and political 
system needed to be democratized and transformed. In contrast to national media 
and the other six demands contained in the document, the ‘right to the Internet’ was 
the only demand referring directly to the constitution. This way #YoSoy132 ratified 
and produced the Internet as indispensable for the country and worthy of 
development efforts in promoting its inclusion in the fundamental law of the state and 
with that, its integration into state institutions and practices with its capacity to 
produce far-reaching effects, coinciding in a fundamental way with Peña’s digitisation 
effort (see Chapter 5) and the global connnectivity endorsed by the US government.  
 
Overall, the production and assertion of the intrinsic democratic and instrumental 
value of the Internet is something that was assumed from the beginnings of the 
movement and to its last and more disaggregated actions. #YoSoy132’s clearest 
values were freedom of information and expression, justice, non-partisanship and 
democracy. Such Values had, as the following lines demonstrate, a clear 
correspondence to the Internet and internationally diffused values on Internet freedom 
and freedom of information. According to such commitments and values and 
regarding the Internet, #YoSoy132’s counter-proposal of a ‘new media system’ to the 
Telecommunications Reform proposed by Peña (7 November 2012), demanded that 
Mexico build infrastructure to guarantee free access to the Internet of at least 1Mbps, 
allowing new providers of Internet connections to compete in the market share. This 
demand was quite similar to the one implemented by Peña’s digitisation (connectivity) 
in line with US global connectivity rationality. Both aimed to expand Internet 
infrastructure and access to foster competition. Consequently, in April 2013, the 
Mexican Congress approved the reform on Telecommunications and Broadcasting 
																																																								
41 Regarding other media, they called for the conformation of instruments that could guarantee the 
watch of social interests in radio, TV and press contents; that permissions to transmit on public 
channels should be subjected to public contest (auction) in the diversity of schools on communication; 
to open spaces for debate between students and media on the demands exposed; and security to be 
guaranteed for the members, journalists and everyone who expresses himself freely. 
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(Proceso, 19 April 2013). The reform established universal broadband access to 
information and communication technologies as a constitutional right. Despite such a 
recognition of the Internet, and the creation of regulatory institutions in 
telecommunications, the reform was criticised, among many other points, for allowing 
foreign investments up to 100% while closing opportunities for originary groups to 
participate in the sector (Aristegui Noticias, 23 March 2013; BBC, 22 March 2013).  
 
On its part, ‘YoSoy132’ questioned the lack of support the reform provided to 
communitarian and indigenous media and the right of the audiences to better content 
or to a minimum of social content (García, 2013). However, and notwithstanding the 
differences between the official proposal and the ideal of media endorsed by 
#YoSoy132, a basic correspondence between the two, regarding the necessity to 
guarantee universal access and support the expansion of new information and 
communication technologies, persisted. A shared commitment was expressed in 
terms of a national infrastructure capable of carrying broadband access as a feature 
of an appropriate process of democratization and competition in service provision. In 
this way, competition and fundamental rights, together with freedom of information 
and expression, were produced as essential for democracy. 
 
In light of the Internet as a constitutional right and the need for infrastructure and 
competition, some other important features of the Internet and social media need to 
be addressed. More precisely, the understanding and contact with international actors 
was crucial, framing the understanding of democracy, freedom of information and 
their reliance on the Internet and digital platforms. The case of Operación 1DMX (1 
December Mexico City) was illuminating in this instance as it not only demonstrated 
how the Internet was seen and experienced as a liberation technology but also how 
its intricate pitfalls and extraterritorial element linked to state actors were obscured 
and dismissed under the priority of enacting activism through the adequate timing and 
reach offered by technological supports.  
 
Operación #1Dmx was the banner and call that grouped different collectives and 
organizations, including #YoSoy132 as one of the main actors, in order to protest 
against Peña Nieto when he was sworn in (Nájera, 2014a). Against the protestors, 
the police enacted several arbitrary arrests (Aristegui Noticias, 11 April 2013) and 
infiltrated members as agent provocateurs to trigger violence and justify repression 
(Gilly, 2013; Nájera, 2014a). Protestors, bystanders and journalists recorded such 
events. After the demonstrations, the group #1Dmx used the website 1dmx.org to 
gather, organize and publish evidence, mainly videos and photographs but also 
testimonies and chronicles, documenting the repression, police abuse and arbitrary 
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detentions, intending to reconstruct the events and counter the official version of them 
(Favela and Lecona, 2012).  
  
The website 1dmx.org gathered crucial data for the liberation of many unjustly 
apprehended individuals and was also a source of information and important feature 
in the organization of new mobilizations.  Within a year, by 2 December 2013, 
however, the website was taken down by the US Embassy in Mexico, the Specialized 
Technology Response Center (CERT) that is part of the National Security 
Commission in Mexico (CNS) and branch of the Federal Police under the Secretariat 
of Government, and the US domain provider GoDaddy, a US based corporation and 
‘the world´s largest domain name registrar’ (García, 2014: see O´Brien, 2014) that 
was hosting 1dmx.org.  
 
A first email from the domain provider justified the suspension presuming violations of 
its terms of service. As the activist group requested the domain provider to inform 
them about the presumed violations, GoDaddy replied via a second email that the 
order to suspend the domain was part of an ongoing law enforcement investigation 
and they needed to contact the officer in charge: Special Agent Homeland Security 
Investigations, US Embassy Mexico City (Cabrera, 2014a). Embassy staff refused to 
give any information, so the activists requested a defence in court and filed an 
injunction against ten dependencies of the Mexican federal government (García, 
2014). Only two of the addressed institutions refused any response: the National 
Commission of Security and the Secretariat of Government. Days later, an employee 
of GoDaddy replied to the activists that the Mexican agency that requested the U.S. 
government to suspend the domain was the CERT. The group made the case public 
and a few hours later the website was re-established without any mediating 
explanation either on behalf of the domain provider or the government institutions 
involved in Mexico and the US (García, 2014). 
 
After the website was re-established #YoSoy132 broadcast an Internet TV program 
(on Channel #TodosSomos132) on censorship in Mexico, titled ‘Censura de Internet 
en Mexico’ [Censorship of the Internet in Mexico]. The program emphasised the 
fundamental importance of freedom of expression as a human right. As well, the 
program mainly consisted of a conversation between three members of #YoSoy132’s 
Media Democratization Task Group (Sofia de Robina, Carlos Brito and Yoalli 
Rodriguez) and short videos intermittently displayed and related to the topic. In this 
case, the continuity of the construction of the Internet relied on the different elements 
integrated during the program. Of crucial importance are the broad discursive 
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articulation of meanings and practices within the general meaning of the Internet, 
which reveal the order of meanings for understanding international society. 
 
Along such lines, the Internet represented a transformation in ‘the way in which much 
more easily we can have access to information, flows of information, or increase the 
number of people that can be there,’ in our presence (author’s translation, Sofía in 
Todos Somos 132, 2014). The power of the Internet in everyday life was 
acknowledged by #YoSoy132 in the potential for connectivity, as ‘many people, more 
and more, want to use the Internet more and more, and now you have it connected 
everywhere’ (author’s translation, Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014). This diffusion of 
the Internet was also based on the multiplicity of applications this technology 
provides, ‘tools’ for ‘everything’ like music, photos, meeting people, etc. (author’s 
translation, Yoalli in Todos Somos 132, 2014), which are characterised as an 
essential part of this technology and many times even understood through a 
synecdoche of social digital platforms, called the ‘networks’ and the totality of the 
Internet (the ‘networks’ or social media platforms as being the Internet).  
 
In the members’ account (Ibid), the overall contraposition between state government 
and the Internet was translated into an opposition between freedom of expression 
and censorship. As a member commented on their use of digital platforms, the 
Internet challenged national governments as ‘many people, more and more, want to 
use more and more the Internet, and now you have it connected everywhere’ 
(author’s translation, Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014). The Internet, being a ‘freedom 
tool’, threatened and at the same time lured the ambition of once unaware 
governments.  
 
So [governments] suddenly realised, these men [in government], that they had 
two choices: one, to allow this freedom tool to challenge them. More and more 
people communicating, people informing themselves, what was very easy to 
control before: perhaps newspapers, may be for the press, to buy two or three 
journalists and it´s done, the information never again comes to the light (author’s 
translation, Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014). 
 
The other option at stake was control, as governments ‘came up with the idea of 
controlling it [the large net of communications] in many different ways, each one for its 
own aims’ (author’s translation, Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014). Governments 
recently became aware of the power of the Internet, aiming to control this ‘too 
powerful’ technology for their own interests (ibid). Governments ‘want to turn the 
Internet into a tool for domination, a tool for control, a tool for espionage, a tool for 
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becoming that state which seems science fiction-like’ (Brito in Todos Somos 132, 
2014). This understanding expressed the basic opposition between, on the one side, 
the power of information and communication; and on the other, state control and 
censorship. In general, throughout the program ‘Censura de Internet en Mexico’ 
[Censorship of the Internet in Mexico], dichotomies were articulated within a coherent 
proposal of action and understanding of the Internet and the international context 
revolving around three key themes: the Internet and human dignity, state control and 
the international society, and the US and the censorship mechanism.  
 
Drawing upon a human rights discourse, the production of the Internet reproduced 
human dignity in a sort of contraposition but also rhetorical reconciliation with the 
security concerns that prevailed to a large extent in Mexico. The condition according 
to Brito was that ‘if we want to have dignifying lives, we all have to participate in the 
defence of human rights’, because human rights are about a ‘person´s dignity’, and 
‘dignified people [la gente digna] question, dignified people [la gente digna] participate 
and take away spaces from them [the Mexican government]’ (Brito in Todos Somos 
132, 2014). #YoSoy132 again reaffirmed that freedom of expression was a 
‘fundamental right for democracy’, ‘necessary’ for democracy and its process of 
selection of political representatives. ‘Any other right might be fundamental but 
debatable, while freedom of expression is key’ (Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014), as 
it is ‘linked to all of the other rights’ as it ‘is necessary for demanding other rights, for 
setting out whatever’ you want to set out (Yoalli in Todos Somos 132, 2014). 
Freedom of expression ‘protects’ the Internet (ONG Derechos Digitales in Todos 
Somos 132, 2014) and the appropriate use (active, critical and free) of the free 
Internet is performative of the exercise of freedom of expression and the circulation of 
information, which as a human right represents the ‘dignity’ of subjects.  
 
For the members of the Media Democratisation Task Group (MTDM), the opposition 
between a freedom tool and government control implied subjects of liberation and 
subjects of control within a broader system of meaning – that of human rights and 
liberal democracy. But also, subjects were produced within the strategic arrangement 
and techniques of persuading people to use and defend the Internet, the latter being 
constantly produced as vital for the defence of human dignity. Moreover, by locating 
freedom of expression as the key right, Brito not only defended the possibility of 
citizens and journalists to communicate and produce trustworthy information in a 
context of insecurity and corruption of media and government institutions, but also, 
and more important, in an international context, supported a vision that prioritises 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on freedom of 
expression over Article 29 on communities self-determination.  
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Prioritizing Article 19 over Article 29 of the UDHR is the same understanding of 
international communications and information US foreign policy has been promoting 
for the Internet and the free flow of information in relation to human rights. ‘The 
importance of freedom of speech and expression as a universal human right – is 
constantly expressed throughout US discourse. Its initial crystallization occurred at 
the end of the first phase of the WSIS [World Summit on the Information Society]’ 
(McCarthy, 2015: 103).  In this vein, liberal values are the basic condition for 
sovereignty, as ‘US policy- makers simultaneously work to undermine the legitimacy 
of the right to self-determination for other states’ (Ibid: 104), conditioning other 
conceptions of sovereignty depending on the extent to which communities and states 
recognise individuals’ right to freedom of expression under specific cultural values 
(Carr, 2013; Jablonski and Powers, 2015; McCarthy, 2015). The ‘free flow of 
information’ in US foreign policy and under specific cultural values means that access 
must not be denied or restricted on the basis of ideology or politics but mainly on the 
basis of market or ‘capital accumulation’ (McCarthy, 2015: 111-121).  
 
#YoSoy132, in advancing their demand for access to the Internet as a Constitutional 
right (see also Chapter 5 on Data for Development), reiterated liberal values that 
implied a particular kind of ‘coordination without politics’ and instrumentality. One that 
privileges a third actor’s sanction of individual freedom of expression and access to 
information under market conditions over communities self-determination and politics. 
Taken for granted as fundamental for democracy and bonded to human rights, the 
use of the Internet unfolded within an opposition between free flow of information and 
state efforts to regulate and filter information. Consequently, tecnopolítica and 
instrumentality acquired a post-national nuance consolidated through digital activism 
(Rodriguez Cano, 2018); local networks were always linked to international ones, 
although dismissing its instrumental link to coloniality. Instead, the Internet was 
reaffirmed in its basic composition as a freedom tool at risk of being controlled by 
states, thus misused regardless of self-determination and other definitions of 
sovereignty.  
 
The Internet was reaffirmed as liberating (Todos Somos 132, 2014), despite 
acknowledging its being a space for state propaganda, control and surveillance. The 
Internet was then ‘difficult’ to control thanks to its being ‘new’ and different from other 
easier to censor traditional media and was overall in opposition to governments 
across the world and the control they exerted over other ‘old’ media (Brito, in Todos 
Somos 132, 2014). This way, the Internet was produced as ambiguous: a freedom 
technology at risk, ‘attacked’ by the state (Brito, Sofia, Yoalli in Todos Somos 132, 
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2014), turning the once ‘idyllic’ dream of the Internet as free of censorship (Yoalli in 
Todos Somos 132, 2014) into a ‘myth’ (Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014). The 
response of the group, which as we will see corresponds to that of a large number of 
members, was not to stop using the technology. Instead, many considered that the 
Internet’s essence was at risk by hosting state activities. Instead of revisiting the 
whole idea and commitment to the Internet, MTDM members reinforced such 
commitment by drawing upon its essential characteristic of ‘absolute freedom’ and 
calling on activists not to fear the technology but, on the contrary, to use it (Brito in 
Todos Somos 132, 2014).   
 
We shall not fear the Internet, in fact, if the Internet grew [creció], grew to its 
current extent, it is because of its principles. It has many; it is a series of elements 
that allows the net to function this way. And one of those principles is around an 
absolute freedom. This point cannot be argued. Internet either is free or is not 
Internet, is something else, something completely different (Brito in Todos Somos 
132, 2014). 
 
What was to be done was to defend the Internet according to its founding principle of 
freedom and its mission of reaching everyone, as a ‘human right’. The prevailing 
understanding was that the Internet must be defended, used and trusted in its 
essence, which is alien to state interests as it represents the values of human dignity 
and democracy. The latter, trust, responding to the proposition of the NGO ONG 
Derechos Digitales [NGO Digital Rights], which promoted the slogan No Temas a 
Internet [Do Not Fear the Internet]. Overall, however, the Internet was continuously 
produced as a natural space for public engagement and protest. This technology was 
endorsed as a ´public space´ where freedom of expression must prevail as essential 
for democracy. What was at stake in the Internet was human dignity as founded on 
the aim of freedom of expression and the ideal of democracy. In this light, the 
representation of international society, implicitly and explicitly reproduced, was one of 
struggle between democratic forms of organization and state-governments.  
 
A ´healthy democracy´, the members of #YoSoy132 argued (author’s translation, 
Todos Somos 132, 2014), comprised freedom of expression as the possibility of 
having a ´voice´, enhancing and allowing the free flow of information, the 
documentation of events, creativeness, pacific struggle and protest, along with the 
production of content, revolutionary knowledge, science, and transparency as 
possibility of knowing what is ‘really going on’. Despite resembling the Internet as a 
technological fix as promoted by digitisation (Chapter 5), all of the latter attributes 
were mainly opposed to censorship, secrecy, national law, control, violence, 
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repression and silence, amongst others like control, espionage, religion, traditional 
media and lies. The Internet for #YoSoy132 entailed both a more positive 
transformation of everyday life and a risk of censorship, as the Internet as a ´public 
space´ could be subject to state surveillance, meaning ‘conceding part of your life’ to 
the government’ (author’s translation, Sofía in Todos Somos 132, 2014). 
Nonetheless, for both #YoSoy132 and Peña’s digitisation, the Internet was always to 
be embraced as a Constitutional right. 
 
An optimistic and instrumental account of technology as a ´freedom tool´, present 
from the beginnings of #YoSoy132 (e.g. Mario, Magaly & Tania, in Muñoz, 2012: 231-
234), and a pessimistic one as being rendered useful as a ´tool for domination´ and 
control are the understandings that made sense of the use of the Internet in a 
situation of surveillance, control and censorship. However, the essence of such 
technology, its absolute freedom and its relation to human dignity, predominated and 
over-determined the negative aspects that endangered its essence. In the last 
instance, risk prompted the need to act and engage in a deeper commitment as the 
importance of freedom of expression was consistently produced as the possibility to 
speak and therefore to be heard and become democratic. #YoSoy132 used the 
Internet as instrument of coordination, assuming and promoting it as essentially 
democratic and endorsing the liberal values of a free Internet and the strategic 
arrangements that underpin the promotion of such values. 
 
6.4 On coordination without politics as the flexible management of fragments 
and the absence of political referents  
 
This section analyses the understanding of the international scenario regarding the 
US role and the adscription of responsibilities in the censorship of 1Dmx in order to 
understand the activists’ lack of critical engagement and their ongoing use of the 
Internet despite being aware that the Mexican government had put citizens under 
systematic surveillance and that foreign or ‘extraterritorial’ elements were implicated 
in any local use of this technology. Such analysis sheds some light on the form of 
coordination that prevented #YoSoy132 members from questioning and 
understanding the relationship between freedom and control through the 
extraterritorial element of the Internet. In other words, this section shows how 
instrumentality and a flexible form of coordinating diversity concealed the 
intertwinement between freedom and control and, moreover, lacked and hindered the 
advent of a shared political experience – the embodied encounter that ‘brings about 
the “existential affinity” of those “who just happen to live together” [Schmitt, 1993: 
210]’  (Ojakangas, 2007: 210-212) – and the shared referents of order and 
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orientation. The Internet’s embedded form of coordination occupied the space of such 
shared referents and concealed its already existent and distant (someone else’s) 
ones. Finally, the form of collective coordination and organisation of #YoSoy132 is 
characterised as fragmented and flexible, dependent on the Internet and social media 
platforms’ mediation and concealing its extraterritorial and colonial elements.  
 
Members of the #YoSoy132 MTDM interpreted the censorship of the 1Dmx website 
on an Internet TV programme (Todos Somos 132, 2014). Throughout this 
transmission a specific construction of meanings, regarding the Internet and the 
Mexican and US government and major Internet companies, produced and 
reproduced a specific use of the Internet within a strategic arrangement and a set of 
international and transnational interactions that reiterated national governments as 
main actors of control on the Internet. Carlos Brito, member of the MTDM, claimed 
that 1dmx.org was taken down by a ‘censorship mechanism’ in which, ‘men, men and 
women, […] collaborate so that you, I and nobody can say “things” on the net’. His 
claim was that the US (US Embassy in Mexico) and Mexican governments (the 
Federal Government, the Government Secretariat and the National Council of 
Security) and the domain-name provider GoDaddy were part of such mechanism 
(Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014). Among these actors, however, Brito attributed 
responsibility according to their interests and their importance within an overall 
understanding of the Internet in which the Mexican government was the main 
responsible for censorship and the main threat to the liberating essence of the 
Internet.  
 
Within #YoSoy132 and #1dmx understanding, the US commitment to a free Internet 
was seen as matter of pure rhetoric or ‘empty words’ (author’s translation, Brito in 
Todos Somos 132, 2014). In a similar way, ‘they [agents of the US government] use 
copyright enforcement as an excuse’ for installing an economic integration through 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Ibid). In this light, the ‘censorship mechanism’ and the 
specific ‘collaboration’ of the US government through the US embassy, were seen as 
having a careless attitude, just going with it. As Brito characterised what he thought 
happened in this instance, agents of the US Embassy said: ‘[the Mexican 
government] is asking me to censor this website, nothing happens, I will go with it’ 
(author’s translation, Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014). US government ‘collaborated’ 
in a form of passive and careless attitude, simply responding to a request from a 
foreign actor. 
 
In a similar way, the Mexican government appeared particularly, in Brito’s narrative, 
as ‘men’ in the federal government who ‘decide to take down’ the website as part of a 
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general effort of ‘criminalising’ public spaces (the Internet), ‘creating criminal figures 
or digital crimes, because of their intent of regulation’ (author’s translation, Sofia in 
Todos Somos 132, 2014). The Mexican government – they explained – argues 
insecurity on the Internet as a pretext to control the opinion that criticises them: ‘they 
[the Mexican government] are making us [the Mexican people] think that there really 
is a chaos and we need “daddy” government inside to control it and to tell us what we 
can and cannot say’ (Ibid). The relation between state and the Internet was in this 
way reduced to an intent of regulation of freedom of expression relying on a common 
understanding and gendered discourse that has been prominent among activists, 
denouncing Mexican government’s paternalism as useless offerings and harsh 
measures in the name of public order. Finally, in such a narrative, GoDaddy was 
responsible as well, but its collaboration was also nuanced. The company was 
characterised as a ‘seller’, an ‘enterprise’ through which the Mexican government via 
the request of US Homeland Security censored the website. In Brito’s 
characterisation of the events, GoDaddy complied with the US government request 
by saying: ‘The Mexican government requested the US government so, and what 
they request to me is to censor a website for them. Then fine, I will do it, I don´t want 
to get into trouble’ (author’s translation, Brito, in Todos Somos 132, 2014).  
 
#YoSoy132 emphasised the responsibility of the Mexican government and 
recognized the collaboration between the three actors involved, which were in 
contraposition to the values of democracy and human rights. As Brito argued, ‘no Law 
forces GoDaddy to take down a website’, ‘no law nor any international agreement 
foresees that the Embassy proceeds in that manner with Mexican matters and, as I 
said, there is no authority in this country with the faculty to do so’ (author’s translation, 
Brito in Todos Somos 132, 2014). The three actors were pointed out as ‘violating 
human rights’, and more precisely freedom of expression, therefore understanding 
the international operation of the Internet beyond any established law as a human 
rights problem regardless of borders. However, in the MTDM members’ 
characterisation and understanding of the events, GoDaddy in the end was 
‘complying’ to the demands for information of 1Dmx; as it ‘informs’ the group as a 
result of the constant ‘pressure’ they exerted and as the company was concerned 
about staying out of trouble. The legitimacy that arose from a private domain as 
opposed to a state domain was important and was evident as well in the group’s 
search for ‘international response’ and the support of international NGOs and 
collectives (e.g. Article 19, Anonymous). This support was expected to come once 




As above, the case further produced an opposition between state control and free 
Internet among the activists. This was important not only due to the censorship and 
lack of transparency in the attribution of responsibilities, but also in virtue of how it 
pointed at the contradictions between, on the one hand, claims by US and Mexican 
governments about endorsing Internet freedom and freedom of speech; and on the 
other, their censorship actions. As Luis Fernando García (2014), the lawyer of 1Dmx 
mentioned, there are several issues that remain unattended concerning ‘discussions 
on Internet governance, where it is becoming more and more frequent to use or 
invoke words associated to the legal language of human rights’ (author´s translation). 
When compared with the ongoing effort of the Mexican government to control 
information on the Internet through reforms whilst declaring an overall commitment to 
freedom of expression on the Internet (see Lagunes, 25 November 2013; 
Operación1Dmx, 4 March 2014), or the US discourse on ‘Internet freedom’ – although 
it supports censorship in obscure circumstances (Ibid) – García (Ibid) concluded that: 
 
Repeatedly, it has been suggested that the power of both the United States and 
the major Internet companies, based within its territory, are actually a boon for 
free speech on the Internet. With the approval of many, it is often referred to as 
“imperialism of the first amendment”. Maybe it’s time to revisit those claims, 
because in cases like that of 1dmx.org, it is precisely the extraterritorial element 
that has led to the possibility of there being an act of censorship (openly violating 
the prohibition of prior censorship unequivocally embodied in the Mexican 
Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights), and worse still, it 
has greatly hindered the possibilities of defence and punishment of those 
responsible (author’s translation). 
 
Garcia´s emphasis on this ambiguity (free speech – censorship), for once not seen as 
a clear opposition, rested on the extraterritorial element he refers to. In his account, 
this extraterritorial element played a determining role both for Internet freedom and 
the act of censorship. Thus, he called to revisit the claims over this extraterritorial 
element and vague allusions to human rights. However, his account remained 
unclear. García did not explain whether such an extraterritorial or instrumental 
element – as it obeyed a third party’s decision – was constitutive of the Internet by 
design and there was a more basic correspondence between Internet governance, 
‘the legal language of human rights’ and censorship. Such an explanation would have 
been relevant considering the role of US government and Internet corporations in 
promoting both freedom and control on the Internet. Ultimately, this line of inquiry was 
hindered among #YoSoy132 members by their need to use this technology and these 
corporations’ services and by endorsing hegemonic values embedded in the 
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Internet’s design. The provenance of such values as particular interests and 
prerogatives of control was then obscured and concealed.  
 
As it has been pointed out before regarding the predominance of Article 19 of UHRD 
on freedom of expression over Article 29 on communities’ self-determination in a 
world context in which US foreign policy undermines the legitimacy of the right to self-
determination for other states, freedom of expression and Internet freedom 
(embraced by #YoSoy132) have not been mere rhetorics for the US: supporting either 
one or the other has been a matter of convenience42. Regardless of the contradictions 
and such values and meanings’ importance in supporting a specific foreign policy and 
strategic arrangement, underlying and accommodating the opposition between 
freedom and censorship for #YoSoy13243 was the common agreement on the need 
for these technologies, taking for granted its place within social endeavours of 
democratic engagement and its necessity as a human right. Despite knowing that 
platforms were objects of censorship and surveillance (Gómez and Treré, 2014: 506), 
a consistent imperative of using these technologies, as they facilitated fast, cheap 
and far-reaching capabilities, persisted within #YoSoy132. 
 
For instance, awareness of censorship was not something new for the activists. The 
group 1Dmx knew about GoDaddy´s previous participation in some websites 
censorship and about its support regarding the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). 
Despite this awareness, they used the domain provider´s service arguing that ‘it was 
the most popular one’ (Cabrera, 2014a). The collective dismissed extraterritorial 
government and corporate decision on whether freedom of speech or censorship 
were endorsed within the same space44, while a common or ‘popular’ understanding 
was more important for deciding whether or not to use a digital platform. In this case, 
a common understanding – in an alternative activist intent (1Dmx) – relied on the 
basic components of US predominance on the Internet (GoDaddy), even while trying 
to counter the concentration of power in national politics. This exemplified how 
knowledge of such ‘extraterritorial element’ of Internet governance, both as freedom 
and control, did not really open a critique of the centrality of digital technologies for 
																																																								
42 For instance, Hillary Clinton’s support to circumvention technologies and sponsorship of the World 
Youth Summits (see Mejías, 2013) speak of how US government harnessed digital technologies and 
the Internet in order to advance US foreign policy interests abroad, while the San Francisco’s Bay 
Area Rapid Transit (BART), a local agency in the United States, blocked mobile phone service in order 
to ‘disrupt political protests’ after deciding to privilege commuting necessities over public 
demonstrations and free speech (Calperin, 2011). 
43 Mainly the groups comprised in the Media Democratisation Task Group and those members who 
conformed digital rights advocacy NGOs [e.g. Luis Fernando García and Carlos Brito in R3D for digital 
rights defense). 
44 On how corporations affect freedom of speech online see for instance DeNardis and Hackl (2015) 
and Rosen (2013). 
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mobilisation and, moreover, for the country as a constitutional right. Instead, 
instrumentallity was endorsed as a broader strategic arrangement in which foreign 
actors define and decide at a distance the way in which the Internet and its subjects 
are shaped, used and understood, constraining the possibilities for a different 
practice. Through coordination, mediation conditioned according to another’s 
interests, values and economy, instrumentally defining other collective formations as 
advocates of a free and liberal democratic Internet by providing them with an 
instrument of coordination that ultimately benefits US foreign policy and commerce. 
The commitment to the Internet as essentially liberating and popular guaranteed its 
surveillant character – perhaps not entirely as planned by the Mexican government45 
but leaving unaltered US government and corporate platforms prerogatives. 
 
The same stable overall commitment to the Internet, despite its surveillant and 
repressive capacities, was expressed by #YoSoy132 when it became known that the 
Mexican Government was eavesdropping on profiles and hacking accounts (see 
Ahmed, 2018; Privacy International, June 2018). In these cases, and as it was 
mentioned before, it must be considered that mobilisations were already integrated by 
young individuals for whom ‘communication technologies [were] not something “new”, 
but something perfectly “natural”’ (Gómez and Treré, 2014: 502). As Treré (2013) 
significantly emphasised regarding social media platforms, ‘these were not new 
technologies emerging from a void in order to create revolutions’ but ‘daily 
communication practices’ that left a stamp on the overall representation and 
dynamics of the movement through the ‘hashtag’ that precedes the ‘brand’ 
#YoSoy132 (117). These practices were able to produce a ‘new habit of everyday life 
as well as public… life’ (Goggin and Albarrán, 2014: 38). Nonetheless, despite people 
being (instrumentally) formed and shaped in relation to these technologies, making 
them fundamental for their everyday interactions, digital technologies were not 
‘inherently emancipatory and positive for the movement,’ as sometimes were matter 
of conflict and negotiation regarding issues of organization and some awareness of 
Mexican government´s surveillance practices (Treré, 2013: 118).  
 
As Gómez and Treré (2014) mentioned, based on interviews with some participants 
of the movement, ‘issues of data exploitation, surveillance and threats to privacy 
relating to the use of social media,’ as well as the status of these platforms as ‘owned 
and controlled by US corporations’ were ‘rather neglected in the academic literature 
																																																								
45 The Secondary Laws on Telecommunications were published on 14 July 2014 in the Diario Oficial 
de la Federación (Official Diary of the Federation) (DOF, 14 July 2014). The final document did not 
include online censorship but surveillance, signals interruption and other measures justified by 
national security concerns, corporative bias in favour of dominant actors and other exclusions of social 
actors remained. 
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on #YoSoy132’ and ‘never thoroughly discussed’ within the movement (Gómez and 
Treré, 2014: 505). Whilst data exploitation did not produce any discomfort, 
surveillance and control – limited to its exercise by the Mexican government and after 
the protests on 1 December 2012 – started to attract attention and were asserted as a 
main concern. After the surveillance software named Finfisher was revealed as an 
acquisition of the Mexican General Attorney’s Office (PGR, Procuraduría General de 
la República) and employed since 2012 (Gómez and Treré, 2014: 506), some 
members started deleting their accounts out of fear. 
 
In such a situation, activists accepted the use of personal data by corporations 
(Gómez and Treré, 2014), which is not rare or exclusive of the Mexican context but 
can be seen all across the world through the lens of ‘ignorance’ or ‘resignation’ 
(Naughton, 2015) and has been embedded in the Internet by design (Chapters 3 and 
4). Nonetheless, concerning government surveillance, activists ‘did not deal with 
these issues rationally, expressing instead a general sense of paranoia around social 
media such as Facebook and their use of mobile phones’ (Gómez and Treré, 2014: 
505). ‘Social media paranoia’ as it was denominated, was not enough yet to urge the 
activists to elaborate on their prefiguration or to reconsider their generalized use of 
digital technologies. It was rather dismissed as unknown external or ‘mysterious’ 
dynamics and ‘almost immediately discarded,’ both by the imperative necessity to 
communicate and by the idea that if the government wanted to spy on them, they 
would do it anyway (see Gomez and Trere, 2014: 505). It was instrumentality as the 
underlying strategic arrangement with its proviledged actors and the social relations 
etablished on the basis of the Internet’s design as intertwined with several diffused 
everyday practices and imperatives that defined intelligibility and action for 
#YoSoy132. 
 
Even though many of the members of ‘YoSoy132’ participated in ‘Operación 1dmx,’ 
and experienced censorship as ultimately sanctioned by foreign agents, the presence 
and extent of any profound critique or understanding within the Media 
Democratization Task Group of the ties between Internet Governance, digital 
technologies and international politics, beyond global trends of activism, remained 
practically non-existent. As the presence of digital literacy and the mediation of 
everyday life communications and collective action made possible the emergence of 
#YoSoy132 as a ‘connected multitude’, activists were subject to the form of 
coordination enbedded in the Internet.  
 
The Internet as an ‘instrument of coordination without politics’ offered simplicity and 
accommodated heterogeneity while hiding the overarching end and economy of the 
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system, fragmenting knowledge and awareness (Chapter 3 and 4) of the mediation 
that made possible their collective actions. Accordingly, the imperative to 
communicate effectively and efficiently, together with digital literacy and the popularity 
of social media platforms for activism, overcame the fear of being under surveillance 
and reassured the urge to communicate. Therefore, the overall and simple 
representation of the Internet projected in public message by #YoSoy132 as a basic 
feature for democracy and human life prevailed. In rhetoric and demonstrations this 
technology and the ‘digital human rights’ it entailed needed to be defended from the 
malpractice of the Mexican government according to constitutional guidelines and 
international human rights standards and instrumental to US values and interests 
conditioning national sovereignty abroad. The Internet, with its corporate and 
hegemonic arrangements (its meanings and use), persisted as a reference for 
liberation where no other ideology or referent enjoyed the trust of the group (just like 
digitisation envisaged trust as embedded in digital technologies, Chapter 5); in 
mediating everyday life and becoming imperceptible as instrumental to someone 
else’s interests, the Internet persisted as a taken for granted ‘instrument of and for 
coordination’ whose users/activists did not happen to live together (see also Chapter 
7) but only to protest together through the most effective means. 
 
More precisely regarding political referents and ideological consensus, a vast majority 
of members of @YoSoy132 identified themselves with indignation (as ‘indignados’) – 
non-organised young people with no unique ideological reference but variegated 
forms of resistance and protest (author’s translation, Pineda, 2012). Autonomist 
positions like those of originary peoples’ struggles for territory represented a minority 
(ibid). Although the context of protest and alternative organisation in Mexico had 
sedimented some of the basic principles of Zapatismo – horizontality, direct 
democracy, no interest in taking power and non-partisanship – #YoSoy132 could be 
interpreted as experiencing a ‘political vacuum’ and absence of shared horizons and 
political referents: a vast gap which groups of the revolutionary left could not save 
(author’s translation, Modonesi, 2014: 147), except for the Internet and digital 
platforms. Despite the diversity of ideologies and positions within #YoSoy132, all of its 
members had been marked as a whole by their technological support and private 
universities positions: their collective identity preceded by a hashtag (author’s 
translation, Pineda, 2012: 10). 
 
‘Internal fragmentation was the vice and virtue of #YoSoy132’; virtue, as assemblies’ 
autonomy –inspired by communitarian practices legacy of Zapatismo but proved 
limited when translated to urban spaces – ‘made it possible to operate freely showing 
an impressive dynamism that would have been restrained by consensus building’ 
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(author’s translation, Modonesi, 2014: 147).  Vice, because in their lack of explicit 
ideologies and shared political referents, in addition to suspicion of any institutional or 
partisan mediation or leadership, #YoSoy132 enacted what has been described as 
extreme horizontality and extremely long assembly meetings mainly due to the 
plurality of groups and tendencies it comprised, as well as the impossibility of one of 
them becoming hegemonic or drawing stable alliances in that direction (Ibid).  
 
‘[#YoSoy132] was an accumulation of protests, not an integrated one’ (author’s 
translation, Rodrigo in Muñóz, 2012: 32) described a member referring to 11 May 
2012 at the Universidad Iberoamericana. Accordingly, this common feature of 
#YoSoy132 pervaded their coordination unfolding both as plurality and fragmentation. 
No clear referents or ideology offered cohesion46 (Modonesi, 2014). Young people 
using social media platforms for protest found a rationality of organisation and 
coordination in platforms like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter but lacked a shared 
existential awareness and orientation on what the common ground and horizon was 
for and as a collectivity. For #YoSoy132 general assemblies and meetings became 
massive and prolonged, finally fragmenting the movement. There was emotion and 
indignation, a common representation of the grievances committed by government 
and media corporations, and finally a medium through which members found each 
other as experiencing the same reality and wanting to do something about it. Their 
acting together as a collectivity, acknowledging and pointing at each other as part of 
the same experience, started with the Internet and digital platforms. Then, such a way 
of organising people as a multitude did not rest on and did not bring a shared 
understanding of social reality or a shared order and orientation to what society they 
wanted. The Internet provided a way of managing things as connected, flexible and 
fragmented. In a context of absent political and ideological unity, the Internet sufficed 
and put forth its constituting values, meanings and form of coordination – 
fragmenting, functionalising, accommodating diversity and simplifying interactions in a 
sociotechnical reality on behalf of others – as #YoSoy132. 
 
Nevertheless, fragmentation and loss of political referents does not mean here an 
underestimation of the experience it represented for the participants and members of 
the mobilisation. #YoSoy132 was definitely a performative and emotional practice that 
will eventually sediment in the collective imaginary (Bartra, 2014) and moreover, there 
is a shared desire that ‘they [the young people] will come back, stronger, [better], 
more numerous’ (Galeano, 2013). However, in their coordination, in their practice and 
understanding, there was a rationality that did not correspond to the members of 
																																																								
46 Allegedly, this was a common feature amongst movements using digital platforms, including Ocuppy 
Wall Street and the so-called Arab Spring demonstrations (Curtis, 2016). 
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#YoSoy132 as grounded in a collective existential affinity and a shared experience of 
living together. Instead, such rationality made possible the emergence of #YoSoy132 
as a collective by conditioning their experience and practice. Emblematically, Roger 
Bartra (2014: 16) stated: 
 
I cannot find in the verbal discourse of the 132, memorable texts like those by the 
Sup [Subcomandante Galeano] for instance, but I do find assertive, lapidary 
phrases. Synthesis capacity attributable to the discipline of Twitter. In his Nobel 
Prize speech, the poet Joseph Brodsky said: “I believe… that for someone who 
has read a lot of Dickens to shoot his like in the name of an idea is harder than 
for someone who has read no Dickens.” The anonymous demonstrator of 
#YoSoy132 wrote with a marker on a banner, drawing on the lyrics by Calle 13 [a 
band from Puerto Rico], “Someone who reads little shoots a lot”. There is no 
doubt, a tweet is worth more than a speech (author’s translation, Bartra, 2014: 
16).   
 
Digital literacy and discipline meant synthesis, effectiveness and efficiency, which 
blurred an account of the historicity of enunciation: the historicity of the Internet and 
the world it inhabits. If the Internet and digital platforms are to be used in specific 
contexts responding to politics, those new disciplines embedded in these 
technologies need to be acknowledged rather than embraced in a practice of effective 
communication whose referents are concealed relying on assumptions and 
generalisations that are neither present nor acknowledged as a political ontology. The 
design of the Internet has unfolded specific elements (instruments) with specific 
functions that do not know what the overarching design and task is about. Each part 
of the system has merely developed its own function (e.g. the Internet 
accommodating diversity without a shared known ideological referent), even if it could 




This chapter has demonstrated how the Internet worked as an ‘instrument of 
coordination without politics’ – an instrument that made possible collective 
coordination and experience only when mediated by an external third party – when 
used by #YoSoy132 to bring together a diversity of groups and coordinate actions as 
a ‘connected multitude’. #YoSoy132 reproduced the forms of coordination embedded 
in the Internet and endorsed instrumentallity, becoming instrumental within a broader 
strategic arrangement in which foreign actors define and decide at a distance the way 
in which the Internet and its subjects are shaped. Global connectivity and 
interoperability were reproduced while fostering the expansion of infrastructure and 
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universal access to the Internet as fundamental for the nation, democracy and 
humanity, and as a constitutional right; the free flow of information was reproduced in 
demanding freedom of expression and a free Internet according to US foreign policy 
interests; and the personalisation of identity and mediation of subjectification were 
reproduced in embracing social media platforms as fundamental for the constitution of 
a collective identity and action. 
 
A specific discourse of human rights and Internet freedom saturated the meaning and 
practice of the Internet for #YoSoy132 and framed their actions within an international 
strategic arrangement. The Internet, understood through an image of freedom, 
neutrality, human dignity and information as fundamental for democracy, reproduced 
meanings and practices embedded in this technology’s design and linked to 
hegemonic values and a US foreign policy practice that undermine other forms of 
self-determination. Accordingly, the technology was seen by #YoSoy132 as 
anathema to governments’ interests and ultimately as supported rather than 
threatened by US corporations. The role of US social networking platforms undertook 
a crucial role in this production, as these organizations’ links to the US state were 
noticed but nevertheless dismissed. The Internet’s coordination capabilities and the 
lack of stable and shared referents favoured ignorance of its instrumental dynamics 
linked to foreign actors’ agendas. Responding to the absence of shared political and 
ideological referents among the members of #YoSoy132, the assumptions regarding 
the benefits and democratic nature of the Internet occupied the vast gap between 
otherwise disparate groups and offered visibility to those who reiterated with utmost 
clarity the hegemonic meanings and embedded values of the Internet. 
 
The underpinning element that supported all those meanings and practices was the 
form of coordination embedded in the Internet and digital platforms’ design (Chapter 
4), together with their mediation of collective communication, organisation and 
experience. The Internet and digital platforms made it possible to gather and call 
upon the multitude, constituting a ‘connected multitude’ and offering a frame for 
collective identity, lowering costs and reinforcing internal solidarity (Treré, 2015). 
Nonetheless and regardless of its far-reaching capabilities across time and space, 
these technologies did not bring about any certainty or knowledge of a shared 
existence. There was no political event that ‘brings about the “existential affinity” of 
those “who just happen to live together”, in which the self emerges through 
experience and reflection and which is constitutive of ‘order and orientation’ [Schmitt, 
1993: 210]’ (Ojakangas, 2007: 210-212). Instead, what using such technologies 
brought was coordination, efficiency, speed and reach across geographical and social 
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locations, diversity of actions, demands, ideologies and performances of liberation: 
fragmentation and flexibility in a reproduction of instrumental and expansive forms.  
 
The Internet, despite its corporate and hegemonic arrangements (its meanings and 
use), persisted as a reference for liberation where no other ideology or referent 
enjoyed the trust of the group just like digitisation envisaged trust as embedded in 
digital technologies (Chapter 5). In mediating everyday life and becoming 
imperceptible as instrumental to someone else’s interests, the Internet persisted as a 
taken for granted ‘instrument of and for coordination’ whose users/activists did not 
happen to live together (see also Chapter 7) but only to protest together through the 
most effective means. #YoSoy132 did not engage with the intricacies of living 
together and deciding together on the basis of politics. Therefore, the chapter is 
significant for the overall argument of the thesis as it explains how the forms of 
coordination embedded in the Internet were reproduced, expanding colonial forms 
rather than politics. As in the case of digitisation, these forms have been approached 
through philosophy of technology and critical approaches to the internet and oriented 
by the consideration of coloniality. However, the thesis as a whole argues that moving 
towards an alternative politics and a different praxis of the internet is necessary and 
possible in Mexico through advancing the inclusion of a decolonial element of 
analysis: the Zapatsita experience and the tsosil and tojolabal philosophy. The 
following chapter analyses the Zapatista experience in detail in order to advance the 
inclusion of such a decolonial element through a more fundamental inquiry into the 






The Internet in the margins of instrumentality 
The Zapatistas, territory and the political 
 
 
The Zapatista support network has been celebrated as ‘the first example of the use of 
new technologies in favour of a resistance movement that generated a global virtual 
community’ (Rovira, 2003: 57). The rebellion has been deemed ‘an information-age 
prototype of militant social netwar’ (Arquilla et. al. 1996: 1) and the origin of a ‘new 
logic of resistance’ that has meant a ‘fundamental transformation in the way social 
movement organizations function, which places communication technology and 
media practices at the center of resistance’ (Wolfson, 2012: 149). However, instead of 
deeming the insurgency a case of ‘coordination without politics’ and instrumentality – 
collective coordination and experience made possible when mediated by an external 
third party without a shared political experience – the chapter further analyses the use 
of the Internet by the Zapatistas through the concept of the political (Agamben, 2009; 
Gelman, 1996; 21; Marder, 2010; Schmitt, 1993, 1996; Ojakangas, 2007), as an 
event of encounter/openness in which partners acknowledge/sense and define 
themselves as being together. It does so, in order to demonstrate how the 
instrumental/colonial character of the Internet – its form of coordination and the 
values, interests and aims embedded in this technology and analysed in Chapters 3 
and 4 – are not consistently reproduced by the insurgency.  
 
The chapter contends that the use of the Internet by the Zapatistas has not been 
instrumental as it has not allowed in a third party mediation or decision over its 
collective parameters and the orientation and order of their practice. Instead, a 
particular political formation and practice, with an intersubjective (Lenkersdorf, 1996) 
horizon, has encountered and responded to the use of the Internet redefining, at least 
temporarily, its instrumental/colonial character, both epistemically and 
organisationally. The Zapatista organisation effort as a self-governed, self-aware and 
self-defined community and its strategic orientation – the fundamental importance of 
attaining autonomy and territory – brings about ‘the “existential affinity” of those “who 
just happen to live together” [Schmitt, 1993: 210]’  (Ojakangas, 2007: 210-212), 
sharing an ethical horizon and a way of living together based on territory, with a 
shared political ontology. The overall argument is that the political as an experience of 
openness and encounter and the self-awareness that arises from it, informed by a 
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cosmological basis, affects the Internet by suspending its instrumental operation and 
its main rationalities of expansion according to the communities’ concrete 
circumstances and to collectively defined parameters and practices of intersubjectivity 
whose foundation is the earth. The chapter contributes thus to the overall aim of the 
thesis of advancing a decolonial critique of the Internet as an ‘instrument of 
coordination without politics’ in Mexico by questioning the technological character of 
technology as set by Western metaphysics and by proposing a different concept of 
the political. 
 
The chapter is organised through four sections. The first section underlines the 
strategic character of the Internet for the Zapatistas, which responds to a main 
political line of attaining ‘tierra y libertad’ [territory and liberty] instead of being the 
condition of possibility of collective practice as tecnopolítica on the instrumental basis 
of responding to another’s end (see Chapters 5 and 6). The second section links the 
importance of the territory for the Zapatista insurgency to Mexico´s historical 
background of originary and agrarian rebellions and traditions throughout Mexican 
history. This section identifies territory as sign of a shared experience and orientation 
towards community life that has persisted in agrarian struggles and the Zapatista 
insurgency in the twenty first century. The third section further analyses, through the 
notion of intersubjectivity and the concept of the political, the importance of territory 
as the earth and ‘Our Mother’ and with it, its politico-ontological character for the 
Maya peoples that comprise the Zapatista rebellion. This section underscores territory 
and the earth, instead of technology, as sign and condition of possibility of community 
life and collective practice as it is the foundation and the index of interpersonal 
encounter (or the ongoing trustworthy symbolic mediation of social interactions) and 
cosmological and politico-ontological awareness and experience of community life. In 
addition, it shows how the equality of all things as assumed in Maya cosmology is in 
tension with an instrumental conception of beings.  
 
The fourth section considers a more recent use and understanding of the Internet in 
the communities, in order to better understand how the political, and the multiplicity of 
elements it entails, redefine each of the rationalities described regarding digitisation in 
Mexico (Connectivity, Open Data and a Single Digital Identity) and those concerning 
the form of management embedded in the Internet´s design in the US (Global 
Connectivity, Free Internet and Personalisation of identity). The Zapatista distinctive 
practice was not that of relying or mediating collective existence and practice through 
the Internet. Rather, they encountered the Internet and located it within their own way 
of life and experience of the earth [la tierra] and according to an intersubjective 
understanding and practice of community that has ultimately underpinned their 
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struggle for territory and autonomy, destabilising the assumption of a technological 
being. Thinking of the political experience of the Zapatistas contributes to a 
questioning of the technological/colonial character of technology as instrumentality, 
as the ethical horizon of intersubjectivity recognises every being as a subject not to 
be instrumentalised as means to another’s end or property but respected in itself and 
as in intimate coexistence with all beings and community life. 
 
7.1 Territory and the strategic character of the Internet for the Zapatistas 
 
The most important, consistent and emblematic political mobilisation in Mexico that 
has found in the Internet an asset for activism is the Zapatista organisation in 
Chiapas, well known as EZLN. This predominantly “indigenous”47 guerrilla movement 
became visible after more than ten years of clandestinity in 1994 the day the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect supported by the 
amendments of Article 27 of the Mexican constitution, an article that previously 
promoted territorial distribution and had been used to protect originary peoples’ 
communal land and ejidos from being sold as private property (Muñoz, 2003). This 
uprising brought attention to the inequities of capitalism and the persistence of 
colonization within modernity as a long-lasting (more than 500 year long) reality in 
Mexico. This reality was fostered by the Mexican state and transnational capitalism 
under the banners of progress, globalisation and free trade (Marcos, 2003). As the 
Zapatista spokesperson, Subcomandante Marcos, explained, the “free trade” 
agreement was for them an expression of transnational liberalism and the 
neoliberalisation process that was intensifying its effects over other models of 
production and political understanding; NAFTA was emblematic as a focus of 
confrontation between ‘two winds’, one from above –aiming towards the exploitation 
of land as a mere resource for consumption and the concentration of wealth– and one 
‘from below’ claiming ‘tierra y libertad’ [territory and liberty]: a wind that ‘born below 
the trees, will come down from the mountains; it whispers of a new world, so new that 
it is but an intuition in the collective heart’ (Marcos, 1994: 297). Beyond any 
idealisations of the Zapatista struggle, it is the strategic significance and political use 
of digital technologies by EZLN that is addressed as indissociable from ‘tierra y 
libertad’ and that ‘collective heart’ to which Marcos and the third section of this 
chapter refer. 
 
Following ancient inequalities in territorial distribution, access to natural goods and 




territory has been a constant practice enacted throughout more than 500 years in 
Mexico. Territories have been seized from peasants and indigenous peoples, either 
illegally or exploiting the gaps in agrarian and land tenure laws, always spearheaded 
by racism and the inequalities it fosters. Pushed deeper and deeper into lowland 
rainforest, Maya communities in Chiapas were increasingly excluded from political 
and economic life, and the territories they inhabited further exploited and depleted 
(Marcos, 1994, 2003; Estrada Saavedra, 2007). In this context, the Zapatistas – 
mainly Mayan indigenous communities and urban Marxist and middle-class 
revolutionaries [Tsotsil, Tzeltal, Tojolabal, Chol, Mame, Zoque and mestizo] –gained 
national visibility on the 1st of January 1994, occupying prominent towns and 
municipalities in the state of Chiapas, the poorest state in Mexico. The guerrillas 
initially relied on military skills and the Maoist-inspired programme of action 
developed by the military command of the rebellion (González Esponda and Pólito 
Barrios, 1995). Once the EZLN was forced back into the mountains by the military 
strength of the Mexican state, threatening to eradicate the uprising, the movement 
and allied activists resorted to information technologies as a main strategic 
component. The EZLN developed an international information campaign that was 
retransmitted through the Internet48 thanks to a network of activists and NGOs from 
within Mexico, the US and Canada (redes de solidaridad [solidarity networks]) (see 
Rovira, 2009). The campaign and the network established ‘gave constant visibility’ 
(Rovira, 2014: 388) to events regarding the Zapatista indigenous communities and 
achieved international pressure against the Mexican government offensive. 
 
The EZLN later on consolidated itself as an anti-systemic heritage retrieved by new 
movements standing against neoliberalism, and more concretely against corporate 
media. Its innovative operation on the Internet inspired new efforts based in the US 
and Canada (such as the Indymedia project: a network of independent media, which 
developed along the lines of the battle of Seattle in 1999 [Wolfson, 2009, 2012]) and 
other contemporary social movements (see Castells, 1996; Cleaver, 1998; Dyer-
Witheford, 1999; Juris, 2008; Wolfson, 2009, 2012). The Zapatistas example gave 
activists interested in new media and the Internet an extraordinary case: a ‘framework 
and a language that catalyzed the development of a new type of social movement 
that had media and communications at the core’ (Wolfson, 2012: 152).  
 
As the report The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico commissioned by the Pentagon 
to the Rand Corporation, a US think tank, stated, the innovation of the Zapatistas in 
																																																								




using the Internet consisted of being ‘an information-age prototype of militant social 
netwar’, more precisely ‘an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, 
involving measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists used networked 
forms of organisation, and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to 
the information age’ (Arquilla et. al. 1996: 9). It was thus a case in which ‘a violent 
insurgency in an isolated region mutated into a nonviolent though no less disruptive 
“social netwar” that engaged activists from far and wide and had both national and 
foreign repercussions for Mexico’ (Ibid: xi). Others argue that the Zapatistas ‘engaged 
in a war of words, fought primarily with communiqués rather than bullets, giving voice 
to the victims of neoliberalism’ (Routledge, 1998: 253), without emphasising the use 
of the Internet. While another account claims that the Zapatista use of the Internet is 
one of those ‘radical initiatives that cannot be inscribed in the mainstream public 
sphere […] driven by discursive struggle as opposed to a search for consensus’ 
(Bakardjeva, 2009: 91). However, the persistence and use of the Internet by the 
insurgency have much more to do with their own experience of the political than with 
information networks, communiqués or bullets. In the same way the ‘EZLN was not a 
“wired” indigenous army’ (Arquilla et al., 1998: 23), the insurgency neither had 
information technologies as fundamental feature or mediation of their political unity 
nor expressed static guidelines and principles of organization for technological 
endorsement.  
 
Despite having a ‘superb media spokesman’, the insurgency ‘did not have their own 
laptop computers, Internet connections, fax machines, and cellular telephones’ (Ibid). 
Such devices ‘were in the hands of most transnational and some Mexican NGOs—
and they used them to great effect for conveying the EZLN’s and their own views, for 
communicating and coordinating with each other, and for creating an extraordinary 
mobilization of support… (Arquilla et. al., 1998: 23). As Todd Wolfson (2012) has 
explained in a particularly clear way, ‘it was the use of new media tools principally 
taken up by activists and NGO leaders outside the EZLN that marked the movement’ 
(Wolfson, 2012: 160-163) in the eyes of an international audience. If the movement is 
understood as constituted by ‘three layers’: the indígenas or indigenous peoples: 
Tzeltales, Tsotsiles, Tojolabales, Choles, Zoques and Mames; EZLN´s members 
‘from educated middle-class Ladino49 backgrounds’; and the ‘most networked layer’ 
constituted by local and transnational NGOs, it was the ‘top layer’ (Arquilla et. al. 
1996) of NGOs and technological devices that brought about the possibility of having 
huge visibility.   
 
																																																								
49 A mixture of native American and European ascendancy, more generally Spaniard. 
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The establishment of a support network and the visible permanence of the 
movement, mobilising supporters in order to dissuade the Mexican government from 
taking more violent action, was possible in the encounter between such top layer of 
the mobilisation, the Internet and the other two layers of indigenous and ladino 
members. Then, technological mediation allowed both NGOs and the EZLN to take 
advantage of already existing relations of solidarity and to create new ones receiving 
increasing support from beyond Chiapas. Nevertheless, the use of the Internet was 
always politically grounded in ‘a process that comes from a clear political line, based 
first and foremost in the interests of the peasants of southern Mexico, and 
consequently allows for an adaptable strategy of confrontation’ (Wolfson, 2012: 160-
163). This clear political line is expressed in the claim for ‘Tierra y libertad’ [land and 
liberty]. In other words, NGOs and civil society’s support was included within an 
already and to a large extent consistent process of political understanding that had 
territory50, and autonomous self-government [liberty] at the core of its efforts. 
 
It is in relation to territory and liberty that the historic and spatial development of 
Zapatismo in Chiapas comprehends a complex set of events and multiple encounters. 
First, the organization of Mayan communities in the jungle, the on-going relationship 
with the Catholic church and liberation theologians (Estrada Saavedra, 2007), through 
the arrival in indigenous communities of urban Marxist and middle-class 
revolutionaries coming from Northern Mexico. Then, the translation and mixture 
between western revolutionary traditions and originary Maya roots (Bartra, 1998): a 
sort of ‘Marxist/Mayan synthesis’ in conflict and armed confrontation with the Mexican 
military. And finally, the encounter and change of strategy in the conflict against the 
Mexican government and the use of information networks (Wolfson, 2012: 160). By 
the 90’s the Zapatistas were listening to and talking with variegated expressions of a 
common concern against neo-liberalism and a common understanding of humanity 
expressed in eleven demands: work, land, housing, food, health, education, 
independence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace (trabajo, tierra, techo, 
alimentación, salud, educación, independencia, libertad, democracia, justicia y 
paz)(Comandancia EZLN, 1993; see Ceceña, 2004).  
 
In this context, the Internet was more of a dialogue, coordination and organization 
opportunity between the community in rebellion and the support coming from outside 
organizations and activists. The shared experience of being together as a community 
																																																								
50 The use of the word territory instead of land in this chapter stands for the difference between the 
valorisation of space as embedded and intertwined, co-produced, with multiple forms of life and 
experience. This means that cultural forms and practices as well as multiple embodiments are seen as 
correspondent to territory as a co-production between human and non-human subjects and its multiple 
expressions of interaction.  
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as such did not rely on technological support but on a form of living together 
grounded on and translated into territory. Paying more attention to the latter, contrary 
to Peña’s digitisation and #YoSoy132 (Chapters 5 and 6), the constitution of the 
Zapatistas as a political process and collective subject was not due to its digital 
networked character, which was only acquired after the uprising and the advent of the 
Mexican government´s response. The collective practice was constantly formed and 
transformed through decades of everyday interactions and organization that goes 
back to the years of land distribution, ejidos formation from jungle settlements, extra 
communitarian solidarity networks (Estrada Saavedra, 2007, Renard, 1997) and the 
intersubjective translation – respect and dialogue – that started in the 70´s (Bartra, 
1998; García de León, 1995; Renard, 1997). All that was finally expressed to world 
audiences as a visible collective voice on the 1st of January when ‘it was spearheaded 
by the triggering of their arms’ (author´s translation Bartra, 1998: 9, in Marcos, 2002).  
 
Looking at the campesino (peasant) and indígena (indigenous) or native American 
roots obliges us to consider the multiplicity of interactions and meanings embedded in 
territory and thus the use of the Internet as dependent on the social and political 
context of the Zapatista political base. In this light, the importance of territory is not as 
an economic factor but as the ‘physical basis for community–for having a sense of 
community and for being able to endure as a community’  (Arquilla et. al. 1998: 25-
27). As we will see in the next section, territory has been a constant political 
endeavour amongst the agrarian and native peoples of Mexican society, still present 
as an imperative in twenty first century struggles and persistently linked to the 
Mexican Revolution and the process of land distribution as preservation of agrarian 
communities and the recognition of their right to the usufruct of land, officialised and 
embodied in the post-revolutionary Mexican state. Territory has been the main driver 
of indigenous and peasant political communities throughout centuries in Mexico as it 
signals the interpersonal character of communitarian life (with a long history among 
Mesoamerican peoples) and the possibility of autonomous self-government and not 
exclusively private appropriation or individually based usufruct of land. As the 
following two sections will show, through the aim of attaining territory, the Zapatistas 
reiterate not only a shared representation of the earth and territory among Maya 
communities and other native American peoples but also the concrete awareness and 
presence of the earth as foundation and index of interpersonal encounter (or personal 
mediation of social interactions) and cosmological and politico-ontological awareness 
and experience of community life. 
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7.2 The political importance of territory in Mexico: Heritage and foundation of 
originary and agrarian communities and their colonial, pre-revolutionary, 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary struggles for community basis 
 
The Zapatista movement in Chiapas has been but one of many rebellions in the last 
decades across Mexico and many countries of Latin America that fight against the 
private appropriation of communal territory.  In this context, as Carlos Rodriguez 
Wallenius (2016) explains, originary accumulation and ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (Gregory, 2006; Harvey, 2003) have converged in the will to obtain 
extraordinary profits and comparative advantages of rent over land. Under common 
agreement between national and transnational corporations and local and national 
governments, such private appropriation has generated great confrontation between 
two ways of cultural and socio-economic construction of everyday spaces or ways of 
territoriality and ‘directionality for specific forms of local development’ (author´s 
translation, Rodríguez Wallenius, 2016: 19). On the one side, stands a 
neoliberalisation process and, on the other, the awareness of territory as fundamental 
for constructing community – as a living together in which all its parts and members 
are fundamental within a shared everyday experience and intimacy that in this case 
includes the territory and looks to respect and use the goods provided by the earth as 
part and members of the collectivity instead of appropriating and exploiting them as 
mere resources.  
 
In Mexico these confrontations and rebellions involve a colonial past, the exploitation 
of natural goods as resources for the reproduction of capital in foreign metropolis and 
markets, a 20th century marked by the hacienda51 system and plantations, other 
peoples uprisings and of course, the Mexican revolution (Bartra, 2015). Thus, by the 
beginning of the present century in Mexico, regional and local movements 
underpinned the ‘communitarian defence of the territory’ and at least 60 cases of 
confrontations in this respect had been fully documented. As mentioned, these 
confrontations have meant the opposition between a form of territorial appropriation 
bonded to corporations, governments, profit, dispossession and rural territories 
destruction and another one, that defends self-determined forms of life ‘bonded to the 
earth, agricultural and livestock production, nature, culture and communitarian 
organization’ (author´s translation, Rodríguez Wallenius, 2016: 25). 
 
																																																								
51 Huge areas of land owned by one family or landlord who employed peasants under extremely poor 
conditions and holding intrusive prerrogatives generally under a scheme of perpetual debt as the wage 
was never enough to pay for the employee’s debt contracted with the owner due to food and basics for 
living or even tools for working. 
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All these processes are part of a broad range of social struggle expressions that 
transformed, little by little, the axis of peasant struggles in our country, which 
went from agrarian vindications and access to land in the 1970´s decade, through 
the appropriation of the productive process by peasant economic organizations in 
the 1980´s and through the emergence of the indigenous agenda and demands 
for autonomy strengthened by the Zapatista insurrection in the decade of 1990, in 
order to arrive at the beginnings of the 21st Century, when the concurrence of 
various peasant and agriculture and livestock producer organizations (gathered in 
the movement ‘El campo no aguanta más’ [Land cannot stand any more]), tried to 
influence agrarian policies (Ibid). 
 
The contraposition of two ways of enacting space and constructing territory has a 
meaningful and outstanding contrast which is crucial for understanding the non-
technological mediation of the Zapatista communities: land is crucial not as a 
resource but as a fundamental bond and basis for communitarian existence. Within 
this understanding multiple forms of life seeking autonomy and organized 
contestation against capitalism have taken place. From among these forms, the 
Zapatista movement in Mexico is the most visible one as it occupied territories, 
reinvigorated its indigenous roots, called for autonomous self-government and was 
supported by a dense and multiple set of local and international NGOs, activists and 
civil society members world-wide. In such conditions, the Zapatistas were able to 
push forth demands in accordance to the language of ‘contemporary demands in 
modern societies: democracy, liberty and justice’ and in a context of  ‘democratization 
processes of the end of the century’ (e.g. the end of socialism in Eastern Europe) 
(author’s translation, González Esponda and Pólito Barrios, 1995:102). Nonetheless, 
before visibility and innovation regarding a Western public sphere and informatics, the 
earth was fundamentally important not only for the Zapatistas in Chiapas but also in 
the history of Mexico as a country and the popular expression that brought about the 
Mexican Revolution and the institutionalisation of certain territorial vindications. 
 
As James C. Scott (1994: ix) has asserted, ‘the Mexican revolution… was a 
constellation of local revolutions that had taken root well before the new state was 
created’. Despite not having a modern national overarching sense as a state 
community, these local revolutions also expressed how before, during and after the 
Spanish colonial period territory has been fundamental as heritage to originary 
communities, ‘the sign (prenda) of their sacred relationship with nature, their gods, 
their ancestors and their descendants’ (author’s translation, Rhoux, 2011: 14). This is 
a relationship that has ‘persisted in the imaginary of [those] communities even 
throughout the colonial viceroyship, surviving in the Indian laws and the myths, rituals, 
celebrations and the safeguarding of primordial titles over land’ (Ibid).  
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During the revolution, despite the fact that villagers supported different revolutionary 
factions52 and adopted their proposals of territorial reform ‘interchangeably in their 
continued struggle over land’ (Baitenmann, 2011:3), that sense of the importance of 
the territory was still present and embedded in local struggles, as it would become 
clear in the institution of the Mexican ejido – collective territory, indivisible and without 
possibility of being sold or individually inherited and distinct from the Spanish ejido 
and the English commons (see Esteva, 2013: 174) – and dominium over the natural 
goods within the national territory as heritage of the Mexican people. Crucially, during 
the revolutions and ‘despite important philosophical, regional, ethnic and class 
differences, agrarian reform programmes were remarkably similar’ as they ‘all 
retained key elements of the colonial criteria for the pueblos de indios, and they were 
based on nineteenth century procedures for the disentailment of communal land’ 
(Ibid). Such colonial criteria and nineteenth century procedures in turn responded to 
the legacy of indigenous and agrarian communities’ struggles for territory as symbol 
and foundation of communitarian socialities. 
 
Despite the communitarian character of territory being represented in the Republic of 
Indians (the juridical form of the Spanish monarchy that recognised rights over land to 
originary communities), the Borbonic Reforms in the XVIII Century retrieved 
delegated administrative control into a more centralised form of government and 
accumulation by dispossession (Vásquez, 1999; Florescano and Gil Sánchez 2003). 
In the nineteenth century, territory as heritage of these communities was further 
neglected by liberal constitutions, thus always encountering peasant and indigenous 
resistance but to nevertheless be continued throughout the governments of Benito 
Juarez53 and Porfirio Diaz.54 As Rhina Roux (2017: 43) has emphasised:  
 
Before the liberal project of creating an atomised society of individuals united by 
the impersonal bond of the market and the abstract rules of law, agrarian 
																																																								
52 Amongst the most representative factions were the Constitutionalist faction of Venustiano Carranza 
and Alvaro Obregón, Francisco Villa in the North of the country with his División del Norte [Northern 
Division] army, and Emiliano Zapata in the South of the country. Each faction had a different emphasis 
around agrarian reform and state government. 
53 President of Mexico from 1858 to 1872. He was a lawyer and identified himself as a liberal politician. 
Implemented liberal reforms based on individual rights and the rule of law, nationalised the wealth of 
the Clergy, waged the War of the Reform (1858-1860) against Conservatives and defended the 
country against the Second French Intervention in Mexico (1862-1867). He implemented the 
disentailment and disamortisation of eclesiastical and communal lands and properties. 
54 General and politician, was president from 1876 to 1880 and from 1880 to 1911 when overthrown 
by the Mexican Revolution. He imposed modernisation and favoured foreign investment according to 
European, particularly French, standards, expanding train lines and promoting the concentration of 
land ownership in the form of privately-owned haciendas (plantations, mines and/or factories) property 
of estate-owning hacendados (for a general overview see Coatsworth, 1981). During his government 
the general conditions of the peasantry decreased under an accelerated and generalised scheme of 
accumulation by dispossession.	
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rebellions put forth once and again the redeeming myth of a community whose 
symbolic representation was the earth. In that symbolic order the earth did not 
only mean a natural good as guarantee of material self-sufficiency or a mode of 
production. In the conservation of the earth and the commons that the agrarian 
rebellions impelled was comprised the resistance of a world of life that rejected to 
be dissolved: with its mesh of traditions and uses [costumbres] and moral rules, 
its sacred relationship to nature, its ludic experience of work alien to a puritan 
ethos and a notion of time linked more to the rhythms of harvesting than to a 
lineal time of “progress”. But it as well comprised the agrarian communities 
struggle for rights and jurisdictions’  (author´s translation, emphasis in the 
original, Roux, 2017: 43). 
 
Therefore, despite the opposition between two forms of life, communities did not 
reject state forms of government in toto. Moreover, a practical arrangement resorting 
to official and revolutionary regimes was evinced as looking to guarantee local 
territorialities (Baitenmann, 2011) and thus the existence of communities. As these 
communities tried to keep territorial political jurisdictions, the struggle for territory 
often resorted to whatever land tenure rights, revolutionary regimes support or official 
centralised mediation that promised an opportunity to maintain their territories, 
manage their goods and deliver justice. So, while demands and struggles were 
generally accompanied by demands for political autonomy, they could also make use 
of liberal institutions. For instance, once the Republic of Indians disappeared, ‘the 
retrieval of the ayuntamiento [town hall] of liberal provenance was an early example 
of the resources used by agrarian communities to preserve their identities, territorial 
rights and forms of government’ (Roux, 2017: 44). In a similar way, Spanish colonial 
institutions would be used for the same purpose during and after the Mexican 
Revolution. 
 
Overall and most emblematically, the persistence and insistence of communitarian 
socialities nurtured the inclusion within the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the 
Mexican State order of ‘three principles that stemmed from the Spanish monarchical 
tradition of public law’ (author´s translation, Roux, 2017: 47).  First, the agrarian 
communities’ right to usufruct the territory and its natural goods under the form of 
ejido. Second, all lands and natural goods within the Mexican territory belong to the 
state. And third, ‘the “direct dominium” of the nation “inalienable and imprescriptible” 
(which is to say an absolute, exclusive and perpetual right) over minerals, salts and 
oil’ (author´s translation, Roux, 2017: 47).  From this perspective, ‘the originality of the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917 was that it took land and commons out of the circuits of 
market exchange’ (Roux, 2017: 37) through Article 27, combining a shared sense of 
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communitarian socialities with useful institutions from the Spanish monarchical 
tradition of public law.  
 
As villagers supported a national administration that mediated and formalised their 
territorial claims, and employed agrarian laws and procedures in a practical manner, 
they ‘actively sustained the construction of a national agrarian bureaucracy’ 
(Baitenmann, 2011: 22-29). This ended up weakening the ideal upheld by 
revolutionaries like Emiliano Zapata, after whom the EZLN took its name, and its 
famous claim for ‘Tierra y Libertad’, which supported a more autonomous form of 
national organisation based on municipalities, a decentralised governmental system, 
and equity in territorial distribution rather than restitutions (see Brunk, 1995). On the 
contrary to the latter, while ‘regulating villagers' participation in land reform, federal 
administration ‘claimed legislative authority, invaded the sphere of the judiciary and 
greatly restricted the role of municipal and state governments, all elements that would 
characterise Mexico's agrarian reform for the next 70 years’ (Baitenmann, 2011: 19).  
 
Defining whether and to what extent the role of such manoeuvre, the allocation of a 
centralised management of this rich sense of territoriality and communitarian life 
under a state form, has in the end been beneficial to peasant and indigenous 
communities or not is something that cannot be discussed in detail here. However, it 
is not only a matter of the extent to which the agrarian reform either brought about 
contention to capitalist exploitation or co-optation of popular claims and demands into 
a state apparatus that centralised the administration of agricultural production, 
eventually consolidating its presence as a capitalist actor in disfavour of peasantry 
(see Nugent and Alonso, 1994: 211-212).  It is more about the concrete political 
experience and claims for territory that found themselves eventually mediated by an 
ensemble of technical positions (constitutionalism, liberalism and agrarianism), which 
intended to bring stability to the country but never achieved this on the basis of an 
organisation of autonomous municipalities and communitarian socialities. 
 
Autonomy was progressively limited under a Federal government that centralised 
agrarian law and its executive and judiciary scope. In the decades following the 
Mexican Revolution and as the Federal government consolidated as a centralised 
government, dissent would be co-opted, excluded or annihilated in a very specific 
manner (see Pansters, 2012). However, the advent of the Mexican Revolution 
signalled the presence of an, although dispersed, shared sense of communitarian life 
grounded on territory. The revolution hindered the destruction of a form of life oriented 
towards preserving territory, autonomy and its set of sacred relations; a form that 
would be crucial in the recognition of territorial distribution contained in Article 27 of 
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the Constitution of 1917 – foundation of the legitimacy and sovereign authority of the 
Mexican state and post-revolutionary elites’ legitimacy (Roux, 2017) – and that is here 
proposed as crucial for politics in a context of expanding technological mediation. 
 
Territory in its communitarian importance for the Zapatistas is correlative to the 
history of Mexico as a nation. Although national and official rituals and symbols 
regarding the revolution were put in place and reiterated along with an increased 
centralisation of government and the consolidation of a hegemonic party, these could 
only mean that self-awareness, decision and self-government were never achieved 
as a nation beyond or before official mediation. Territory in turn, points directly at the 
concrete experience of communitarian efforts in Mexican history. On this basis, the 
following section analyses territory as a historical, existential and communitarian bond 
and concrete experience of the political and as it is displayed by the Zapatistas. This, 
in order to understand how territory, autonomous self-government and self-
awareness through philosophy have constituted the political for the Zapatistas and 
have limited the instrumental character of the Internet.  
 
7.3 Maya roots of Zapatismo in Chiapas: Intersubjectivity, territory and the 
political 
 
While land reform and territorial claims (tierra) had persisted throughout the centuries 
finding legal recognition in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, autonomy was severely 
limited and postponed under a centralised government and international political and 
economic pressures. More recently, with the reform to Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution, which preceded the signing of NAFTA in 1992, territory as basis of 
communitarian existence and its legal form as ejido have come increasingly under 
threat. Since then, the Zapatistas have called upon the Mexican and world population 
to rise up against capitalism and the depletion of the earth, working towards ‘a world 
in which many worlds fit’ (see Klein, 2001). This section analyses, through the notion 
of ‘intersubjectivity’ (Lenkersdorf, 1996, 2006) and towards an understanding of ‘the 
political’ in relation to instrumentality, the importance of territory as the earth and ‘Our 
Mother’ and with it, its politico-ontological character for the Maya peoples that 
comprise the Zapatista rebellion. This section underscores territory and the earth, 
instead of technology, as sign and condition of possibility of community life and 
collective practice as it is the foundation and index of interpersonal encounter (or the 
ongoing symbolic mediation of social interactions) and cosmological and politico-
ontological awareness and experience of community life. In so doing, the section 
shows how the equality of all things as assumed in Maya cosmology offers an 
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alternative view to the instrumental conception of beings and a different 
understanding of the political in relation to the Western category of technology.  
 
Autonomy for the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas has appeared as correlative to an on-
going effort of intersubjective self-awareness informed by Maya cosmology and 
philosophy and rooted in the practice and language of communities based on 
territory: a political ontology (Ceceña, 2004; Lenkersdorf, 2002). Such self-awareness 
means life and decision as a community are defined not by a third party but by a 
practice of intersubjectivity (Lenkersdorf, 1996, 2006), a living-together, not to be 
confused either with any kind of isolationist effort or identified straightforward with a 
Western ideal of democratic non-hierarchical or horizontally perfect decision-making 
process constituted by rationally aware and critical subjects. The Zapatista 
communities and the Maya peoples are not here offered as an example of a utopia or 
a reservoir of hope. The Zapatistas are interpreted (and in many ways speak) here as 
an invitation to listen and try to understand what keeps coming back as political, 
which in this case is developed and valued as bonded to territory and the concrete 
constitution of community experience.  
 
Concerning territory and philosophy for the Zapatistas, in an effort of translation from 
a Maya sense, from a Tojolabal way of life, the condition of possibility for liberty is ‘the 
existence of the free community in which we are integrated’ (author´s translation, 
Lenkersdorf, 1996: 85).  
 
We enjoy thus liberty thanks to communitarian conditions that make us free. 
Community, on its behalf, needs space in a specific place that bonds us to the 
soil that is Our Mother and where our ancestors passed away and keep visiting 
us. There is no liberty thus, if there is no place to extend roots that give us life, 
community and support’ (Ibid). 
 
As above, in this experience Our Mother is the soil, not only a specific location but 
also the multiplicity of interactions it entails, which linked to collective memory, 
tradition, practice and flesh is a bond that makes possible community itself. Liberty 
means to live in community and thus bonded to Our Mother. Territory, experienced 
from a Maya cosmological and philosophical perspective as Our Mother means life, 
community and support. Territory, lands, waters and the multiplicity of beings and 
interactions are comprised in Our Mother who is ‘flesh of our flesh’ and offers the 
possibility itself of existing; it nurtures us (Ibid). The earth provides food, which 
cosmologically and traditionally is associated with maize, of which our body has been 
made of (see Florescano, 2000). Therefore, Our Mother offers food and food is 
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present as our supplier, our flesh and our blood. In the same way, the earth provides 
a place to extend roots and form a community, literally living together with other 
members while being formed with maize or the food offered by Our Mother. As a 
consequence, when Tojolabales ‘see the milpa55 [their agricultural practice], they do 
not think of exchange values or use values, but in a vital relationship as the one 
between brothers, partners or families’ (Lenkersdorf, 1996: 110). La Milpa and family 
are a vital relationship not limited to an economic production or exchange in terms of 
resources. Instead, joy comes from co-existence and responsibility, from a particular 
form of use. Family has no exchange value or use value, family is used not in 
utilitarian terms but as joy (Ibid). This is why ‘la tierra [the earth, territory and soil] is 
indeed our mother. This is why it is never a commodity you can sell or property you 
can accumulate’ (Ibid: 112). 
 
Such an understanding from Tojolabal philosophy is a common one among Maya 
peoples, informed by its cosmogonic tradition (see Florescano, 2000). Although in 
many aspects similar to other Mesoamerican cultures, Maya philosophies and 
practices vary depending on each group and of course have not been immune to 
urban and Catholic practices and ideas (see Estrada, 2008; Florescano, 2000; 
D’Alessandro and González, 2017; Pitarch, 1996).  However and overall, philosophy, 
myths, rituals and agricultural practices conciliate Maya groups with the earth and 
nature. For instance and in a similar way to the Tojolabal peoples, Tzeltal territories 
are experienced and constructed in accordance to their agricultural practice that is la 
Milpa, entailing human and non-human beings (D’Alessandro and González, 2017: 
271). As an important cosmogonic element for many originary peoples in Mexico, this 
agricultural practice of la Milpa, in the case of the Maya peoples, is complementary 
with oral tradition as a way of relationship with nature (Ibid, see Estrada, 2008) and 
entails a very particular linguistic structure.  For the Maya peoples, and more 
emphatically for some Zapatistas, the close relationship to la Milpa is philosophically 
meaningful as it is related to that which is sacred and to the equality in the sacred that 
remains in their language. Despite some gaps in practice this sense of equality or 
sacredness keeps coming back and pushing forth in their vindications of everyday 
life, as we will see in the following lines.  
 
What Carlos Lenkersdorf (1996: 106-110) calls ‘intersubjectivity’ helps understand the 
idea that ‘the milpa has much more value than its use’, that ‘its heart turns sad as our 
heart does when we are far away from our beloved ones’, that ‘it has thus, feelings 
that make it transcend commercial value, just as our family has no utilitarian value 
																																																								
55 Mesoamerican agro-ecosystem mainly comprising and combining maize, beans, courgettes, chile 
and others altogether in the same area. 
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[…] without rejecting the fact that they [our beloved ones] are useful because we help 
each other’ (author’s translation). Here, intersubjectivity is ‘the starting point’ for 
Tojolabales, which means, in linguistic and social terms, the absence of objects and 
the plurality of subjects (as ‘agential subject’ and ‘experiencing subject’) in a dialogical 
structure of meaning and enunciation in which two or more acting subjects always 
recognize themselves as actors (Ibid: 110-117). In linguistic terms, for instance, the 
proposition ‘I told you’ would be enunciated in Maya Tojolabal as ‘I told you and you 
listened’, accounting for two agential subjects instead of one; while to say ‘I saw the 
mountain’ would mean something like ‘I saw the mountain and the mountain had the 
experience of being seen’ (see Lenkersdorf, 1996). Everything is a subject expressed 
in their linguistic structure as the absence of objects and the presence of agential and 
experiencing subjects. Those inanimate things from a Western perspective are 
recognised by the Tojolabales as having a relationship to themselves – as 
experiencing – and to others – as being agents. In social terms, from this 
philosophical stand ‘human beings are not the only possible society, because there is 
nothing that does not have a yaltzil [a heart]’ (author’s translation, Lenkersdorf, 1996: 
106). 
 
Such an intersubjective understanding, linguistically and socially explicit, is common 
amongst Maya peoples (see Mentinis, 2006: 176, Paoli, 1999) and has been 
reiterated by the Zapatistas. For instance, as Xuno López (2015: 267) explained in a 
Zapatista forum, also recalling to other Maya peoples present, among the Tsotsil 
peoples, ‘everything that exists has its O’tan-heart and all O’tan has W’otan, its 
guardian’, and  
 
this notion of O’tan is one of the forms of our sna’el k’inal in our pueblos [towns]. 
Sna’el k’inal is something like knowing the world [saber el mundo], 
meeting/getting to know the world, to comprehend it, understand it, recognise it, 
to long for it, to miss it, to apprehend it, knowing to be-exist in it, knowing to direct 
the word, knowing to live in the ich’el ta muk’-recognition-respect, knowing to 
listen, knowing to feel, being awake, being vigilant, being as guardians [estar de 
guardianes], knowing to correspond (author´s translation, López, 2015: 267).  
 
From the O’tan-heart the sna’el k’inal unfolds, at the same time that the O’tan-heart 
unfolds as a form of sna’el k’inal. Ich’el ta muk appears as a mode of knowing and 
living in recognition and respect for everything as everything has O’tan. This is the 
seed-word [semilla-palabra] that is taught by current Tsotsil youngest elders 
[mayores-menores actuales] (Ibid). As López (2015: 269) continued explaining, ‘our 
grandmothers and grandfathers also comment that, just as everything has O’tan and 
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Wo‘tan, as well everything has Ch’ulel’, which ‘is like the spirit, the soul, conscience 
and language, it is being, that which on its own [de por si/naturally] exists’ (author’s 
translation). Different from an instrumental understading in which things are objects 
designed or meant to follow another being’s specific programme and achieve specific 
functions as their own end, each and every thing in the universe has its Ch’ulel. On 
the contrary to the rush of digitisation to relocate trust from human mediation to 
machine mediation (Chapter 5), recognition and respect for every single and 
whatever being speak of a fundamental and immediate interaction and trust among a 
multiplicity of beings and worlds. ‘With the existence of many Ch’ulel’, Tsotsil people 
‘consider that a pluriverse Ch’ulel exists’ (Ibid). ‘From this notion our world was 
ordered’, asserted López as he emphasised how ‘the sacred is co-substantial to our 
humanity’, as it is about ‘matter and spirit amalgamated’ and about all that exists 
being sacred (Ibid: 271).  
 
Despite being sometimes idealised by observers such equality of subjects in spoken 
language and philosophy has a correlate in collective decision-making and the 
capacity to listen and dialogue with non-Maya practices. Such a sense of belonging 
and existence bonded to the territory and the specific set of interactions maintained 
with nature and other members of society, from a Maya perspective, emphasises in 
practice the importance of community and principles like patience, listening, direct 
participation and decision through a ‘culture of intersubjectivity’ and ‘otherness’ 
(Ceceña, 2004; Lenkersdorf, 2002). This practice has guaranteed cohesion among 
the originary peoples and the EZLN, and is usually one of the main focuses of 
attention and sympathy from outside observers and supporters (Ceceña, 1997). 
However, support and sympathy even in the far-reaching and close relationship with 
local and transnational NGOs is not the same as living within the cultural 
understanding and practices of these indigenous and autonomous communities, 
where horizontal structures of participation generally accounted by observers are 
combined with vertical hierarchical ones and the ‘essential elements’ of the rebellion 
are not limited to ‘democracy, autonomy, communications, or networks’ (Wolfson, 
2012: 163, also see Estrada Saavedra, 2007; Mentinis, 2006) but consistently linked 
as well to the inhabitance of a territory as a community, with all the complexities it 
entails (e.g. conflict and imposition of foreign forms). 
 
Regarding such complexities and calling attention on the expansion of capitalism, 
López has described how ‘this mode of sna’el k’inal [the notion of O’tan] is 
increasingly less common’ as ‘[capitalism] has taken away Ch’ulel from all that exists 
and has turned it into an object, a thing, a commodity’ (Ibid: 269). However, he 
underlines, ‘re-cognising [re-conocer] again the sacred in everything that exists 
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means to take back our sacrality, our humanity, to hearten-us [corazonarnos] and 
unite-us56 [hermanarnos]’ (Ibid: 271). To hearten [corazonar] in this sense can be 
understood here as ‘original con-senting’ and ‘becoming other of the self’ (Agamben, 
2009: 36) as feeling/sensing together and being together. This is the vision that has 
been shared by the Tsotsil and Maya ascendency, that has been present in the 
Zapatismo in Chiapas and that is now part of a decolonial critique of the Internet 
through the idea of the political. In this light, the contrast is clear between 
instrumentality or the technological character of technology and Maya cosmological 
tradition: the former objectifies, hides interactions and fragments knowledge while the 
latter recognises and makes visible the interactions between – human and non-
human – subjects drawing together and sharing knowledges. Even in the case of the 
creation of for instance, cooking utensils and ceramics or fabrics, Maya cosmology 
recalls the notion of corazonar or to hearten with something (Ibid: 274-6), displacing 
the understanding of technology and the colonial form of ‘thingification’ of beings 
(Chapter 2) through an idea of parejitud (equality/evenness). As with other “human” 
members of the community, it is possible to corazonar with non-human beings one 
has given form to and shaped and this has to do with politics and territory, 
metaphysics and philosophy. 
 
As a Zapatista member asserted: ‘(…) the future of the EZLN is not defined in military 
terms but in political terms. We are not worried about the enemy, we are worried 
about how we are going to define a new relationship among partners’ (author’s 
translation, Ceceña, 2004: 21). Along with this emphasis on partnership over enmity, 
in the case of the Zapatistas there is a basic experience of the equality of all things 
and of collectivity that must be considered as underlying their political experience. If 
the political, inspired in a Schmittian definition, is an event constitutive of ‘meaning 
and order’ in which the self emerges through experience and reflection from the 
encounter with the ‘other’, ‘[bringing] about the “existential affinity” of those “who just 
happen to live together” [Schmitt, 1993: 210]’  (Ojakangas, 2007: 210-212), the Maya 
sna’el kinal (stating that everything is alive and has a heart) and its mode of living in 
ich’el ta muk-recognition-respect refer precisely to the decision and experience of 
living together that is constantly present in linguistic and social terms.  
 
However, instead of a Schmittian emphasis on otherness as brought about by enmity, 
the political here has to do with the experience of encounter and how a collective 
																																																								
56 Here an english translation feels inadequate but tries to express something Spanish 
language can still express in the reflexive sufix –nos which means to act on oneself. Again, 
Giorgio Agamben has written on how this desubjectification and subjectification is related to 
a different understanding of the notion of use, as it used to be expressed in the idea of 
Chresis (see Agamben, 2015). 
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decides and defines itself (in evenness with all that exists) as being together, open 
and in respect towards every ‘other’. Then, this ‘other’ that appears and is recognised 
can be seen as the friend: who ‘constitutes the political’ and shares no positive or 
predicative identity but the pure fact of existing and the ‘original con-senting’ that the 
friend exists (Agamben, 2009: 36). From the latter perspective politics appears as a 
‘becoming other of the self’ (Ibid: 34-35) and not exactly a becoming a self from the 
experience of the other. This flexibility in the interpretation of the political, in terms of 
enmity or friendship, does not exclude one another but speaks of the political as 
encounter/openness at the level of facticity and the emergence of a collective self 
from that experience and reflection. As Xuno López (2015) reminds us again: 
 
As everything has O’tan, so that [sic] exists a great O’tan that can transform into 
Ko’tantik or Ko’ontontik [in Tsotsil language] – something like “our heart of all of 
us [todas y todos nosotros]” (our heart). The other way of making-us [hacer-nos, 
as consituting a we as being together] and enunciating-us in a kol-lek-tive57 heart 
[corazón kol-lek-tivo] is ko’tanjo ‘tik/ko ‘tantikon or ko’ontonkutik (Tsotsil), [which 
is] as well one type of “our heart-us [nuestro corazón nosotros]”, but in this way of 
enunciating-us [enunciar-nos, enunciating a we] we exclude because we are 
excluded. We do not place everybody [todos y todas] because they do not 
hearten [corazonan, be in a collective heart] with us [nosotras y nosotros]; if they 
do not hearten with us, then they do not feel what we feel, do not endure what we 
endure, do not see what we see, do not listen what we listen to, do not fight for 
the same we [nosotras y nosotros] from below fight for (author’s translation, 
López, 2015: 267-268).  
 
As above, the way of interpreting and building upon equality in facticity is differential 
depending on the mode of living and ‘corazonar’ (heartening), it can be inclusive or 
exclusive. In this way, political ontology as the ‘interpretation of […] collective 
existence’ (Marder, 2010: 4) is a present matter among the Zapatistas, although it 
takes a different form and nuance in its explicit enunciation, be it cosmological and 
philosophical propositions and practices, or be it language and social traditions like 
agriculture. Based on this form of being together that comes from the persistent 
intuition that everything is alive and deserves respect and recognition, in contrast to 
instrumentality, a specific heart formation can follow, depending on the way we want 
to live together with everything that exists and more precisely with those who reject 
																																																								
57 As Xuno López (2017: 276) explains, kol in Tseltal and Tsotsil, from kolel and kolelal have a wide 
array of meanings and senses, referring to what in Spanish [castellano] would mean ‘liberation, to free 
oneself, to unleash, to free off chains, to let go, untie, etc’. Lek refers in turn to what is ‘dignifying, 
good, just, honest, simple, what is correct, goodness, virtue, gratitude, compassion, solidarity, 
kindness, what is useful, appropriate and convenient, adequate, healthy, nice and enjoyable, fun and 
pleasant, serviceable, the tasty and magnifique in quality’ (Ibid). 
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the dignity and existence of all other beings, or even those ‘who simulate to hearten’ 
(author’s translation, López, 2015: 268).  
 
The latter case refers to all those who want originary peoples to delegate 
responsibilities, who want to take their place, to manage their affairs, to ‘act as their 
guardians in all aspects of life as peoples’ (Ibid), preserving coloniality as analysed in 
Chapter 2 and in close resemblance to the instrumental management and mediation 
of subjectification identified in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. This is what has been 
interpreted by these same peoples as domestication, every time those who want to 
speak and act on their behalf  ‘plant their stalel kuxlexal (mode of life) in our heart, 
they place modes of feeling-thinking, of acting, of being-existing in our hearts and so 
we reproduce what they are and how they are’ (Ibid: 268). A simulation that ends up 
deciding on and forming, through domestication as instrumentality, the indigenous 
subject according to another’s end and interpretation of the world. 
 
Such a clear differentiation and awareness of the way of being-together is an inquiry 
into the collective experience accompanied by the reiteration of equality in facticity 
and from which meaning and order arise in a specific form. As López (2015: 268-269) 
confirms,  
 
constituting us into a kol-lek-tive Wo‘tan is as well to become a kol-lek-tive Ch’ulel 
and to become a cosmic-kolektive Xch ‘ulel wo ‘tan, so to speak, in guardian 
spirit-consciousnesses of all that exists. In this all that exists is included our own 
existence. To be vigilant, sentinels… each one in the place that corresponds to 
her but with feet, heart and eyes [from/on] the earth. It is a come-and-go… We 
enunciate ourselves from an exclusive-excluded ko ‘tanjo ‘tik in order to 
reconstruct, reincarnate a ko ‘tantik, a new heart, an our-we-humanity [una 
nosotras humanidad nuestra, in which we walk pajal-pajal [as equals], in 
evenness as those women in our towns demand, in which there is ich’el ta muk’-
respect and recognition to each one of its grandeur, its value, its importance, its 
being, its doing, its thinking and its existence (Ibid). 
 
In the preceding lines, the experience of collective existence pushes towards 
becoming ethics, not as prescriptive points or specific norms of conduct but as a call 
for and embodiment in territory and community of a concrete and grounded encounter 
first, within an exclusive community and within and between each one of its members 
through awareness of what is (facticity) and the way in which tradition has preserved 
knowledge. But also, through the awareness of community’s collective form and its 
distance from other modes of life, based on the awareness of a fundamental living 
together that is possible thanks to the equality of all things. Such is the correlate and 
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ground to the enormous effort and process of translation carried on for more than 30 
years in the Zapatista organisation. 
 
As Subcomandante Galeano (2017) explained at the critical reflection seminar 
entitled ‘Los Muros del Capital, Las Grietas de la Izquierda’ or ‘The Walls of Capital, 
The Cracks from the Left’ celebrated in April 2017 in Chiapas, ‘as far as the Zapatista 
indigenous communities are concerned, collective work was not organized by the 
EZLN, nor by Christianity; neither Christ nor Marx had anything to do with the fact 
that, in moments of danger, faced with external threats, and for parties, music, and 
dance, the community in territories of the originary peoples becomes a single 
collective’. More than a contestation effort, the Maya roots of the Zapatistas play an 
important role in harnessing the negotiations and translations among discourses and 
practices across cultural and political boundaries, always embodied as communities. 
Zapatismo appears as a translation and mixture between western revolutionary 
traditions and indigenous Mayan roots (Bartra, 1998): a sort of ‘Marxist/Mayan 
synthesis’ (Wolfson, 2012: 160) and an intersubjective relation between 
Enlightenment, Christianism and Mayan cosmovision (Lenkersdorf, 1996). 
Nevertheless, such translation has had a strong political certainty from which to 
inquire into all that exists and the way in which it exists and that offers a valuable 
advice in order to better understand Western cosmology and epistemology from an 
outside. 
 
In this light, three Zapatista well-known motifs, which question the instrumentality and 
objectification of a subject-object relation and the colonial/modern ideas of superiority 
of the dominant, become clearer: A world in which many worlds fit, as many political 
ontologies are always possible and ought to be respected as equal; Commanding 
while obeying, as a collective heart and the equality of all things translate into 
evenness in decision-making; and All for all, nothing for us, as there is no real object 
of appropriation and every thing corresponds to every other thing and in the end and 
in principle we are all equally sacred, we all come from Our Mother, enjoy each other 
and are potentially one heart, one soul and one community. In addition, the 
Zapatistas and their notion of ‘walking while asking questions’, inspired in an ‘Other’ 
cosmology presents an important diversion to what Ramón Grosfoguel (2012: 99-
100) calls the “walking while preaching” of the Judeo-Christian, Western cosmology 
reproduced in equal measure by Marxists, conservatives, and liberals’. Instead of 
claiming to have a specific programme of action and established norms of conduct, 
Zapatismo ‘moves forward “asking questions and listening” and thus their ‘programme 
of struggle is a concrete universal constructed as a result’ of a dialogue in recognition 
of pluriversality (Ibid). This means that the Zapatistas ‘do not set out from an abstract 
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universal (socialism, communism, democracy, the nation, as floating or empty 
signifier) in order to then preach and convince all Mexicans of the correctness of this 
view’ (Ibid).  
 
Walking and living together, the Zapatistas have been fighting for territory and liberty 
in order to achieve community. Self-government and self-awareness are condition 
and tendency of their own existence as a community, while territory is experience and 
sign of the multiple interactions that arise from equality and the aim of living in 
recognition and respect. Thus it seems like a collective interpersonal certainty arises 
in their awareness of their commonality and persists in their bond to territory and the 
meaningful order that takes place and reiterates, although with varying intensities, this 
same certainty. The call for modernity and economic development has remained in 
the margins of the Zapatista communities despite being imposed in several ways and 
embraced to varying degrees. This, to a large extent, due to historical, social and 
economic circumstances beyond the control of these communities; but also, thanks to 
the cohesion and certainty that tradition and grounded existence and experience as a 
community have to offer. Accordingly, as already mentioned, 
instrumentality/coloniality involves tension with the Zapatista and Maya experience 
and political ontology. First, in terms of conceiving a technological object that is 
instrument without a heart, personality or dignity, which exists only in order to fulfil 
another being’s end. And second, in terms of a systematic practice of delegating self-
government to those who do not hearten with them or relying on external supports in 
order to constitute community, letting some other political group to decide over their 
coming to terms with (or managing) the multiplicity of interpersonal interactions, as 
the design of the Internet and its most recent use by government and activists in 
Mexico suppose, has still remained in the outskirts of the Zapatista communities.  
 
Although increasingly pushing towards its penetration into Zapatista communities, 
delegation of self-government has been generally subdued by an experience of the 
political in which instrumentality and technology do not have a stable presence and, in 
contrast, can be profoundly put into question. Politics in relation to technology, 
inspired in the Zapatista experience and political ontology, can be understood as the 
pre-eminence of the political as a collective experience, not as a given or a 
constituted sphere of action or affairs, and the conditioning, redefinition or suspension 
of a technological character of beings, which corresponds to a specific different 
geography, political ontology and experience of the political. In contrast to 
technopolitical approaches, an ‘other’ idea of politics and technology does not 
assume two separate spheres of interaction: politics and technology. A critique of the 
instrumentality and colonial forms of the Internet rather calls into question technology, 
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in its being technological, according to the concrete experience of the political and its 
political ontology. In the following section, the way in which the Zapatistas have more 
recently used and thought of the Internet is analysed in order to show how from their 
own experience of the political have redefined each of the rationalities described 
regarding digitisation in Mexico (Connectivity, Open Data and a Single Digital Identity) 
and those embedded in the Internet´s design in the US (Global Connectivity, Free 
Internet and Personalisation of identity). 
 
7.4 Redefining forms of coordination: A collective use of the Internet  
 
Whereas the strategic imperative of autonomy and territory has demonstrated that the 
Zapatistas are not an example of ‘coordination without politics’ as they did not 
mediate their collective existence as a community with the Internet, the recognition of 
territory as interpersonal mediation (or its interpersonal immediacy and familiarity) 
and means and end of struggle has also contributed to a politico-ontological and 
decolonial approach to the instrumentality/coloniality of beings through the 
understanding of intersubjectivity and the consideration of the equality of all things. 
This section will detail how in addition to the contributions to a decolonial critique of 
the Internet, the Zapatista practice and more recent use of the Internet entails a 
redefinition of the rationalities described regarding digitisation in Mexico (Connectivity, 
Open Data and a Single Digital Identity) and those embedded in the Internet´s design 
in the US (Global Connectivity, Free Internet and Personalisation of identity). 
 
As mentioned before, the rebellion has been paradigmatic for their use of information 
technologies, mainly the Internet, in gathering support, coordinating actions and 
diffusing information against capitalism and the neoliberal agenda. Strategic skills and 
savvy use of the media have proved fundamental for the Zapatista organisation in 
their most visible facet that started in 1994. More recently, as many Zapatista 
members have asserted, a crucial motivation for using the Internet within the 
communities has been to be informed within and between municipios autónomos 
[autonomous municipalities] about what happens beyond Zapatista territory and 
mainly about the grievances committed against other peoples across the world in the 
name of capital, in addition to establishing solidarity with those peoples (personal 
communications).  
 
In 2014, once the organisation noticed that commercial media copyrighted information 
on the organisation and offered these media’s interpretation of the events but not the 
Zapatista voice, they decided to organise their own media: Los Tercios Compas. 
Instead of media, which in Spanish is medios and in terms of portions means “halves” 
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(as in one half or half an hour, each of two equal parts), they used tercios, which 
would mean “thirds” (as in one third of an apple or each of three equal parts) in 
addition to compas, short for compañeros or partners (Galeano, 2015). Los Tercios 
Compas stand for the use the organisation does of their own information and diffusion 
appliances, describing them as those thirds that are partners (Ibid). Tercios Compas 
is an alternative to mass media and an option for information to become legible and 
partner, not a worker under the sign of commodification. The communities required 
journalism that performed investigation and analysis, so scarce in mass and 
commercial media, as well as avoiding third parties mediation of their voice to the 
world, so the Tercios Compas were the option. They wanted to speak for and by 
themselves to other communities and groups within and beyond the Zapatista 
territory. They recorded events and information to diffuse and share with those who 
sympathise with the movement and the general public and to allow Zapatista 
members to take a focused glance at the many events that take place between them 
and other sectors of national and international society. With Tercios Compas the 
Zapatista organisation took over the administration and publication of the website 
Enlace Zapatista, 58  where they publish communiqués, events and calls for 
participation in events. More recently they have produced and presented films at their 
own film festival Puy ta cuxlejaltic in Chiapas (see Comisión Sexta, October 2018). 
 
The collective use of the Internet has maintained thus a shared political meaning and 
orientation within the framework of the organisation. In a similar way, the 
understanding of and reflection on the Internet corresponds in many ways to such 
political orientation. Paradigmatically, Subcomandante Galeano (2014) (former 
Subcomandante Marcos) when talking to alternative and free media has described 
the Internet as a battlefield. A notion that has been alluded as well in more recent 
events like CompArte Cybernetic Edition in 2017. Moreover, informatics are the 
means of globalisation to expand, to conquer the world as a vast territory and 
administrate it; all languages are to be translated to that of informatics [think of Open 
Data] (Marcos, 1999). In addition, contrary to understandings of the Internet as a new 
public sphere or taking for granted its characterisation as essentially open and free or 
potentially democratic, Galeano and the Zapatista call have emphasised its conflicting 
traits and the necessity to spread art, resistance and rebellion through this space. The 
Internet and social media platforms are part of an overall critique of capitalism and 
developmentalism with a particular consideration of technology. As Subcomandante 
Insurgente Moisés and Subcomandate Galeano (2018a) have emphasised in a 





The possibility to purchase labor power is provided for by private ownership of the 
means of production, circulation, and consumption. Private ownership of the 
means of production forms the nucleus of the system. Built upon this class 
division (the owner of private property and the dispossessed), and hiding it as 
such, are a whole range of juridical and media simulations, as well as other 
dominant evidentiary forms: citizenship and juridical equality; the penal and police 
system; electoral democracy and entertainment (increasingly difficult to 
differentiate); neo-religions and the supposed neutrality of technology; social 
sciences and the arts; free access to the market and to consumption; and a 
whole spectrum of nonsense (with some versions more developed than others) of 
things like “change begins within oneself”, “you are the architect of your own 
destiny”, “when life gives you lemons, make lemonade”, “don’t give fish to the 
hungry, teach them to fish” (“and sell them fishing poles”), and, highly fashionable 
today, efforts to “humanize” capitalism by making it good, rational, and objective, 
that is, “capitalism light.” 
 
The neutrality of technology as a form of simulation is understood in relation to private 
ownership as possibility of capitalism. This form of simulation can be seen as part of 
the effort of ‘those who simulate to hearten’ (López, 2015: 268) to make other political 
communities embrace a capitalist way of life in a concealed manner, taking 
advantage of simulation to convince and expand but directly threatening territory and 
with it, community life. Thus, Moisés and Galeano (2018a) explain that 
 
[w]hen a mining company invades the territory of originary peoples—often with 
the alibi of offering “work opportunities” to the “autochthonous population” (yes, 
that’s what they call us), they aren’t just offering people wages to buy a new high-
end cell phone: they are also discarding a part of this population and annihilating 
(in all senses of the word) the territory in which that population functions. The 
“development” and “progress” offered by the system in reality disguises what is 
truly its own development and progress and, more importantly, hides the fact that 
that progress and development are obtained via the death and destruction of 
populations and territories (emphasis in the original). 
 
The neutrality of technology, as a promise with no cost, helps conceal the core 
practice of capitalism regarding originary territories: depletion and dispossession. 
Capitalism expands through concealment embedded in the implicit, although for the 
Zapatistas explicit, agreement to be governed. In this same line, discussions through 
social media platforms have been described as ‘autoerotic exercise’ (Moisés and 
Galeano, 2018b), thus calling into question the idea of a new public sphere from its 
capitalist foundations. Besides waging war through the Internet through spreading 
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their word (or word-seed, in Spanish palabra-semilla), it is clear that in terms of 
information, communication and most importantly organisation, is a priority to surpass 
concealment and the mediation of third parties and establish interpersonal 
communication and autonomy. In this regard, even the use of social media platforms 
like Facebook and YouTube has been notably limited to diffusion of information under 
a collective account.   
 
As above, Galeano (2014) has emphasised that ‘the best information is that which 
comes from the actor and not from that who is covering the news’ (author’s 
translation). The idea is to have those who are living in the place you want information 
about ‘to tell us what is going on, not through someone else’ (Ibid). In addition, it is 
clear that the Internet offers huge amounts of information and ‘you can find whatever 
you want, if you are in favour of something you will find arguments in favour, if you 
are against something in there you will find arguments against’ (Ibid). What is needed, 
furthers Subcomandante Galeano (Ibid) is ‘for that information to have a space to 
accommodate within, to be legible’. This is where free, autonomous and alternative 
media have an opportunity to investigate and inform and maybe even communicate 
as direct interlocutors. This is why Galeano (Ibid) asserts that ‘those who have 
disrupted the world of information are collectives where the individual is completely 
diluted’. And he finishes off by saying that ‘what they have seen is that the anonymity 
of the collective is what is starting to replace and put in crisis [that] media eagerness 
of those above for finding individualities and personalities’ (Ibid). 
 
Regarding digitisation in Mexico and its rationalities of Connectivity, Open Data and a 
Single Digital Identity, the Zapatista use of the Internet has limited this technology’s 
instrumentality as it has maintained territory as the interpersonal matrix of community 
life. First, regarding connectivity as infrastructure expansion connected to 
international networks (see Chapter 3), the Zapatista connection to the Internet is 
conditioned by its geography and weather, being more difficult and expensive to 
reach the rural areas in which they have established. In addition, autonomous 
municipalities intend to establish autonomous infrastructure or at least try not to 
compromise autonomy as a community through third party commitments. Second, 
regarding Open Data, while the Zapatistas have supported art, resistance and 
rebellion, and of course the copyleft idea as opposed to the copyright (Galeano, 
2015), tending towards the de-commodification of information, information on 
everyday life of the communities (as anyone who walks in a Zapatista community can 
notice) has not been digitised in order to be traded and shared so that technologically 
and technically equipped corporations and organisations can exploit such data. In 
developing their own services they have dismissed digitisation as intended by the 
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Mexican government and as expanded through health, education, revenues and 
taxes and banking services. Not being a wired organisation and limiting their use of 
the Internet mainly to their communication with the outside, in addition to 
socioeconomic individual and family limitations in mobile phones with Internet 
connection and the geographic limitations to infrastructure, drastically reduces the 
amount of data available and most importantly, their decision-making process would 
assess collectively instead of imposing at great scale according to foreign 
parameters. Third, and traversing the first two, in terms of not being profitable for the 
government or private corporations to invest in infrastructure and services without 
local population having the right consumption habits (see Chapter 3) and not 
producing enough data, is the rationality of a single digital identity.  
 
As emphasised by Galeano (2014) the idea of the Zapatistas is to establish direct 
communication, upholding anonymity and collectivity instead of personalisation and 
individuality. Without dismissing individuality, intersubjectivity tends to locate and 
ground such individuality on community life and so-to-speak face-to-face interaction. 
Despite individuals exploring and using platforms that are based on the production of 
profiles, there is something ‘not quite well about it’ (personal communications, March 
2018) that limits its scope of use. This limitation as well comes from engagement in 
everyday collective activities. Not everyone has money to pay individual services. 
Members of the communities use mobile phones mainly for contact with the outside. 
Neither community organisation nor internal communications rely on the Internet. 
Territory emphasises direct affection between subjects, pushing towards making the 
members of the community aware of this affection as intersubjective through 
variegated forms like cosmology, philosophy, tradition and agriculture. Even though 
individuals might not be rationally and logically aware (according to Western 
expectations) of the orientation established by the community and the territory, their 
mode of living, even in its tensions with so-called modern forms, gives them an 
experiential awareness and not only rational or logical understanding. The 
organisation looks towards awareness and constant reiteration of the importance of 
recognising and respecting equality (which does not necessarily mean a de facto 
condition) rather than individualising fashions. 
 
Concerning the form of coordination embedded in the Internet´s design in the US and 
the rationalities of Global Connectivity, Free Internet and Personalisation of identity, 
the above points apply in a similar way. What must be emphasised is that the 
individualisation of identity, its profiling and data mining of behaviour, desires and 
attitudes turns contradictory in terms with all that means the non-mediation of an 
intersubjective and territorially grounded community. If the principle of non-
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commodification of information, communication and organisation, along with the 
fundamental knowledge of the equality of all things and thus of the inappropriable-as-
an-object character of all that lives, withstands, appropriating individual identities that 
seek to distinguish from the commonality of the collectivity is out of terrain. Where 
members of a community live together and walk together, there is less space for 
foreign mediation of community practices. This does not mean taking for granted that 
Internet expansion and the use of profiling platforms is merely impossible within the 
Zapatista municipios. Instead, it means that the political experience of the 
Zapatistas,takes its grounding on concrete communities, on concrete territory and on 
a concrete mode of life. To expand the individualisation of identity would most 
probably mean to displace autonomous self-government and the principles and 




As analysed in this chapter, in the Zapatista experience, the formation of their political 
community has not been shaped by the Internet. Disposition and openness towards 
listening, patience and action were not the product of mediation by technological 
devices or an effect of information. Moreover, the strategic use of the Internet and 
email servers was possible by its being grounded on an intersubjective awareness 
and community experience with territory. This is in contrast to the many 
consequences the transformation of the Internet and Web 1.0 into Web 2.0 has had 
for the way in which more recent cases of activism (e.g. #YoSoy132) are collectively 
constituted through social media platforms and profiling practices. Communities of 
digital activists are nowadays formed through and within digital platforms, usually 
moving ‘beyond’ these and to the streets (Rovira, 2014) but nevertheless being 
conformed and organized in a disperse space connected through “nodes” whose 
physical support is generally unacknowledged. Such mobilisations aim at mobilising 
from individually inhabiting privately owned digital platforms into the public space. 
Instead, the Zapatistas have mobilised from inhabiting collective public spaces into 
digital platforms and the Internet as a battlefield, where, recalling Naomi Klein (2001), 
their best weapon is not the Internet but their own word. 
 
Communities’ bond to the earth and territory, together with their disposition towards 
autonomous self-government and self-awareness, as a living together reiterated in 
Maya cosmology and philosophy, have limited the extent to which the Internet has 
reproduced its instrumentality in economic terms and as coordinating elements on 
behalf of others. Instead of endorsing government at a distance as the Internet does 
at the level of conditioning nations’ agendas and orientation and shaping 
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individualised subjects and its collective arrangements (instrumentality), territory 
stands for the concrete interpersonal (not exclusively human) experience and 
decision of a community with a shared awareness and orientation. Territory means 
then the self-embodied interaction with the multiplicity of beings (human and 
non´human) that inhabit and happen to live together, which is not delegated to a 
foreign agent but is experienced and decided by the community itself. Different from 
the Mexican State´s digitisation policy and from #YoSoy132 instrumental and 
instrumentalised use of the Internet and its reiteration of foreign parameters and 
interests, the Zapatistas have a multiplicity of elements that limit the instrumental 
character of the Internet, mainly arising from the political as living together – with and 
as territory, land and Mother Earth – and acknowledging their own collective 
experience and metaphysics (not exclusively in logical terms but through symbolic 
and meaning production practices).  
 
A critique of the Internet and of the ‘relation’ between ‘technology’ and ‘politics’ must 
consider the political always in relation to territory as the symbol and index to all the 
human and no-´human beings that inhabit together and interact – affect each other – 
as a political community, and as the awareness of the interactions entailed by that 
community and territory – contrary to the mediation of interactions by third unknown 
actors. Therefore, the chapter is crucial for the overall argument of the thesis as it has 
moved towards the inclusion of a decolonial element in understanding technology and 
the political. On the basis of the Zapatista experience and tojolabal and tsotsil 
philosophy, such understanding includes not only human beings but also the 
multiplicity of beings that constitute a political community as intertwined with and as 
territory. By recognising that all beings have a heart and are part of a collective one 
as partners, instrumentality is not the defining characteristic of some beings. 
Ultimately, the chapter argued, the internet as experienced by the Zapatsitas appears 
as something other than a technology – an instrument that is only valued as it serves 
another being – and becomes a being that is to be listened, considered and located in 
relation to community life, philosophy and collective awareness. Only through the 
inclusion and consideration of tojolabal and tsotsil philosophy and the experience of 
the Zapatistas, together with philosophy of technology, critical approaches to the 
Internet and an inquiry into the concept of the political, has this thesis accounted for 
the political implications of using the Internet in Mexico without defining such 











Academia, government and activism in Mexico have assumed technology and politics 
as two constituted although generally unquestioned spheres, thus being unable to 
describe the multicultural reality of Mexico in relation to so-called technology. While 
such understanding assumes an inevitable technological reality and digital futures to 
be democratised, neither the category of technology nor the one of politics have a 
clear referent, meaning and presence among culturally diverse groups in Mexico. In 
assuming a technological reality together with a democratic drive, the Internet in 
Mexico has performed as an instrument of coordination without politics, where politics 
has been replaced by public administration through colonial forms of 
developmentalism and democratisation. These forms and practices have concealed 
their own subject of enunciation and the situatedness and non-universal character of 
these foreign parameters of doing and thinking. 
 
In a coloniality context, a critique of the Internet as an ‘instrument of coordination 
without politics’ has been initially developed in this thesis as a questioning of the 
cultural and metaphysical matrix of the construction of technological objects. 
Therefore, together with a decolonial understanding of the link between modernity, 
capitalism and coloniality as inextricable, instrumentality as the technological 
character of technology has been included in the equation as a fundamental way in 
which beings are constructed and objectified. More specifically, through the intended 
universality of technology and politics, and the alleged desirability of liberal 
democracy, the expansion of the Internet has instrumentally – that is, relying on its 
constitutive metaphysical assumption of the need to govern over unaware 
instruments – concealed the specificities of its design and its forms of coordinating its 
components (both so to speak human and non-human) within a specific disposition of 
things and a specific task, meaning and orientation of managing what is produced as 
a complex technical and social environment on behalf of its users. Such a form of 
management conceals and fragments shared collective meaning, knowledge and 
orientation, accommodating its fragments as instruments within a hidden overarching 
economy. 
 
In other words, the Internet has been designed to manage its components in a 
distributed manner although maintaining points of authority and control which are 
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concealed through the fragmentation of knowledge of the overall economy of the 
system. A process of concealment and fragmentation that is crucial to its right 
operation. This way, the Internet has developed into a pervasive mediation, first 
fragmenting information into data packets and adapting heterogeneous systems to 
transmit such information in a most efficient manner according to security 
imperatives, and later establishing the frameworks of subjectification under which 
access and the exploitation of data are granted. In exchange, the Internet and the 
prolific production of platforms and applications have managed a multiplicity of 
interactions on behalf of its users, expanding, through simplification and adaption, to 
different contexts, cultures and ideas but preserving its specific control foundations in 
capitalist values and colonial practices; the same foundations and form of 
management that condition the possibility of alternative collective practices of self-
government.  
 
In designing and exporting the Internet, coloniality – the control of economy, authority, 
knowledge and subjectivity exerted under foreign parameters and by foreign actors – 
has been embedded and expressed in this technology’s form of coordinating its 
components as product of an imperative of expansion, efficient administration, 
entrepreneurial, scientific and military opportunity and national superiority. The 
Internet has been designed according to this imperative in terms of accommodating 
diversity and adapting this diversity to pre-established parameters of discrimination 
(first of information and then of people and cultures). In this light, global 
interoperability and connectivity, one of the forms of coordination of the Internet, in 
the instances of the US and Mexican governments, orient expansiveness toward the 
achievement of a capitalist market expansion and benefit privileged actors. 
Something similar happens with the other three forms of coordinating resources of the 
Internet. 
 
The free flow of information reiterates the need of data to circulate while concealing 
the cultural values and economy that underpin this necessity and its hidden forms of 
controlling circulations. As just a formal right, the free flow of information hides the 
fact that information on the Internet is always under scrutiny and control 
(infrastructure and protocols design, third parties’ terms and conditions, cultural 
parameters and law enforcement). But also, that this form of coordinating information 
as it was free while disseminating culturally specific values like freedom of 
expression, individualism, post-nationalism, digital humanities and electoral 
democracy undermines self-determined ways of using the Internet and controlling the 
flow of information according to local and situated forms of social organisation and 
political experience.   
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Personalisation of identity and the mediation of subjectification have been core 
elements in the expansion of the Internet and the economic benefits it provides to 
well-established actors in technological development and data exploitation. Grafted 
into the commercial drive of the Internet and the globalising expansion of the Web 
2.0, the exploitation of user-generated data not only objectifies behaviors and exploits 
users’ unawareness of their own labour, but also functionalises users as instruments 
that produce data, objectifying them as a manageable resource under hidden 
parameters. Individualised and shaped according to market parameters of data 
mining and big data analysis techniques decided by third parties in order to produce 
profit, users are made identifiable, manageable and predictable, offering certainty to 
financial markets (and the circulation and control of resources) and simplicity in 
everyday life interactions to users, managing interactions on behalf of others who 
cannot understand the economy of such interactions, thus undermining the capacity 
of recreating and revisiting collective existence through shared referents. 
 
The administration of information and data embedded in the Internet is also a 
production and management of individuals that conceals its own intricate processes. 
By hiding and simplifying processes for users, producing an appearance and 
appreciation of reality as a seamless and culturally neutral experience, users delegate 
a series of decisions, awareness and knowledge to an impersonal structure whose 
mediation is intended to be imperceptible on a regular basis. Correspondingly, the 
globally expansive interconnected circulation of data and the alleged free flow of 
information, whose ethnocentric parameters of discrimination are intended and 
constructed to appear as universal and neutral (thus neglecting communities self-
determination regarding information and knowledge), have as their main resource 
data, which are increasingly coordinated and packed according to digital identities 
and in terms only accessible to those privileged and literate members of an exclusive 
group, being bought and sold under unclear parameters. The Internet is thus 
embedded with coloniality also as ‘thingification’ – turning ‘man into an instrument of 
production’ (Césaire, 2000: 42) – in its need to expand through fragmentation, 
accommodation (commodification and alienation) and concealment. 
 
The Internet fragments, individualises and then accommodates such fragments and 
diversity by hiding its own parameters of decision and overall economy aiming to 
achieve a “seamless” mediated reality. This way, users delegate the management of 
technical and social interactions to third parties that have designed and keep 
designing the Internet, which operate servers, applications, platforms and 
infrastructure, and that also define policies and the horizons of digital futures without 
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users being able to grasp the broad interactions required, embedded in and produced 
in a hardly perceptible manner by and through such technologies, let alone the 
metaphysical assumptions that underpin their operation and the effects they 
generate. 
 
The analysed understandings and practices of digitisation and #YoSoy132‘s activism 
in Mexico have epistemically and empirically expanded coloniality in the form of 
coordination without politics. As an instrument of coordination, the Internet and its 
mediation of interpersonal engagement, indefinitely postpone truth and trust as 
collectively shared and territorially based knowledge, order and orientation; that is, 
the Internet postpones a shared experience and awareness of existential affinity and 
the definition of a relationship among partners as it increasingly mediates the 
interactions of those who would happen to live together. As the Internet expands, it 
determines and accommodates the diverse nature of its components as instruments, 
the latter which do what they have been designed and expected to do although 
indifferent [or ignorant] of the broader economy and the principal cause that they 
ultimately respond to. As a flexible mediation of truth, trust and meaning construction 
as habit, the Internet has entailed and diffused coordination without politics in Mexico 
in the cases of #YoSoy132 and Peña’s digitisation. The case of the Zapatistas is 
however different as the Internet has been so far, present and located, used or 
neglected, with respect to the community´s own shared existential experience, stalel 
kuxlejal – mode of life – and sna’el k’inal – meeting/getting to know the world –, 
walking towards knowing to live in the ich’el ta muk’ – recognition-respect – and 
constituting an inclusive collective heart – ko ‘tantik and cosmic-kolektive Xch ‘ulel wo 
‘tan – where, the thesis proposes, the political includes decoloniality as the (human 
and non-human) beings that constitute a community in and as territory. 
 
The thesis has argued that the internet in Mexico has reproduced coloniality rather 
than politics and that the Zapatista use of the internet as a decolonial element, 
together with philosophy of technology and STS, can offer respite to the problematics 
of alienation, discrimination, and fragmentation in digitalising contemporary Mexico. 
Therefore, the dissertation has sought to act as a mediator, moving towards the 
epistemological inclusion of a decolonial element that also considers the metaphysics 
and historicity – orientation, values and interests –of technological design within the 
broader discussion on politics and technology. Ultimately, the Zapatista way of life 
offers not only an alternative use of the internet but also an alternative experience 
and understanding of the political, which is identified here as decolonial politics as it 
debases instrumentality, thingification and domestication. Only through the inclusion 
and consideration of tojolabal and tsotsil philosophy and the experience of the 
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Zapatistas, together with philosophy of technology, critical approaches to the Internet 
and an inquiry into the concept of the political, has this thesis accounted for the 
political implications of using the Internet in Mexico without defining such implications 
within assumed concepts and expectations of technology and politics. 
 
The use of the Internet in Mexico, as intended to achieve development and 
democracy, has diffused forms of coloniality to the extent it has reiterated 
instrumentality through coordination without politics. That is, in assuming the 
inevitability, need and desirability of technological mediation of interpersonal social 
interaction in everyday life and between government and governed and assuming the 
presence of a liberal democratic subject capable of participating in technological 
design, the use of the Internet consolidates third parties’ control at a distance through 
this technology’s hidden layers and fragmentation of shared knowledge and 
consenting. Coloniality in this instance consists in the reiteration of an economy that 
manages a vast array of interactions and decides on behalf of other unaware 
subjects, instrumentalising and exerting control in a concealed manner. 
 
In the instance of digitisation by Peña’s administration, coordination without politics 
followed the discriminating ideal of being part of a group of selected countries under 
the distinction between developed and less developed countries according to 
parameters of economic growth and technological modernisation determined in 
countries other than Mexico. Within that endeavour, three transversal practices 
converged on stabilising and giving certainty to the opening and expansion of 
financial and telecommunications markets: Connectivity, Open Data and Single 
Digital Identity. These practices, defined under foreign parameters of development 
and modernisation, underpinned digitisation as market-oriented in a liberalising 
fashion, mainly in terms of private property, infrastructure and resource management.  
Significantly, the Open Data agenda of the Mexican Government not only has 
guaranteed and concealed the privilege of foreign access to huge amounts of data 
but also the entrepreneurial use of these data according to the construction of a civil 
society and government that assume technological mediation as constitutive of 
politics and promote technology as the agent that engenders the trust governments 
are no longer capable of producing.  
 
Through digitisation the Mexican state tends to lose its own place as third party and 
mediation – its administrative position – by delegating decision and the construction 
of trust to a foreign sense of orientation, a capitalist impulse that combines the 
expansion of the Internet’s rationality and its forms of coordination with the mediation 
of subject formation and the continuous exploitation of the earth. The latter, as it is 
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commodified and offered to extractivism, in combination with the promotion of the 
Internet’s rationality by the Mexican government, entails the expansion of a 
disposition over the members of a national society as active resources and 
instruments.  
 
On the other hand, #YoSoy132 used the Internet as an ‘instrument of coordination 
without politics’ – an instrument that made possible collective coordination and 
experience only when mediated by an external third party – when used to bring 
together a diversity of groups and coordinate actions as a ‘connected multitude’. 
#YoSoy132 reproduced the forms of coordination embedded in the Internet and 
endorsed instrumentallity, becoming instrumental within a broader strategic 
arrangement in which foreign actors define and decide at a distance the way in which 
the Internet and its subjects are shaped. This organisation reproduced epistemic 
forms of coloniality by reiterating US values of free Internet and freedom of 
information over self-determination and national and local prerogative in the 
circulation of resources. But also, this collective was coadjutant in the process of 
integrating the Internet as fundamental for the country and democracy as a 
constitutional right and necessary mediation of subjectification (having a voice and 
participating). #YoSoy132 ignored and further concealed the forms of control 
embedded in this technological mediation, which have responded in the last instance 
to foreign actors and interests.  
 
Everyday use of the Internet among #YoSoy132 members and through popular 
applications and services demonstrated to have sedimented into habit, fragmenting 
collective knowledge and conditioning their scope of action but remaining useful for 
coordinating its members and actions. Aware of censorship and control by US and 
Mexican governments and corporations, activists still used US commercial services 
and popular websites under the imperative of wide, efficient and cheap 
communications. The Internet as an ‘instrument of coordination without politics’ 
offered simplicity and accommodated heterogeneity while hiding the overarching end 
and economy of the system, fragmenting knowledge and awareness (Chapter 3 and 
4) of the mediation that made possible their collective actions, allegedly, as a 
‘connected multitude’. The Internet persisted as a taken for granted ‘instrument of and 
for coordination’ whose users/activists did not happen to live together – did not share 
a stalel kuxlejal  – mode of life – or were aware of their sna’el ki’nal – meeting/getting 
to knoe the world – and their existential relationship as partners – (see also Chapter 
7) but they only happened to protest together through the most effective means. 
#YoSoy132 did not engage with knowing their living together and deciding together 
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on the basis of politics and territory while the Internet did not bring about any certainty 
or knowledge of a shared existence 
. 
Overall, Peña’s digitisation policy and #YoSoy132’s epistemic and meaning 
production was correlate to a form of coordination without politics. In the absence of 
shared referents, universalism has remained hidden among fragments, a universalist 
logic and practice have been imposed and the system components have been 
impeded from uniting into a shared effort and political experience. Thus, in using the 
Internet to transform Mexico as a nation, forms of coloniality, rather than politics, have 
been widely diffused by Peña’s administration and #YoSoy132. 
 
As embedded in the Internet and reiterated by public administration efforts in Mexico, 
capitalism, modernity and coloniality have transformed into a more flexible form,, 
which discriminates in a subtle manner, promising inclusion only within a capitalist 
way of life, where commodification and objectification are the rule for accommodating 
diversity into a global design. This way, both instrumentality and coloniality have 
transformed, in a US context of expansive capitalism, into a form that is being 
exported globally. Such a form has unfolded into an embedded form of coordination, 
management and concealment that is hardly noticeable and is increasingly becoming 
rooted in everyday life and its common imperatives of being efficient in terms of 
reach, time and costs. 
 
An instrument of coordination without politics emerges in the intersection between an 
instrument of coordination that increasingly and inadvertently mediates every aspect 
of social life and its use in a situation that reproduces someone else’s embedded 
values and interests ignoring their economy and final end. This situation exposes how 
this instrument of coordination becomes an instrument of coordination without politics 
in other geographies. In using the Internet as an instrument of coordination designed 
by someone else, one is inadvertently reproducing a third parties decision and 
government over oneself, postponing self-determination and politics. Therefore, it is 
ignorance that forestalls politics, but as shown in Chapter 7, it is not exclusively 
ignorance of the particular structure and design of this technology; it is ignorance of 
the multiplicity of beings and interactions that constitute a shared world and reality. 
 
Only when used within a shared stalel kuxlejal, existential experience and sna’el 
ki’nal, including a cosmological and metaphysical understanding, that bring about the 
affinity of those who live together and define a relationship among partners, can the 
Internet as reproducing instrumentality, thingification and domestication be to some 
extent turned inoperative (de-linked) in its main forms of coordination (global 
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interoperability and connectivity, free flow of information, personalisation of identity 
and the mediation of subjectification). Through collective use, global connectivity – 
either in a developmentalist fashion or an economic imperative – has been 
conditioned by the Zapatistas according to local traits grounded in territory. The 
Zapatistas adjusted the free flow of information as information is never culturally and 
politically neutral and collective decision and self-determination is a process that 
emerges from within a community and not as sanctioned by foreign actors and 
agendas (either of economic growth, democratisation or human development). Open 
data agendas and the personalisation of identity or a single digital identity across 
such communities have been largely limited by the obstacles to the previous forms of 
coordinating resources: there is no individual subject with a single digital identity and 
its preconditions have not been settled yet as mobile phones and Internet access are 
not pervasive enough to mediate everyday interactions and obtain more significant 
pecuniary benefits from it, let alone financial services and their data mining practices.  
 
Limitations in Internet access and individualisation of use are not explained by 
geographical or intellectual and entrepreneurial limitations in the case of the 
Zapatistas. Instead, the spatial order and the orientation of the communities respond 
to their sna’el ki’nal and stalel kuxlejal, to specific social and political orders, their 
traditions and modes of production, their cosmologies, their metaphysics and 
ontologies, which as this thesis proposes, speak of a, although contested by 
capitalism, different conception of beings – as equals and not as instruments – and 
therefore, of a different concept of the political as decolonial politics in relation to 
technology. Collective interaction for the Zapatistas is still grounded on territory as 
immediate social and interpersonal interaction; as Zapatistas, collective use and even 
collective accounts on social media platforms (collective efforts to inform and be 
informed through the Internet) have had preeminence over individual use. And most 
significantly, the Zapatistas express an ongoing effort of revisiting the order and 
orientation of this organisation´s collective existence, taking their time and deciding 
over the terms of engagement and politicisation of science and technology as 
ethnocentric categories, caring to live in the ich’el ta muk’ and in interaction 
(openness and encounter) with the fundamental location of the earth and territory as 
sign of community life and ko ‘tantik – inclusive collective heart of all that exists.  
 
The Zapatista organisation effort as a self-governed, self-aware and self-defined 
community and its strategic orientation – the fundamental importance of attaining 
autonomy and land – have meant, in this thesis, the politicisation of the Internet not 
as a technology and not because of a merely strategic instrumental character directed 
towards an end but primarily thanks to their political experience and sna’el ki’nal, 
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seeking to become a cosmic-kolektive Xch ‘ulel wo ‘tan and include beings as 
partners and not as instruments, constituting territory and its experience of co-
existence as concrete foundation of community life. In the instance of the Zapatistas, 
their sna’el k’inal – meeting/getting to know the world –, as walking towards knowing 
to live in the ich’el ta muk’ – recognition-respect –  and as their own shared existential 
experience and stalel kuxlejal – mode of life – that can include the (human and non-
human) beings that constitute a ko ‘tantik – inclusive collective heart of all that exists–
, has been understood to affect the use of the Internet by conditioning its instrumental 
operation and its main rationalities of expansion according to the communities’ 
concrete circumstances and to collectively defined parameters and practices whose 
ethical basis and horizon are founded in the earth and in awareness of the multiplicity 
of unmediated interactions taking place as a community.  
 
As above, the thesis has demonstrated how the Internet has been politicised not as a 
technology but as a battlefield – inhabited or neglected with respect to a community´s 
own embodied mode of being and politics, which necessarily traverse its 
intertwinement with territory. Decolonially and critically thinking of politics and 
technology is not about re-territorialising it according to local endeavors; but about 
considering that something like a technological object restricts the ethical horizon of 
communities to an instrumental ratio and disguises the overarching economy that 
expands by depleting territory and thus by destroying inclusive and territory-based 
community life. In this same line, what this thesis proposes as decolonial politics, in 
relation to technology, comes from the Zapatista use of the internet as a decolonial 
element, which together with philosophy of technology and STS, points towards the 
understanding that whatever being matters and shares its existence with any other 
beings as part of the earth and members of a territory and a political community. This 
means that something like a technological object, the concept itself of technology as 
instrumental – being and doing for someone else’s purposes – is already biased 
according to a specific cosmology and metaphysics. In the last instance, to politicise 
technology in this light means to politicise beings beyond their being and doing as 
shaped by and for someone else, beyond their being instrumental; that is, to 
experience politics by dissolving technology. Again, it is not only about a strategic 
attempt. It is not only about a redefinition of the forms of coordination embedded in 
the Internet. It is about decolonial politics as opening up the possibility for a 
“technological” object of being in itself and not for someone else: being non-
technological and just an ‘other’ whatever being, which is not disposable and 
functional but always potentiallly a member of a political community, who speaks for 
that community and does not – by design – hide or ignore its doings and the economy 
in which it is used. 
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Lastly, politics is not an embedded or intertwined element of technology when used in 
distant locations different from that of its designers. Not acknowledging this could 
endorse the comfortable implementation of technological fixes within the logic of 
reforming the existing technology. In other words, not emphasising the coloniality of 
the internet could unfold into the ongoing use and promotion of the internet and digital 
solutions for the digitally illiterate (and the non-digitally literate) and non-Western 
subject, reproducing its colonial bias. Accordingly and in turn, technology is not 
necessary for decolonial politics. Technology might be necessary for public 
administration in a globalising effort to accelerate the rhythm of resource extraction 
and circulation but technology does not entail the political. Therefore, if we take 
seriously the argument that the internet increasingly expands as an instrument of 
coordination without politics, decolonial efforts would need to engage in self-limiting 
the use of the internet. Firstly, by not assuming and promoting an everyday technical 
experience, let alone one in which the internet or digital technologies mediate 
collective interaction. This means that that being which is considered a technological 
artefact or system should not be used in a coloniality context to perpetuate and 
consolidate an everyday technical experience (and its status as an instrument or 
technology) but instead to turn inoperative its own overarching economy (using the 
internet to eventually stop using the internet for instance). And secondly, by drawing 
this “technology” as a non-instrumental and a non-technological being closer to 
collective awareness. Complex technological artefacts and systems need to be 
politically – sensibly, symbolically and philosophically – situated; this means, 
accounting and saving the distance (ignorance) of its multiple embedded elements 
and processes through collective awareness and experience. The latter by 
recognising first, that technology is not a datum that needs to be “politicised” 
complying with someone else’s economy and that the experience of the political can 
always reject the use of a technological object if decided by whatever group; and 
second, by acknowledging that the political can thus destabilise the existence of 
something like a technological object by living in ich’el ta muk’ and recognising its 
equality as a being.  
 
The main problem with reproducing the coloniality embedded in the Internet is the 
forclosure of the political as a shared experience of encounter, con-senting and 
definition of a relationship among partners, and moreover, of the political as that 
experience which, oriented and being a collective heart (kolektivo) in the ich’el ta 
muk’, entails ethics and territory as con-senting and awareness of the world in its 
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Daniel McCarthy’s (2015: 162-163) Discourse Analysis Guide 
  
Step one – Location and context  
. 1.1 What type of document is this? (policy statement, interview, comments to 
reports, congressional testimony, position paper, etc.)   
. 1.2 Who is the author of the document? Does it represent the view of the United 
States government? Is it representative of personal opinion only? (If it has no 
personal author, does this make it seem  more official/formal/authoritative?)   
. 1.3 To whom is the author speaking? Is this document for a particular  audience? 
  
. 1.4 In relation to the other documents studied, does this document seem 
consistent with the others, or has the author specifically tailored their message to 
meet the approval of a given audience? (Consistency of message)   
.  
Step two – Representation of the Internet  
. 2.1 What does the document say in a straightforward macro-reading? That is, 
who is doing what to whom in the article? What is it about?   
. 2.2 Binary oppositions – what are people/actions/events/places defined in 
opposition to?  
. 2.3 What are the verbs/adjectives attached to the Internet? (E.g. revolutionary, 
democratic, progressive, neutral?) What are the predicates and relations to other 
things and people? How, if at all, is the Internet related to other aspects of 
international society?   
. 2.4 Is the Internet accorded a positive, negative, or neutral value overall? What 
are the metaphors employed? What other texts are referred to in the document?   
. 2.5 Is the Internet deterministic, a neutral tool, a biased but ambivalent 
technology? Is any kind of causation implied?   
. 2.6 Is the Internet described as an actor/agent? A state of being?   
. 2.7 Are there any clear unquestioned assumptions about the Internet?   
 
Step three – Representations of markets, innovation and  
property rights  
. 3.1 What are the verbs/adjectives attached to intellectual property rights? 
(Predicates/Relations)   
. 3.2 Are property rights accorded a specific value? Are metaphors employed?   
. 3.3 Relationship between intellectual property rights and the Internet?   
. 3.4 What verbs/adjectives, if any, are attached to actors who violate  intellectual 
property rights?   
	 222	
. 3.5 What role is accorded to markets in the article, if any? What predicates attach 
to markets? What values does this suggest adhere to markets, if any? What is 
the general relation to markets, intellectual property rights, innovation?   
. 3.6 Does the narrative disclose any particular view or understanding of how 
innovation occurs?   
.  
Step four – United States foreign policy culture/practices  
. 4.1 Does the document fit within a particular stain of American foreign policy 
culture? Is it Universalist/Exemplarist/Crusading/Isolationist/ Realist? Does it 
suggest universal values or culturally specifically values?   
. 4.2 Does the document refer to particular political values that resonate within 
American political culture? (E.g. freedom of speech/press)   
.  
Step five – Disjunctures  
. 5.1 Are there any elements of the discourse that do not fit together, or do not fit 
with the wider discourse? What are the inconsistencies or contradictions?   
. 5.2 Does the discourse significantly shift over time, e.g. with the change in 
administration from Bush to Obama? 
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.    
 
Appendix B 
Additions to the Discourse Analysis Guide 
(Step three of McCarthy’s Guide was omitted) 
 
Representations of the global/digital identity 
1. What are the verbs/adjectives attached to the global and/or global 
connectivity/digital identity? 
2. Is the global accorded a specific value? Are metaphors employed? 
3. Relationships between the global and the Internet? 
4. What verbs/adjectives are attached to subjects who are in contact with the 
global/connectivity or reject it? 
5. What role is accorded to the global? 
6. What role is accorded to the free flow of information? What values does this 
suggest adhere to free flow of information, Internet freedom or freedom of 
expression? Adverbs/adjectives used to describe it? What is the general relation 
to the free flow of information? 
 
Representation of democracy/development 
1. What are the verbs/adjectives attached to democracy/development? 
2. Is democracy/development a specific value? Are metaphors employed? 
3. Relationships between democracy/development and the Internet? 
4. What verbs/adjectives are attached to subjects who violate democracy? 
5. What role is accorded to democracy/development? 
6. Does the doument fit within any meta-discourse of resistence, development, 
democratisation? 




1. Elements not fitting together or not fitting within a wider discourse. What are the 
consistencies or contradictions? 
2. Are there any minidiscourses or interpretative repertoire to make it easy for the 
audience to understand? 
3. Does the discourse significantly change over time? With the change in the 
concrete situation or opposition to a speciic policy? 
 
Discourse as productive 
1. How is the text producing a specific knowledge? What is the location of truth and 
what are its effects? How is social difference constructed?  
2. What meanings and things are being produced? 
3. How are bodies, things and places located in the text? Is there a regular order? 
Key themes? 
4. Interpretive repertoire or minidiscourses?  
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5. How does the text deal with complexity and contradiction 
6. Visibilities and invisibilities, what is not seen or said in the text? 
7. What is being detailed in the text and what is not?  
8. Is there any label or caption for images? What images are left with no caption? 
What does this suppose? 
9. Who produced the image? How is the reader constructed in order to understand 
the message?  
10. What are the popular icons in the image? Has it been modified in some way? 
What is its relation to other images? 
11. What verbs/adjectives are attached to the images? 
12. How is the subject constructed as able to read the message? What 
verbs/adjectives are attached to the subject producing the message? 
 
Discourse and dispositif 
1. How does the text play as part of a dispositif? Ordering/disposition of things and 
space? What constitutes the dispositif  (architecture, regulations, scientific 
treatises, philosophical statements, laws, morals, etc.)?  
2. Are there any technologies as matrices of practical reason producing and being 
poduced by the text? How are technological objects and subjects displayed and 
ordered, what is the materiality of this order’s supports, what is its spatial 




Table: Mobilisations on Twitter – Mexico (2009-2016) 
 
Year Hashtag Year Hashtag 
2009 #VotoNulo 
#GuarderíaABC 















      #MTYfollow 
2014 #TodosSomosGoyo 





      #NoMasPoderAlPoder 
#EPNstop 
      #CadenaHumana 
#LeyTelevisa2 













      #EnDefensadeAristegui 
#Korenfeld 
#Justicia5Narvarte 





      #NoMasTelevisa 
#YoSoy132 
      #MarchaYoSoy132 
      #DebateYoSoy132 
#MarchaAntiEPN 
      #CopeteLeaks 
#FotoxCasilla 
     #OpPRI 
#SorianaGate 




      #TodosSomosPresos 








Source: Rodriguez Cano, 2016: 44   
 
 
  
 
	
